“Orgulhosamente Sós:” Recent Immigration to the Portuguese Republic

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“ORGULHOSAMENTE SÓS:” RECENT IMMIGRATION TO THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC

by


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in the Program of
Immigration and Settlement Studies

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ABSTRACT

Immigration to the Portuguese Republic is a rather new phenomenon in a world where migratory patterns have become rather pedestrian. This paper analyzes the history of both Portuguese emigration and immigration to Portugal, and the role that international relations have played in both. It also demonstrates the social and governmental response to an increasing alien presence amongst the host society. It argues that racism is not an endemic issue in Portugal and that the host society, both its people and the government, have laboured to integrate newcomers into Portuguese society within a framework of Portugal’s domestic needs, on the one hand, and her international commitments on the other.

Key Words: racism; governmental response; international relations; society; immigration.
Author’s Dedication

For Monica,

“A man’s best possession is a sympathetic wife.”
Euripides (484 BC – 406 BC), Antigone

For M & C Simões,

“Gratitude is not only the greatest of virtues, but the parent of all others.”
Cicero (106 BC – 43 BC), ‘Pro Plancio’
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Introduction:

The twentieth century has been referred to as the age of migration. Technological advances, the globalization of commerce, and worldwide conflagrations have made the world a smaller place and provided the push factors behind international migratory patterns. Populations are constantly on the go and societies are either receiving newcomers or bidding farewell to their own. Yet, for the Portuguese Republic, the act of receiving immigrants en masse is a novelty. Although Portugal has a long history of emigration, the fact remains that steady immigration is a but a generation old, and thus Portugal is ill-equipped, socially and politically, to deal with this new trend. One need only consider the total number of foreigners who have found their way into the country following the 1974 Carnation Revolution, which ousted Antonio De Oliveira Salazar, Portugal’s corporatist dictator, and established democratic rule. For example, in the mid 1970s, an estimated 600-750,000 retornados, or returnees, were forcibly removed from their homes as the former Portuguese African colonies spiraled into chaos and civil war.\(^1\) In 1975, there were only 32,000 legally registered foreign residents. Six years after independence, there were 51,000 foreigners, (0.5 per cent of the Portuguese population) within Portugal with 48.8 per cent of them being Africans.\(^2\) By 1995, the number of foreigners in Portugal increased over five-fold from their 1960s levels, and stood at 170,000, or fewer than 2 per cent of the national population.\(^3\) By 1999, this number was approximately 191,000, constituting a 600 per cent increase in a generation. It is of note that within this period, the foreign population grew at an annual average of 7.7 per cent, which is well in excess of the national average. The end of the twentieth century witnessed an explosion of foreigners in Portugal. For example, between 1991 and 1999,
the foreign presence in Lisbon doubled. \(^4\) By 2001, the foreign presence further grew to the extent that Lisbon now boasts of a concentration of 55 per cent of all foreigners.\(^5\) Furthermore, on New Year’s Eve 2001, 3.3 per cent of Portugal’s population, or an approximate 335,000 people were foreign born.\(^6\) Three years later this figure exploded once again, to a total of 465,454.\(^7\) It should also be noted that these figures are for foreigners legally present in the Republic. Conservative estimates are that there are currently between 80,000 and 100,000 illegal aliens.\(^8\) In essence, within a generation, not only has the empire come to an end, but former colonial charges have found their way back to the mother country to the extent that foreigners are growing more rapidly than ethnic Portuguese. It is in this context that the proverbial welcome mat has not been rolled out, and consequently why social integration has been so difficult. It should be noted, however, that the Portuguese experience is not entirely unique. It has incredible parallels with the experience that the French Republic underwent. Indeed, both were erstwhile global colonial powers, whose overseas exploits ended in failed empires. Both nations were defeated militarily in their former colonies. Both nations are in the process of redefining their national identities and are experiencing large-scale colonial immigration, whether through former colonists, like the retornados or the pied noir in Portugal and France respectively, or more recently, through former colonial charges.

Yet, how is one to fully understand this delayed immigration to Portugal? Firstly, one needs to appreciate the history of Portuguese emigration, and the establishment of her overseas empire, to fully comprehend the modern migratory waves that have brought the empire home. As this paper will demonstrate, the Portuguese Empire had a truly global reach, from the neighbouring archipelagos of the Azores and Madeira to the
establishment of colonies in Africa, Asia, and South America, which laid the foundation for future migratory waves. The glue that ensured imperial cohesion was Portuguese culture. The spreading of Portuguese culture in the empire was accomplished through forced religious conversions and a less than benign colonial administration.

Likewise, through the first half of the twentieth century the Portuguese also ventured forth towards their more affluent European neighbours. Yet, as will be demonstrated, international relations are the overarching factor, which explicate both Portuguese emigration and immigration to Portugal. Indeed, from the expedited immigration policy that Portugal adopted for her colonies throughout the latter half of the twentieth century to the reasons for emigration to neighbouring European nations, contemporary geo-politics were paramount. It is also of note that international relations played a role in how Portugal would receive foreigners. The European Union (EU) played a critical role in determining how Portugal would receive future foreigners. The EU’s influence ranged from demanding formal commitments in numerous policy areas to offering Portugal much needed fiscal relief. The end result, as will become evident, has been an increase in immigration to Portugal in both total numbers of immigrants and also origin countries.

Yet, despite the influence of international geo-politics, how has the ordinary population reacted to this increased flux of foreigners? At first glance, the evidence which will be examined, would suggest that the lack of social integration, the prevalence of discrimination, the economic marginalization of foreigners, and negative media representations of immigrants, are representative of racism amongst the Portuguese and demonstrative of their unwillingness to incorporate foreigners. However, blanket
accusations of racism are merely half the story and do not do justice to the Portuguese. Indeed, as will become apparent, some racist feelings can co-exist with a commitment to the democratic ideals that the Portuguese Republic has sworn to protect.

Furthermore, given that governments regulate the act of immigration, how has the Portuguese government reacted to increasing migratory waves? Governance in Portugal has fluctuated between the Partido Socialista or the Socialist Party (PS) and the Partido Social Democrata or the Social Democratic Party (PSD). These parties have diametrically opposed ideological visions for Portugal. Yet, as will be demonstrated below, with regards to immigration both parties have reacted in comparable fashion, with some qualified exceptions. The Partido Nacional Renovador or the National Party of Renewal (PNR) is Portugal’s extreme right-wing party. They have campaigned against immigration and advocate for an ethnically homogenous Portugal. Their positions vis-à-vis immigration will be analyzed to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the topic. With mainstream and extremist political positions on immigration analyzed one will be afforded a more complete picture of immigration policy in Portugal. Yet, to understand contemporary Portuguese policy vis-à-vis immigration, one must firstly appreciate the historical context that has allowed laid the foundation for modern immigration to Portugal. It is to that history that this paper will now focus on.

**An Empire Born Through Immigration.**

The act of immigration has played a key role in Portugal’s history and the formation of her national character. Indeed, Portugal’s empire was established through the Portuguese need to travel. Although the impetus for empire building falls outside the purview of this essay, understanding the empire and how it influenced future immigration
is vital. The history of Portuguese emigration covers nearly six hundred years, dating back to the inauguration of overseas exploration. As early as 1415, by defeating the local Moors, the Portuguese established their first overseas possession on the island of Ceuta, in the Straits of Gibraltar. Four years later, under the patronage of Prince Henry the Navigator, Naval Captains João Gonçalves, Tristão Vaz Teixeira, and Bartolomeu Perestrello inadvertently discovered what was to become the Archipelago of Madeira, when their ships were driven off course by a storm. Likewise, although the exact date is lost to history, 1427 is accepted as when the Archipelago of the Açores was discovered by Diogo de Silves. They were rediscovered in 1432 by Gonçalo Velho. The islands were steadily populated between 1439 and 1444. Within a generation of their first maritime discovery, the Portuguese ventured further afield to the African continent in 1443. Although their original purpose for setting sail were the twin forces of the throne and the altar, by the 1460s the Portuguese established settler colonies on the Cape Verde Islands. By the 1480s, the Islands of the Gulf of Guinea were also colonized. By the end of the fifteenth century, Portugal had established permanent settlements in Africa including those in Cape Verde and Guinea, alongside newly established colonies in Angola and Mozambique.

The Portuguese also found their way to South America when Pedro Alvares Cabral discovered what would become Brazil in 1500. Brazil was soon to establish itself as the keystone to Portugal’s economic health. Initially, this was accomplished through the exploitation of brazilwood, which gave the country its name. With the discovery of gold in 1697 this dynamic was irrevocably altered. By 1700, frontier-mining camps were producing 50,000 ounces of gold per annum. By 1705, total production
skyrocketed to over 600,000 ounces per year. Within 30 years of discovery, Portugal suspended investment in production and became wholly reliant on South American gold.\textsuperscript{14} The expropriation of Brazil’s natural resources became Portugal’s lifeblood.

Although enriching the monarchy’s coffers was an impetus for overseas exploration, the salvation of souls was of equal importance. It is in this context that the Roman Catholic Society of Jesus, or Jesuits, established missions throughout Portugal’s empire. The Portuguese empire was the locale where religious and economic interests were able to converge to great effect for both the state and the church. The Jesuits were some of the most vocal supporters of the Lisbon policy, which advocated imperial expansion.\textsuperscript{15} This was mainly because the Jesuits were, and remain, the largest proselytizing Catholic order. Consequently, not only were the Jesuits able to save souls en masse, but they were also enriched along the way. For example, the Jesuits were some of the largest landowners in Latin America, with a single estate in Rio de Janeiro covering over 100,000 acres and sustained by over 1,000 slaves.

It is in Brazil that the empire and all her interests converged. The civilizing mission was answered with a missionary’s zeal, whilst the economic benefits grew to such an extent that the empire needed to import labour. To safeguard the profit motive, the empire imported African slaves, primarily from Angola, to toil in the jungles and mines of Brazil. Chartered companies were given preference in the new colonies and were afforded the right to exact feudal dues from conquered African chieftains in the form of slaves. These slaves were then exported to Brazil and were forced to work for the empire. This system became both so efficient and prosperous that an average of 10,000 slaves were exported per annum. Conversely, whatever goods could not be sold or traded
in the world market were forced upon the Angolan people. In essence what started as a
civilizing mission proved to be anything but, with the Portuguese employing methods far
more brutal than the “savages” they were entrusted to convert. In the end, profit trumped
the cross. While the empire was made rich, prosperity was attained at the cost of colonial
blood, sweat, and exploitation.

This economic exploitation also came about in the mother country. During the
Portuguese Age of Exploration, over 150,000 slaves were brought to Portugal, when
Portugal’s population was a mere 1,000,000. With the abolition of the slave trade, the
foreign presence in Portugal dwindled throughout the centuries, only gaining momentum
following the onset of the Colonial Wars. Although this migration ultimately proved to be
the keystone of future immigration to Portugal, its initial numbers were negligible. For
example, there were a total of 29,579 foreigners, representative of 0.35 per cent of the
total population in Portugal in 1960, the vast majority originating from Cabo Verde. As
the wars raged on, the position of ethnic Portuguese, and those loyal to their government,
became increasingly tenuous. Reprisal killings and ethnic cleansings became part of
increasingly bloody conflicts. These conflicts, alongside the dictatorial regime of the

Although overseas settlement was encouraged by the state, it was more of a
byproduct of commercial exploitation, and not necessarily a means in itself. Nevertheless,
in two and a half centuries, from 1500 to 1750, an estimated 1,300,000 Portuguese
nationals left their homeland. However, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that
the Portuguese monarchy encouraged settlement in Africa as a matter of state policy.
Between 1850 and 1926 numerous immigration schemes were drawn up by the state to
entice Portuguese to immigrate to their overseas possessions in Africa. These included assisted passage, free land grants, diminution of taxation, and governmental assistance in the form of supplementary equipment, provisions, and subsidies. These schemes were directed at Pemba Bay, Northern Mozambique, at Moçamedes and Huila, in Southern Angola in 1849 and the 1880s, and Angola as a whole in 1910 and 1916, and Mozambique in 1899, 1902, 1907, and 1910. These settlement programs met with some success. In 1940, there were 27,400 whites in Mozambique, and a further 44,000 and 1,400 in Angola and Guinea respectively. Similarly, between 1850 and 1950, a further 2,000,000 Portuguese left their nation for Brazil and the United States, with nearly 1,500,000 Portuguese immigrating to Brazil alone. This corresponds to the dwindling of empire, the dearth of domestic opportunities and the expansion of the American economy. Brazil was chosen for its linguistic and cultural ties and America for her economy.

**International Relations and Portuguese Immigration.**

Portuguese emigration petered off in the mid twentieth century due to blocked waterways and the Second World War. However, as the conflagration that destroyed both empires and European society came and went, Portugal remained politically neutral. Once the hostilities drew to a close, and global waterways were opened, Portuguese immigration to Africa intensified. For example, whilst there where 27,400 White Portuguese in Mozambique in 1940, this number increased over threefold to 97,200 in 1960. A little over a decade later, by 1973, this number doubled to approximately 200,000. The numbers for Angola are no less spectacular. In 1940 there were 44,083 Portuguese on Angolan soil. Two decades later, this figure stood at 172,529. The year
prior to independence, 1973, there were approximately 335,000. By 1974 White settlers numbered 350,000, only 20 per cent of whom had been born there.20

The rationale for this immigration explosion must be properly contextualized within the framework of the Cold War. Although still under a dictatorship, Portugal provided a strategic European base in the Cold War and was thus a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, even though her corporatist dictator António de Oliveira Salazar, publicly decried what he believed to be NATO’s “vague and wordy invocations of liberal and democratic principles in its charter.” Similarly, although direct possession of colonies violated the United Nations’ conventions, Salazar, through a verbal sleight of hand, transformed Portugal from a Colonial Empire into a multi-continental nation by amending the 1951 constitution and inserting the term ‘provinces’ in place of ‘colonies.’ This ensured that former colonial territories became inviolable parts of a sovereign and unitary Portugal. Portugal’s African position was given much-needed moral backing when in 1955, with US support and a compromise with the Soviet Union, Portugal gained membership to the United Nations, despite UN Article 73, which prohibited “non-self-governing territories.” US policy reflected a strategic power play. With Portugal’s African possessions legally incorporated into a single unitary state, her NATO allies could navigate her waterways, thus retarding potential Soviet advances in southern Africa. Portuguese African naval ports were of such importance that with the proper technical upgrades the Port of Nacala in Mozambique, could have housed the entire US Seventh Fleet.21 This diplomatic sleight of hand spared NATO the embarrassing situation of having to negotiate with South Africa’s apartheid regime to gain access to southern Africa. In the Cold War, self-determination took a back seat to
the geo-political machinations of the two-super powers and thus during the decolonization process, Portugal further entrenched her position in Africa by retaining direct administrative control, albeit for a limited time.

Portuguese immigration, however, was not limited to the African provinces. The other side of Portuguese emigration looked to the West. The conclusion of the Second World War witnessed massive Portuguese emigration to more developed nations. The reasons behind this migratory flow were economic and political. Under the *Estado Novo* dictatorship of Salazar, the Portuguese economy was retarded by European standards. By the 1950s, the Portuguese economy was still primarily driven by agriculture, whilst her Western neighbours had begun to re-industrialize. Even when Portugal was offered funds to modernize, the opportunities were never fully embraced. For example, between 1949 and 1957, Portugal accepted a negligible $64,000,000 in US Marshall Plan monies. This figure amounted to a paltry six and 12 per cent of Greece and Spain’s totals respectively. Further, whilst she was rejecting development funds domestically, Portugal expended what little it did have to maintain her overseas provinces. During this era, Portugal’s population totaled less than 8,000,000, yet she had committed a 170,000 strong army to war, and financed it with over 50 per cent of the national expenditure. By 1974, over 1,000,000 Portuguese had seen active military duty overseas, with one in every four males having been in some branch of the Armed Forces.

The wholesale conscription of Portuguese society and a relatively poor standard of life forced the Portuguese to begin emigrating en masse. In the 1950s, with the economies of Western and Northern Europe in rapid expansion, Portuguese migrants followed the road to economic well-being, with the majority of routes leading to France.
By 1965, approximately 75 per cent of all Portuguese migrants wound up in France. This emigration was of such monumental proportions that over 1.5 million Portuguese embraced low-paying jobs in the service sectors of Western European economies with open arms between 1945 and the mid 1970s.

Domestic politics also drove Portuguese emigration. Salazar’s motto of Deus, Patria, e Autoridade, or “God, Fatherland, and Authority”, left no room for political dissent and it showed no quarter to political opponents, who were euphemistically referred to as ‘Communists.’ Salazar’s Policía Internacional De Defesa do Estado (PIDE), or International Police In Defense of the State had, as its name indicates, a long and terrifying reach. Confronting a corporatist and fascist police state that survived from 1926 to 1974, numerous opponents of the regime, and those simply in search of a better life, voted with their feet. Ironically, this was the only time that these people were ever able to vote freely while Salazar was in power. This political exodus was further fuelled by those youth of military age who refused to participate in a colonial war. This mass migration opened the door for immigration to Portugal, which will be discussed further below. Migratory escape from both dictatorship and war reached its most acute period between 1970 and 1974. This is of note because by this time the state was under the guidance of Marcelo Caetano, who was regarded as more moderate than his predecessor, and the colonial war effort had reached its bloody climax. During this period some 630,000 Portuguese nationals, or one-tenth the population, were forced to abandon their homes either legally as workers or as émigrés fleeing certain death. On average between 1961, when the colonial war effort began to intensify, and 1974 with the establishment of independence, 122,000 people were abandoning Portugal per annum. This number spiked
to an incredible 183.000 in 1970. In all, during the last decade of fascist rule and bloody overseas colonial wars, approximately 1.500.000 Portuguese emigrated from their homeland to escape economic backwardness. The end result of centuries of migration is that the Portuguese now have a global presence. There is currently a Portuguese global diaspora of approximately 4.300.000,\textsuperscript{25} of which approximately 1.400.000 reside in Europe: the majority in France. The size of the diaspora is noteworthy when one considers that the current population of Portugal is slightly over 10.000.000.

Although Portugal was politically free following Independence, her standard of living was comparatively low and she still continued to be Western Europe’s economic backwater. Thus, people felt their life choices were still restrained and consequently opted for emigration. As a result, migration continues to be a major social factor in Portugal, in part due to the sense of uncertainty that predominated Portugal’s consciousness following independence. While emigration actually increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s this pattern was altered in 1986 when Portugal became a member of the European Community. Once the bureaucratic wheels began to turn and the financial benefits of EU membership began to flood into Portugal, fewer Portuguese felt compelled to seek their fortunes outside of the country. For example, in 1980, 4.3 people migrated per every thousand. By 1996, after a full decade of European membership, this figure had decreased by 400 per cent to 1.0 per thousand.\textsuperscript{26}

The Portuguese Republic’s experience with emigration, as opposed to immigration, is borne out by the numbers. For example, international emigration over the last 60 years has ensured that Portugal’s population is 2.000.000 people smaller than it should be. Indeed, given the number of people who left Portugal between the 1940s to the
1980s, but for foreign immigration, it is estimated that Portugal’s population in 1999 would be approximately 5,800,000 million, or slightly over half the current population. Furthermore, the number of foreigners or those with foreign ancestry resident in Portugal is dwarfed by a stunning factor of 10 when compared to the Portuguese global diaspora. Needless to say, Portugal’s experience with immigration is not only an inversion of her historic experience, but a novel one at that.

Prior to 1974, Portugal was the “odd man out” of Western Europe, both economically and socially. With the death of the Estado Novo, as Salazar’s regime was known, Portugal found herself at a crossroads: remain isolated on the world scene or become a contributing member of the community of nations. The geo-political concerns of the day ensured that Portugal opted for the latter. While Portugal’s ascension to the European Union greatly improved her fiscal fortunes, membership came at a price. Portugal’s “rehabilitation” meant that she had to ensure that her policies were onboard with her European cousins. For example, the Treaty on European Union, or the Treaty of Maastricht, through Article F.2 formally committed all Member States to embrace the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Similarly, Article 29 of the same treaty committed Member States to actively seeking to prevent and combat racism. Furthermore, in 1997 the EU created two further mechanisms to combat racism. Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty provided the Union with the legal base upon which it could develop the “…appropriate measures to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.” This legal basis for anti-discrimination found expression through the creation of the EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, or EUMC, established in the same year.
By June 2000, utilizing the mechanisms implemented in 1997, the EU adopted the Race Equality Directives, and later that same year, the Employment Equality Directive. For its part, Portugal followed suit successfully. For example, a spring 1997 Eurobarometer survey of all Member States found that nearly 33 per cent of those interviewed openly described themselves as “quite racist” or “very racist.” Yet, only Sweden and Luxemburg with two per cent each, ranked lower than Portugal, at three per cent. Moreover, aside from an insignificant minority, 58 per cent claimed they were not at all racist, while 25 per cent believed themselves to be only “a little racist.” A further 14 per cent concluded that they were “quite racist.” The same survey also found that 60 per cent of Portuguese agreed with the statement “Our country has reached its limits; if there were to be more people belonging to these minority groups we would have problems,” compared to the European Union average of 65 per cent. Although alarmists will contend that nearly one in five Portuguese hold active racist beliefs, these statistics must be properly grounded in context. Firstly, one must consider the economic circumstances. In Portugal, those who openly admitted to having racist worldviews shared numerous characteristics, namely a fear of unemployment and disaffection for their current life circumstance. They also exhibited a pessimistic view of the future and had directly experienced a decline in their quality of life. At the same time, over 90 per cent of Portuguese people believed that “equality before the law” was a right to be respected irrespective of circumstances. In essence, racist sentiments are a by-product of economic insecurity, and not necessarily grounded on a racially inspired worldview. As Carlotta Solé, Sociology Professor at the University of Barcelona, has noted, a host society’s reactions to migrants is based on the health of the general economy, the unemployment rate, and the material structures of the
production system. One must also make mention of the numerous veterans and returnedos who are still present Portugal. Having fought a dirty colonial war to serve their mother country and having been run out of their homes one can understand, without condoning, their racist views.

This success can be attributable to Portugal’s concerted and honest legislative efforts. For example, one of the requirements of membership in the EU was a formal commitment to an anti-racist policy which, given Portugal’s bloody history in Africa, might have proved difficulty to address. Yet the Portuguese legislature has worked tirelessly to introduce anti-racism and -discrimination policies into every pertinent social sphere. For example, Law 20/96 created a legal mechanism by which all the relevant stakeholders, namely immigrants, human rights organizations, and immigrant associations could work in tandem in the development of a formal accusation of discriminatory practices and submit this to the pertinent legal authorities. This act was further fortified with the passage of Law 115/99, which provided for the legal recognition of immigrant associations. The consequence of this was that as legally recognized institutions, these associations were eligible to receive support from the state in order to develop their programs. Essentially, by providing these associations with support, legal and financial, the state provided them with the infrastructure to truly act as both as a watchdog for, and the voice of, immigrants in Portugal.

In the same vein, the Partido Socialista (PS), or the Socialist Party, also enacted a host of laws aimed at combating racism. For example, Law 134/99 forbids any manner of racial discrimination. Racial discrimination for the purpose of this law was defined as “actions or omissions that, taking into consideration the involvement of persons
belonging to a particular race, colour, nationality or ethnic origin, violate the principle of equality.” This legislation of note insofar as it prescribes fiscal sanctions for transgressors and includes a non-restrictive list of behaviours that enter into this definition.\(^{34}\)

Another important reason that Portuguese immigration must be grounded in a European context is down to the base consideration of economics. As political scientists Stephen Castles and Mark Miller have noted “[c]olonialism, industrialization and integration into the world economy destroy traditional forms of production and social relations, and lead to reshaping of nations and states.”\(^{35}\) With the collapse of the empire and Portugal’s economic condition in shambles, integration with the EU became the only viable alternative. By 2004 Portugal was still considered the poorest nation in the European Union. In this context, one can only fathom her condition upon Independence. Between her entry to the Union in 1986 and 1988, Portugal received approximately 1.200.000.000 from the European Regional Development Fund. Over ninety per cent of these funds were employed in the improvement of existing infrastructures or otherwise invested in the creation of new ones.\(^{36}\) This new influx of funds created a dearth of labour. The need for foreign labour was acutely felt, and thus the state responded.

Essentially, the importance of Portugal’s entrance and integration into the Union, to quote Martin Baldwin-Edwards, the director of the Mediterranean Migration Observatory of the Panteion University, is that said entrance is “… seen by the Third World as a process of increasing exclusion: thus even illegal residence in Europe is a more attractive option than poverty on its periphery.”\(^{37}\) The attraction for migrants was not only the fact that incoming EU investments created a massive economic overhaul and injected a breath of life in a dying economy, but also by the fact that this occurred in an
era when Portugal’s richer European brethren were enduring economic restructuring and suffering from a recession. It is in this context that immigrants came to Portugal in greater numbers than ever; more recently, from diverse corners of the globe.

Once Portugal rejoined the community of nations, it developed a niche role within the migratory patterns of the EU, particularly absorbing African and South American migrants. Consequently, the national groups most prominently represented in Portugal are those hailing from the former African colonies, namely Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Buissau, São Tomé e Principe; those in Asia, namely China, India, and Bangladesh; and those African nations which are geographically close to her, namely Morocco. Given Portugal’s historic, linguistic, and cultural links with these two continents, this should not come as much of a surprise. These ties have facilitated African migration and thus, per capita, Portugal has the highest proportion of African and South American immigrants in the EU, second only to Spain. Although illegal migrants are known to employ Portugal as a springboard to the EU, this has not been representative of legal migrants to Portugal. For example, in 1995 there were 168,316 legal migrants in Portugal, representing an increase of 7.15 per cent from the previous year’s numbers. In 2000, these numbers were 207,607 (8.61) respectively. In 2005 they were 414,659 (-7.27), and in 2007, there were 435,736 (3.7) migrants in Portugal. The only decrease in legally resident foreigners in Portugal occurred in 2004 when there were 447,155. Thus, those migrants who come to Portugal legally, by and large, do so to settle down.

Yet, with the diversification of Portugal’s economy and the expansion of the EU, immigrants are beginning to hail from diverse educational, professional, and national backgrounds. This state of origin has exploded since the collapse of the USSR. For
example, although by 1990 the Eastern European presence in Portugal was negligible, within five years Ukrainians became the third-largest ethnic group in Portugal, second only to Cape Verdeans and Brazilians. By 2001, the *Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras*, or Foreigners and Borders Office, noted that 53 per cent of the 94,947 permanence permits issued that year were granted to Eastern Europeans, namely those from the Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Bulgaria.\(^{41}\) This trend continued the following year whereby by March 2002 Eastern Europeans accounted for over 80,000, representing the vast majority of immigrants to Portugal. By 2005, Ukrainians established themselves as the second largest ethnic group in the Republic. Although these numbers are minute compared to the wider European trend, one must keep in mind that Portugal and Eastern Europe have no apparent historic ties. Thus, the presence of Eastern Europeans is an example of both the volatility and unpredictability of migratory patterns and the lure of economic benefits. Indeed, the most feasible explication for their presence in Portugal is as a byproduct of Portugal’s membership in the European Union, her integration in global commerce, and the creation of new jobs following the delivery of EU funds.\(^{42}\)

**The Economics of Immigration.**

In an ironic twist of fate, the current stream of immigration to Portugal has been driven by the same economic factors which, barely over a generation ago, had driven the Portuguese from their homeland. Again, much like the complimentary situation that greeted the Portuguese in their hour of need, those migrants who find their way to Portuguese Iberia are greeted by an overwhelming labour shortage in an ever-expanding economy grounded in EU funds. This labour driven migratory pattern is not a novelty to Portuguese society; rather it is the intensity of this migration with which Portugal is ill-
equipped to deal. Indeed, as early as the 1960s, when Portuguese men ventured overseas to retain their colonial birth right, their Cape Verdeano counterparts made the trek from the periphery to the centre to sustain the labour market, specifically in the construction and manufacturing sectors.\footnote{Economics has been such a driving force of immigration to Portugal that the Portuguese economy is virtually dependant on the continuance of migrant labourers. It is common knowledge that the legalization campaigns, discussed in greater detail below, were attempts to both circumvent EU regulations and satisfy domestic labour needs. Portugal, however, still continues to suffer from a labour glut. For example, despite the fact that 100.000 people had been regularized by 2001, the construction and agricultural sectors were still in need of a further 20.000 workers.\footnote{This reliance on foreign labour is projected to intensify insofar as it is projected that by 2020 over a quarter of the population will be 65 years or older. By 2040 this figure is projected to be as high as 40 per cent. In essence, immigrant intake is daily becoming more necessary if the very economy is to survive.}

These labour market shortages are so acute that it is estimated that Portugal may have to import as many as 1.000.000 immigrants, equivalent to one-tenth of its current population, just to ensure that the agricultural, textile, construction, and service industries do not collapse.\footnote{The need is so sharp that informal economies have begun to flourish. For example, in 1998 in the greater Lisbon area, there were over 50 informal subcontracting firms, which engaged as many as 50 workers each.\footnote{Domestically, the major impetus for the growing dependency on foreign labour has been the modernization of Portuguese society augmented by European Union funds. Portugal’s modernization brought with it a plethora of employment opportunities. Indeed, in this period of relative...}}
economic growth, numerous social improvement projects like the demolition of shantytowns, construction of new infrastructures, and the establishment of housing estates were undertaken and numerous job opportunities were created. Likewise, cultural pieces like Expo ’98 and the new stadia for Euro 2004, whilst only temporary, also produced numerous posts. This feat could not have been accomplished but for immigrant labour. Although migrant labour is very important to the economy, the state still lacks adequate mechanisms to successfully integrate immigrants into the host society. 

As the Portugal continues to modernize and become more integrated within the European Community, its perceived value as an immigrant destination country rises proportionally. Consequently, the percentage of foreigners in Portugal has grown exponentially within the last generation. With the dawn setting on the Empire, immigration to Portugal began in earnest. Although the initial wave of migrants, the retornados, encountered hardships they were not considered foreigners and were ultimately able to integrate. However, with subsequent migratory waves foreigners became increasingly more present which ultimately lead to social tensions and problems of adaptation into the host society on the part of the migrants. Charges of racism are constantly hurled, yet one must analyze this social situation more closely. Firstly, one must differentiate between hard racism, or overt acts of racial hatred, and soft racism, like the language utilized to describe an ethnic group. In this context, Portugal, like the rest of the EU, has enacted legislation that seeks to combat flagrant racism. Yet some critics point to the fact that these forms of legislation do little to combat subtle forms of racism. To answer this criticism, one must query exactly what could the government do to curb individual forms of subtle racism? The answer, unfortunately, is very little.
Subtle forms of racism do exist in Portugal. For instance, racist discourses and the unrestrained use of the pejorative *preto* are examples of how everyday language has incorporated the prejudices and racial hierarchies of Portuguese society. A quick note on the word *preto* might prove beneficial. The politically correct form of addressing black people in Portugal is *negro*, which is akin to the use of black in the UK or Canada. The use of the term “coloured people” is considered patronizing. The term *preto*, which is synonymous with nigger, was often employed as the colonial pejorative, and its contemporary usage has retained this negative meaning. This, for most critics, is proof positive of the existence of racism in Portugal. At the same time one must consider the recent history between both racial groups. Firstly, there are more Africans *per capita* in Portugal than in any other European nation. This concentration of Africans follows the cessation of numerous violent colonial wars, which maimed an entire generation.

Furthermore, colonial history in Portugal is still celebrated and embraced as a positive constituent part of the Portuguese national character; admired for its grandeur, its length, and its multicultural aspects. Indeed, despite the fact this is an invented tradition, modern politicians celebrate a multicultural and anti-racist interpretation of Portuguese colonial history. In the 1950s, Gilberto Freyre, a Brazilian sociologist, was invited by the Portuguese Minister of the Overseas to write a discourse on the Portuguese Empire. Freyre’s resulting thesis, *O Mundo Que o Português Criou*, expounded that the Portuguese were comparatively benevolent rulers whose wholesale engagement in miscegenation, in and of itself, constituted a form of civic devotion to their African subjects. Freyre further maintained that endemic poverty in African stemmed from economic disparities, a byproduct of the influence peddling of the superpowers, and not
on racial grounds. Essentially, Freyre upheld that Portuguese colonial rule was based on an inherent predisposition towards anti-racism and an acceptance of cultural pluralism.\(^49\) Although Freyre’s thesis is historically inaccurate, no further commentary on this contentious theory will be posited here. Freyre’s thesis is cited in an attempt to demonstrate the historical continuity of this mentality. This mindset is still omnipresent in Portuguese official discourse. For example, consider the commentary that the Coordinating Secretariat for Multicultural Education Programmes made when the first public institution, which dealt with multiculturalism in education, was inaugurated:

> “Portuguese culture, distinguished for its universalism and its awareness thereof and for its long links with other cultures which, over the centuries, have made it welcome diversity, comprehend differences and great particularity with open arms, is an open and varied culture enriched by the diffusion of a people which has sought overseas a further dimension to its identity. Today, Portugal is proud to be the product of a mysterious alchemy which found in the sea, that great unknown, its ideal medium and its path to adventure.”\(^50\)

Further, one must also factor in the rates of miscegenation and interracial marriage within the wider framework of this argument. For example, the survival of many of Portugal’s former overseas colonies and settlements was achieved only through intermarriage with the local population.\(^51\) Furthermore, amongst the EU, contemporary Portugal has consistently demonstrated the highest support for, and acceptance of, racial intermarriage and miscegenation, coupled with the most fluid definitions of racial categorizations.\(^52\) In 2003, Portugal had an intermarriage rate that averaged 5.1 per cent. This is of note for two reasons. Firstly, it is significantly higher than the EU average of 3.27 per cent and the African average of 2.68 per cent. Portugal’s rates of intermarriage are second only to those of America, 12.5 percent, and Brazil, 13.34 per cent,\(^53\) which are traditionally multi-ethnic states. Secondly, with some of the highest rates of intermarriage in the world, it is hard to argue that racism abounds in Portugal.
In essence, racism in Portugal can be said to be a relatively new phenomenon insofar as ethnic and racial minorities, in significant numbers, are a rather new occurrence. Nevertheless, the Portuguese state has enacted legislation that has defined both direct and indirect racial discrimination and harassment in an effort to combat racism in conventional society. Despite this, ethnic minorities and the poor remain the most likely victims of discrimination. One of the most prevalent arenas is the differential access to housing. Critics suggest that the high levels of suburbanization, sub-standard housing, ethnic ‘ghettoization’ and informal access to the market are prime examples of this type of discrimination. The quality of housing becomes more precarious if the migrants in question are illegal as they taken residence in unlawful, and thus substandard, shantytowns. This is due to their precarious social position that renders them vulnerable to exploitation vis-à-vis their access to social benefits like education and housing.

Interestingly, housing is more of a concern for those migrants hailing from the *Paises Africanos de Lingua Oficial Portuguesa*, or Portuguese Speaking African Nations (PALOP). 1991 statistics indicated that although 6.4 per cent of foreigners resided in shantytowns, this figure swelled to 16 per cent for those from the PALOP. A decade later, PALOP migrants still registered the highest percentage of people residing in slums and of those residing in congested housing, second only to South Asians. A Black Portuguese citizen who is an electrical engineer epitomizes this sense of marginalization. He states, “I am a citizen but that doesn’t matter. Africans are not valued here. We helped to build all of this but nobody ever recognizes that. I am a Portuguese citizen but at the same time I am not a Portuguese citizen. I have all the rights but, at the same time, I have none.”
These figures do seem to indicate that some form of systemic discrimination has diminished migrant’s life chances in Portugal. Yet, one must also factor in Portugal’s institutional conditions. Although Portugal lacks any formal integration mechanisms, one must also consider the fact that the Portuguese welfare state pales in comparison to those in Northern Europe. Indeed, it is unable to offer universal coverage to the entire population and there is a high differential between expenditures and services rendered. Essentially, social welfare in Portugal is of low quality, and affects all concerned, citizen and immigrant alike. Further, throughout the 1980s the state did not issue any housing directives. In a context of poor economic conditions and an overall housing shortage, those with the least amount of social and fiscal capital bear the brunt. As it happens, immigrants are usually disproportionately represented amongst the disadvantaged.

EU money created a booming economy in Portugal. The dearth of domestic labour coupled with brutal civil wars in Africa, provided Portugal with a steady immigrant labour pool. It is in this context that migrant labourers, particularly those from the PALOP, made their way into both the Portuguese economy and society. Indeed, by the end of 2003, there were approximately 298,000 registered foreign workers, representing 5 per cent of the total labour force. This involvement in the illicit economy deprives the state of a considerable tax base and the workers of their legal rights. The black market has essentially resurrected erstwhile failing industries, specifically the textile and construction sectors. The consequences of this have been the social marginalization of migrants who are perceived as potential threats in a limited job market. The irony of this situation is paramount. With the exception of the mid 1970s influx of refugees, Portugal has enjoyed one of the lowest unemployment rates in Europe. For
example, in 2000 unemployment was at a low of 3.8 per cent. Yet, within the context of the EU, Portugal constantly reflects the most negative attitudes towards foreigners when placed in a context of job competitiveness. Since the 1980s, survey research has consistently demonstrated that the Portuguese constantly rank unemployment as their top worry. This viewpoint seems to be substantiated, as will be demonstrated below, given that the authorities view immigration as an invaluable mechanism to sustain economic growth, and as such have turned a blind eye to migrant’s illegal involvement in the Portuguese economy.

This has not been without consequence, however. The government’s lax attitude towards irregular workers has lead to their economic “ghettoization” in low-wage jobs. Migrants from the PALOP are grossly overrepresented in blue-collar occupations, resulting in their being forced to work in complicated work environments with poor remuneration, irrespective of their foreign qualifications. This provides fertile breeding ground for social exclusion. Indeed, as discussed above, inferior working conditions negate access to housing, and it is these situations that exacerbate migrant’s vulnerability and increase their social exclusion. Ironically, evidence suggests that there is a direct correlate between the spatial concentration of foreigners and increases in racism and xenophobia. Essentially, this is a problem of the government’s own making.

**Constructions of Migrant Criminality and the Portuguese Media.**

Successful integration into Portuguese society has been hampered by an image of criminality that plagues foreigners. The main culprit of this public relations sleight of hand has been the media. There is no question that the mass media is able to mould and influence the public imagination. In the case of immigration, the mass media has chosen
to do so in a generally negative fashion. In the Portuguese media, the term African is assumed to be synonymous with immigrants, and immigration is generally associated with criminality, marginality, and irregularity. The Portuguese media has conflated immigrant, specifically African, communities with acts of violence and criminality, whilst generalizing any violent acts committed by those of African ancestry to be representative of all Africans. For example, throughout the 1990s, media coverage of migrant squatter communities within the Greater Lisbon area was routinely couched in a discourse of foreignness, illegality, and deviancy. Likewise, in June of 2005, a rather minute criminal attack on Lisbon beach was grossly sensationalized by the Portuguese media, which claimed that gangs of hundreds of roving Africans attacked peaceful sunbathers. Yet, a mere five people were injured, three culprits arrested, and video evidence, aired on the British Broadcasting Corporation, which suggested that the attacks were not of such large-scale proportions. It is thus that the media has at times aggravated an already sensitive situation.

This process of criminalizing an entire ethnic and racial group has not been without consequence. For example, police violence, discrimination and random arrests are characteristic of police-African relations, especially in lower-income neighbourhoods in Lisbon. Further, in Portugal, foreigners, most notably those of African ancestry, are overrepresented in all categories of legal proceedings. Consequently, the proportion of immigrants amongst Portuguese prison populations has increased, keeping in line with the general European trend. Although one can claim a skewed interpretation of the law, simple claims of racism cannot sufficiently explicate the high percentage of migrants
involved in crime. Thus, although the media may serve to further entrench social stereotypes it did not wholly create them.

Given the overall negative imagery that the Portuguese news media has generated vis-à-vis immigrants, it is not a surprise that the vast majority of ethnic Portuguese have been influenced with regards to the perceptions of foreigners, which may in turn influence how the government chooses to deal with immigrants. Consider, for example, the 2002 European Social Survey that found that approximately 70 per cent of Portuguese nationals concluded that there is a correlate between immigration and increasing criminality and lack of security.\textsuperscript{70} In March 2005 the European Observatory of Racism and Xenophobic Phenomenon reported that 62 per cent of Portuguese believed that there were too many immigrants present in Portugal, compared to the EU average of 50 per cent.\textsuperscript{71} The media has portrayed immigrants in such a manner that charges of social cadging have now been added to the familiar chorus of criminality and illegality.\textsuperscript{72}

The aforementioned data presents a stereotypical image of the struggling migrant being exploited by an unresponsive state and an even more uncompromising host population. Critics quickly point to the fact that Portugal lacks any formal pre-arrival programs, whilst the government further reduces its budgetary support for integration programs, like \textit{Portugal Hosts}, which offered preparatory classes in numerous subjects including language and civics.\textsuperscript{73} Although there is an element of truth to the aforementioned data, it is not representative of the entire picture. Yet, despite a widespread non-committal approach in this area of integration, there seems to be a divergence of experience with regards to integration vis-à-vis different racial groups. Although one cannot deny the existence of racism, systemic and personal, in any modern
state, one must also analyze the baggage that migrant populations bring with them to Portugal. For example, in 2002 the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, or ECRI, noted what they termed as a ‘two-speed’ integration process in Portugal, namely with Eastern European migrants integrating more successfully and rapidly than their PALOP counterparts. ECRI contends that this situation is due to Eastern Europeans’ elevated levels of human capital, professional qualifications and their race. Without downplaying the deleterious impact of racism, one must not place too much emphasis on a migrant's racial background. Indeed, simply citing the racial factor as the major reason for differing outcomes between both sets of migrants ignores the low levels of educational attainment within the PALOP community both amongst migrants and those born in Portugal. In an information economy, where credentials generally translate to financial security, PALOP migrants still register the lowest levels of educational attainment. This fact is borne out, for example, by the astonishing rates of secondary school abandonment. In the Alfama district, the proportion of students of African descent at the level of requisite schooling is approximately 80 per cent at the onset, yet by the conclusion of secondary school Africans represent a paltry 12 per cent. This lack of education limits life choices in a European context, and thus PALOP migrants are routed into traditional sectors, like construction and public works, thus explaining their aforementioned overrepresentation in these sectors, and the ever-emerging unskilled services sector.

A further consideration is the low exposure that PALOP migrants have had to civil society. Critics point to the explosion of ethnic associations and the general ethnic mobilization, which culminated in 1995 as an emblematic paradigm that the system is
Yet, this associative movement is in essence biting the hand that feeds. High levels of illiteracy, school abandonment, lack of knowledge of, and access to, civil rights plague the PALOP community in Portugal. Yet, not only are these conditions a hangover from their previous lives, but most PALOP migrants originate from nations which not only lack a tradition of democratic participation, but also actively castigated, sometimes mortally, those who questioned the regime. Essentially, PALOP migrants are taking advantage of the very freedoms that were denied them in their home nations to criticize Portugal. Although this is a fundamental freedom in any democratic society, the very fact that it is utilized cannot be correlated with the presence of systemic prejudice, racial or otherwise. Likewise, although one can claim that criminal acts are expressions of dissent against a racist state, or that the police are selectively enforcing the law, the reality is that crimes are being committed in large numbers within the PALOP community. While the added media attention does not aid their social image, one cannot simply blame the media for constructing an image of criminality when they are simply reporting on facts.

Fundamentally, as Bernd Reiter, senior researcher at the Howard Samuels State Management and Policy Centre in New York, notes, the Black presence in Portugal became both more visible and vocal. It does not follow that the Portugal has became more racist.

Immigration to Portugal is a relatively new phenomenon that has presented numerous challenges both to the state and to the nation. Although the Portuguese Republic does lack formal integration mechanisms, her main governing parties, namely the Partido Socialista (PS), or the Socialist Party, and the Partido Social-Democrata (PSD), or the Social Democrat Party, although diametrically opposed vis-à-vis their
ideologies, have nonetheless made concentrated legislative efforts to ensure that social integration and human rights are respected.

*Partido Socialista.*

The establishment of democracy in Portugal also witnessed the cessation of hostilities in Africa. Yet, it also corresponded with an influx of migrants that the nascent democracy was not ready to receive. It should be noted, however, that between 25 April 1974 and 23 July 1976, the first seven Portuguese governments were non-partisan. A military committee, which ruled for a month, formed the first government. Being satisfied that its civilian counterparts could be entrusted with the reigns of power, it transferred power to the civilian authorities, which subsequently formed six further provisional governments. As noted above, between 600-700,000 *retornoados* fled the various African colonies, especially those from Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, hoping for the safety of Portugal that awaited them across the Atlantic, effectively creating Portugal’s first migratory flow. In order to maintain social stability, Prime Minister Vasco dos Santos Gonçalves, head of the left-wing fourth provisional government of the Republic, promulgated *Decreto-Lei*, or Decree-Law 308-A of 24 June 1975. This law limited citizenship to those ethnic Portuguese who had resided in the colonies, those with links to the nation, through institutions like the civil service and the Army, those who had resided in Portugal for more than five years prior to the 1974 Revolution, and to those, who although born in Africa, could trace their ethnic heritage to the third degree of relation.

In essence, this decree not only stripped innumerable African refugees of their Portuguese nationality, but it also limited their access to social welfare and curbed their
access to political participation. Although this decree seemingly prejudiced the political rights of immigrants, the Portugal’s Constitution served as a political counterweight to this. For example, Article 15 maintains that foreigners present in the Republic have the same rights and duties as citizens, save for political rights. Further, although Decree-Law 308-A envisioned Portuguese citizenship in a context of *ius sanguis*, Article 4 of the Constitution explicitly defined citizenship in legal terms, which came into direct conflict with the new nationalist constructions of ethno-cultural identity. Although Decree-Law 308-A set the tone for who could be considered members of the nation, the Constitution sought to safeguard the vulnerable as much as was feasible. For example, Article 13 of ensured that “…sex, race, language, nationality, religion, ideology or political convictions, or their social or economic status” could not serve as basis of discrimination. Further, the Portuguese Penal Code provided these ideals with enforcement mechanisms. For example, Articles 132/2, 146/2, 239, and 240 have mandated harsher punishments for those crimes that are motivated by racial hatred. Thus, although a large number of migrants were stripped of their erstwhile citizenship, the authorities sought to protect them as much as political possible.

This initial migratory pattern was unconventional to say the least. Never before had Portugal been forced to cope with such a large immigration influx like she did in the late 1970s. It is thus that Portugal set the tone for future migratory flows. It dealt with immigration policy in an ad hoc and reactionary manner. It is in this context that Portugal failed to enact any immigration legislation through the 1980s. In conjunction with this, Portugal strictly adhered to its principle of *ius sanguis*, and consequently it had one of the lowest foreigner naturalization rates in Europe from 1982 to 1992. In this period,
Portugal had a naturalization rate of 0.1 per 100 compared to 0.5 in Greece and Italy, and 1.8 for Spain. The relative inactivity of immigration, characteristic of 1980s Portugal, did not prepare Portugal for what the following decade had in store. Changes in technology, membership in the EU, the cessation of the Cold War, and the globalization of economics forever altered the world’s migratory patterns, and Portugal was not exempt. These changes were not lost on potential immigrants, with their exponentially increasing presence and the number of statutes that the Portuguese Republic enacted to accommodate them reflecting this fact.

The 1990s witnessed an explosion of immigrants from traditional sources and the establishment of new ones. With these new sources the contentious issue of asylum was brought to the fore. Although asylum seeking has not traditionally been a problem for Southern Europe, given that it does not boast a strong custom of social welfare, Iberia is still considered to be the “soft underbelly” and the “back door” of illegal immigration, despite the fact that she has lower levels of asylum recognition, per capita, than her Northern cousins irrespective of the veracity of the claim. It is thus that Portugal has attempted to curb illegal migration and asylum shopping. It should be noted, however, that save for the retornados of the late 1970s, Portugal has never been a major destination country for refugees. This may be due, as noted above, that Portugal does not boast a strong tradition of social welfare and her economy is negligible compared to that of her more affluent cousins.

Portugal has consistently attempted to shed this unwanted label. For example, in 1991 Portugal signed onto the Treaty of Schengen, which established, amongst other things, common criteria for mutual control of external borders within the Schengen area.
With regards to asylum, this agreement accomplished a plethora of things. Firstly, it determined which countries would handle asylum applications. It also compelled Portugal to adopt the “safe country of origin” principle, and it also mandated the sharing of asylum seeker information. Likewise, it also expedited both asylum applications and the expulsion of undocumented immigrants.

This effort was followed by Socialist President Mario Soares’ use of his presidential veto, in 1993, which ensured the permanence of the liberal Regime Legal do Direito de Asilo e Estatuto de Refugiado, or the Legal Regime for the Right of Asylum and Refugee Statute. The government, then formed by the PSD, sought to replace this statute with a stricter regime that would harmonize Portugal’s immigration regime with the EU’s. Moreover, following a wider European trend, Portugal has established numerous immigration detention centers throughout the length and breadth of the country. This de-facto criminalization of refugee applicants has not been unsuccessful. For example, in 1993 with the PSD in power, 1,659 people sought refugee status; one year later this number shrank almost threefold to 614 total applications. This trend continued even when the PS formed the government. In 1995 a mere 457 refugee applications were initiated, and yet a little over one-tenth were actually approved. The following year, the number of applications plummeted to a paltry 269. In essence, Portugal has assumed a tougher stance on refugee claimants in an attempt to appease the EU.

Portugal’s perceived perception as the EU’s weak link vis-à-vis illegal immigration has been the policy area that has caused Portuguese governments, irrespective of party affiliation, the most grief, and consequently been the most revised. In 1998 the PS had set about altering the asylum law again. The new asylum statute was
an attempt to balance humanitarian considerations with Portugal’s EU commitments. The law expanded the protections afforded refugees and also offered the potential for a provisional residence permit. This law was also instrumental in recognizing both the role that intake shelters play in Portugal and recognized the Portuguese Council for Refugees (CPR) “…as a key institution in the juridical support of asylum seekers.”

It should be noted, however, that although the PS strove to implement humanitarian considerations in its statutes, it also entrenched Portuguese immigration law, specifically those provisions which dealt with refugees, with the EU framework. Decree-Law 244/98 provided a harsh legal regime to deal with illegal immigrants. It is of note that by 2002, those foreigners who were expelled or invited to leave Portugal rose to an unprecedented 2,000 people. Interestingly, the immigration law passed in 2001 is much more preventive and severe vis-à-vis the criteria of those who can enter and the expulsion of non-status immigrants. Thus, while the Socialist Party is willing to enact legislation to safeguard the socio-political rights of legal migrants, it is unwilling to compromise on illegal immigration, as proscribed by the EU.

This inflexibility needs to be contextualized, however. Although Portugal has taken a hard-line approach to asylum seekers, it has historically turned a blind eye to the illegal immigration that does occur given the strong economic incentive of permitting the continuance of migrant participation in the illegal economy. Yet, with the EU clamping down on unlawful migration, Portugal had to appear to rectify her illegal immigration problem. Yet, deportation was not a viable option. The wholesale deportation of illegal migrants would have a terribly adverse effect on the economy. In this context, António Guterres, leader of the PS and the thirteenth Constitutional government, in office from 28
October 1995 until 1 October 1999, circumvented Portuguese law and the requirements of the EU by offering a regularization scheme.

In 1996 the government announced that it would regularize those migrants who came forward. The main requirement for recognition was that migrants from non-EU states had to be physically present in the country prior to 25 March 1995. More interestingly, Guterres’ government made a more concerted effort than the PSD administration, which had organized a regularization campaign to little effect. Indeed, only 16,000 of a potential 39,000 applicants received status. Conversely, the 1996 regularization procedure was able to approve 90 per cent of the applicants, who were awarded with a residence permit. In essence, 31,000 of a potential 35,000 applicants were able to have their status normalized, of which 67 per cent of those were from the PALOP nations. One should not, however, read too much into the fact that a centre-left government actively attempted to regularize as many immigrants as possible. Essentially, the Guterres administration was able to learn from the PSD’s previous mistakes and they were able to offer status to foreign workers in an era when there were numerous construction projects abounding. The Guterres administration’s decision to regularize was, for the most part, economic in nature and not performed on some ideologically abstract concept of solidarity with international labour. The bottom line, as always, prevailed.

Although the Guterres administration was mainly driven by monetary concerns, it did concede that there were social issues that needed to be addressed. It is in this context that Guterres’ PS introduced and passed Decree-Law 3-A/96, which created the *Alto Commissario De Imigrants e Minorias Etnicos*, or the High Commission for Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities (ACIME) in 1996. ACIME was created to act as the intermediary
between the government and civil society. It was mandated to focus on integrating ethnic minorities into the host society.\textsuperscript{98} ACIME’s mandate has been furthered to ensure that the state is the chief font of immigrant integration. It has also been tasked with combating the social exclusion of migrants by fostering an atmosphere of tolerance and hospitality in Portugal. ACIME has thus begun working with numerous immigrant associations and non-profits to achieve these goals.\textsuperscript{99}

To facilitate ACIME’s goals, the Consultative Council for Immigration Affairs, or COCAI, was established in 1998 with a mandate to gather all stakeholders from the State Secretary for Portuguese Community Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to non-governmental agencies, major trade unions to immigrant associations. Moreover, Law 134/99 created the \textit{Comissão para a Igualdade e Contra a Discriminação Racial}, or the Commission for Equality and Against Racial Discrimination (CICDR).\textsuperscript{100} CICDR was placed under the auspices of ACIME, and functions as the latter’s watchdog. CICDR is responsible for the collection of information with regards to discriminatory acts, and their correspondent fines and punishments; recommending the implementation of adequate legal mechanisms to avert discriminatory customs; advocating public research into racial discrimination; and publicizing authentic cases of discrimination through any means of communication.\textsuperscript{101} In essence Guterres administration has attempted to create the legal and bureaucratic mechanism through which social integration and social equality can be achieved. Although these are lofty aims, one should also qualify this effort. Indeed, ACIME is expected to harmonize all immigration policy and liaise with all relevant stakeholders, whether from civil society or from the government, all with a total staff of 12.\textsuperscript{102} Thus, given the incredible task that the government faces, one might suggest that
its response has been negligible at best. One must also concede that the PS has nonetheless responded to the social needs of non-citizens, through public funds simply because it believed that this was the correct response. While the initial projects may seem small in scope, they must be viewed as potential building blocks for the future.

The establishment of ACIME, and all other programs under its aegis, were meant to curb future discriminatory practices. However, Guterres’ government also enacted numerous pieces of legislation with an eye to combating contemporary practices of discrimination and current forms of social inequality. One of the major areas of reform undertaken by this administration was in the area of social assistance. For example, Law 19-A/96 established a special category within the social security framework that guaranteed legal immigrants access to the required minimum resources in order to aid in their successful integration into the host society, both professionally and socially.

Likewise, Law 79/96 created a legal framework that facilitated the renovation of existing, or the acquisition of new, family housing. The Special Plans of Relocation, as they came to be known, were enacted in an attempt to eliminate the slum neighbourhoods which plagued metropolitan Lisbon and Porto. In essence, Gutteres’ administration created Programas De Inserção which provided social assistance benefits, including but not limited to, medical coverage, health and educational initiatives, housing, professional development, and income guarantees for migrants with status to further them along the road to integration. Moreover, in an attempt to ensure political participation, Law 36/96 extended the franchise and the right to contest municipal elections to legal émigrés as enumerated in the legislation. In the same vein, Law 50/96, commonly referred to as the ‘Reciprocity Law’ allowed citizens from the EU, Cape Verde, Brazil, Peru, and
Uruguay to vote and contest local elections, whilst natives of Argentina, Israel, and Norway were granted the franchise vis-à-vis local elections.  

The Gutteres administration recognized the role that the economy and labour play in the decision-making process of immigrants, and thus sought to reform existing labour legislation. For example, the aforementioned Law 19-A/96 also established a minimum wage. Likewise, Law 20/98, commonly referred to as the Foreigner’s Labor Law, did away with the quantitative threshold that limited foreigners’ participation in the labour market. Although the ultimate goal of this legislation was to curb migrants’ participation in the illicit economy, it also mandated equitable treatment of candidates in terms of the recruitment process and working conditions irrespective of nationality. Decree-Law 60/97 established a reciprocal protocol between the governments of Portugal and Cape Verde. This protocol facilitated the emigration of Cape Verdeans to Portugal, albeit for a limited time, in a professional capacity, whilst also regulating how potential employers were to treat them. In essence, the Gutteres regime sought to safeguard the Republic’s economic interests, whilst at the same time also entrenching some socio-political rights for regular immigrants.

Gutteres’ PS had done enough on the domestic front that when elections were called, they won and formed the fourteenth Constitutional government, which assumed office on 25 October 1999 and remained in effect until Prime Minister Gutteres stepped down on 6 April 2002. Still conscious of the fact that the vast majority of immigration to Portugal was driven by economic considerations and the need to synchronize Portugal’s laws with her EU partners, the government introduced new labour and residence permits, which allowed migrants to continue to work in Portugal legally.
In 2001, the government introduced Law 4/2001. This law effectively revolutionized the current immigration scheme. It not only established labor recruitment quotes, but it formally connected immigration policy with the needs of the economy. This was accomplished with the introduction of the autorização de permanência, or the stay permit. Rather than applying for the autorização de residência, or residence permit, potential immigrants applied for the former as long as they had obtained a valid work contract and did not possess a criminal record in Portugal. The added benefit of this legislation was that it allowed for family reunification. Significantly, these one-year stay permits could be renewed up to five times, thus facilitating future residence permit and citizenship applications. Law 4/2001 also provided the grounds for another regularization drive, which lasted from January to November of 2001, with a focus on regularizing the status of those migrants already working in Portugal. This drive has legalized over 90,000 workers. In addition, a further 170,000 permits were also awarded under this scheme, the vast majority of them to Ukrainians, 63,500, and to Brazilians, 36,600. This law, however, also ensured that Portugal towed the EU line by attempting to regulate migrant influxes into the Republic; prescribing more castigatory measures vis-à-vis illegal immigration; and establishing stricter controls for the issuance of residence permits.

Immigration policy in Portugal is now erected on three pillars, namely the promotion of “…legal immigration based on the country's labour market needs; to integrate immigrants into Portuguese society; [and] to combat unauthorized immigration…” This law ensured that Portugal was in lock-step with the EU whilst also allowing for the introduction of a human element to immigration law.
Fundamentally, the PS has sought to synchronize Portugal’s immigration regime within a EU framework, whilst enacting legislation which sought to protect the social and political rights of migrants. It should be noted, however, that the PS was afforded the luxury of a prosperous period with comparatively little geo-political turbulence, which made for a smooth ride domestically. This was not, however, the case with the PSD.

**Partido Social-Democrata.**

The *Partido Social Democrata*, or the Social-Democrat Party (PSD) is Portugal’s right of centre party. During the 1980s, immigration to Portugal was of such negligible proportions that Portugal neglected to pass any immigration legislation. Ironically, it was also the early part of this decade that produced some of the most influential immigration legislation. The eighth Constitutional government was formed by a coalition between Francisco Pinto Balsemão’s PSD and the coalition’s junior partners, the *Centro Democrata Social- Partido Popular*, or the Center and Social Democratic People’s Party (CDS) and the Popular Monarchical Party. Balsemão’s administration was in office from 4 September 1981 until 9 July 1983.\(^{114}\) In 1981 the enactment of Law 37/81 completely reconfigured what it meant to be a Portuguese citizen by opting to identify with ancestry and descent. This racialized conceptualization of the nation not only restricted who could be counted as members of the national body, but its implications for the legal regime were that Portugal endorsed the principles of *jus sanguinis* at the expense of those of *jus soli*. There were numerous consequences of this shift in perception. For example, citizenship now became the mark of distinction of those who could claim to descend from sons of the nation. Further, as of 1981 the children of non-Portuguese nationals were relegated to foreigner status. Lastly, and in diametrical opposition to the aforementioned,
this law also facilitated the acquisition of citizenship status to those who resided or were born outside of Portugal as long as they were able to prove ethno-racial descent.\textsuperscript{115}

Although immigration in the 1980s was not a hot-button issue in Portugal, the PSD formed the government during very sensitive times both domestically, in Europe and globally. The eleventh Constitutional government was formed by Aníbal Cavaco Silva and his Social-Democratic Party and was in office from 17 August 1987 until 31 October 1991, and again from 31 October 1991 until 28 October 1995, thus forming the twelfth Constitutional government.\textsuperscript{116} In essence, Cavaco Silva’s PSD governed a NATO nation when Gorbachev’s principles of \textit{glasnost} and \textit{perestroika} led to the liquidation of the Soviet Union, and with it the end of the Cold War. The PSD were tasked with governing an erstwhile strategically important nation within the NATO alliance, which had effectively lost its importance almost overnight and thus had to compete for position within the new world order. For example, the early 1990s ushered in a recession in Portugal elicited by changes in the European and global market systems; a devaluation of the international economy; the creation of the European Economic Community and the Monetary Union; and the entrance of former Communist nations into the market economy.\textsuperscript{117} Likewise, Portugal’s Gross Domestic Product depreciated considerably compared with the EU average. For example, in 1989, Portugal’s GDP growth was 5.5 per cent compared to the EU’s 3.4 per cent. This had dropped to 4.2 per cent in 1990; 2.2 per cent in 1991; 1.5 per cent in 1992; -1.2 per cent in 1993; and 0.5 per cent in 1994 for Portugal. The EU averages for the same years were 2.9, 1.5, 1.1, -.04, and 2.9 per cent respectively. Equally, between 1993 and 1995 Portugal’s levels of unemployment
increased rather sharply, comparatively. It is within a context of a shifting world order combined with adverse economic conditions that the PSD tackled immigration concerns.

Cavaco Silva’s PSD also had a narrow definition of who could claim membership in the nation. Law 25/94 created more stringent citizenship criterion. Prior to this legislation, migrants who were legally resident in Portugal could apply for citizenship status after six years, provided that they fulfilled all other norms. However, this law now limited the six-year period to those nationals from the PALOP nations and Brazil, whilst it required that all others wait for 10 years before being able to apply. A further caveat stipulated that children, while born in Portugal, who were of foreign descent further required that there parents be present in the Republic for the same length of time before their children could apply for citizenship. Indeed, this law limited the acquisition of citizenship through marriage, adoption, birth, or naturalization. Yet, those immigrants with linguistic and cultural ties to the host nation were still preferred.

Not only did this administration strictly define who could claim citizenship, it also limited who could attempt to enter Portugal. Bill 69/93 appreciably altered the erstwhile character of Portuguese immigration law. It enacted tighter entry control mechanisms that highly complicated the entrance of non-EU nationals. More significantly, however, was the addendum that solely placed the power of expulsion with the Office of the Minister of the Interior, rather than with the judicial authorities, who until the enactment of this legislation had held this responsibility. Moreover, Law 70/93, which dealt with asylum claimants, brought Portugal’s laws in this area in line with EU standards. This specific law is of note in that it annulled Bill 38/80, which granted admission of refugees solely
on humanitarian grounds. Moreover, the new law made the decisions of the SEF final given that it did not provide any route for recourse either judiciously or administratively.

Cavaco Silva’s PSD provided a two-prong justification for their wholesale revision of Portugal’s immigration regime. Firstly, as Members of the EU, the Portuguese state was required to harmonize her laws in key areas with European norms. More importantly, however, was the fact that foreigners and refugees were perceived as both threatening and abusive of social assistance. As noted, unemployment has consistently been ranked as one of Portugal’s major worries and foreigners are consistently viewed as potential competitors in an end-sum game. Thus, an August 1993 national poll conducted by Painel Expresso and Euroexpansão recorded that a vast majority of respondents concurred with the statement that the government should “restrict the admission of immigrant foreign workers,” conclusively demonstrating that government actions had the support of the popular will.

Likewise, this restrictive piece of legislation was framed in a context of benevolent protectionism. The PSD posited Law 70/93 as the only viable mechanism to combat social cadging by those who had no stake in Portugal. Correspondingly, Law 70/93, which passed as the Lei de Asilo, or Law of Asylum, severely limited refugee claimant’s access to welfare benefits, just as it also limited who could potentially be a claimant. Indeed, this law limited the entrance of those who were denied asylum in any other nation, acting as a safe-third country of sorts. As the Minister of the Interior stated in 1993 “… there is a short distance between insecurity and racism and xenophobia. We will only receive people who can be integrated and no one else.” Although some critics attacked these laws as draconian, the Interior Minister’s statement was of grave
importance. Although Portugal does have international commitments which it is beholden to honour, she must first honour and protect the rights of her citizens and her EU cousins. Given that immigration policy is an expression of national sovereignty, and if the state’s agenda, sanctioned by the nation, was one of limited immigration, few arguments can be made against Cavaco Silva vision and governance. His sworn responsible was to safeguard the Republic; a duty that his government executed with aplomb and to the best of its ability. All of this with the public’s endorsement no less.

Although Cavaco Silva’s administration has been portrayed as unfriendly to immigration, one needs to place this assessment in context. For example, despite the enactment of harsh and punitive laws, a meager 166 illegal migrants were deported in 1993. Furthermore, the state initiated a regularization campaign from October 1992 that lasted until March 1993. To aid in this endeavor, the PSD also created a Coordinating secretariat of the Associations for Legalization, which served as an umbrella group for all interested stakeholders, ranging from trade unions to the Catholic Church to immigrant associations and non-governmental associations. The result of this campaign was that 40,000 of an estimated 80,000 applicants were regularized. Consequently those who were deported had the opportunity to regularize their status, and as such should be proportioned some responsibility for their deportation. Although some have criticized the fact that this regularization campaign was lacking in supportive infrastructure, had harsh eligibility requirements and suffered from a dearth of public information, one cannot deny the fact it was initiated by the behest of a law-and-order government which governed during a tumultuous period of seismic geo-political activity. Furthermore, one must further note that these migrants come from nations with an absent
democratic tradition and an institutionalized distrust of government. Essentially, this imported suspicion of government from their respective homelands impeded migrant’s from grasping onto a lifeline provided them by the Portuguese government. In essence, cultural remnants along with a less than concentrated government effort must be cited for the mediocre success of the 1992-1993 regularization attempts.

Cavaco Silva’s PSD did, however, enact some protective legislation. For example, in 1993 the government established the Interdepartmental Commission for the Integration of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities. This commission had a cross-governmental representation of ministers from the Employment and Welfare, Education, Health, Interior, and Public Safety portfolios. It was created to address growing xenophobic sentiments and social discrimination whilst also mandated to provide professional development programs for immigrants. Similarly, the PSD’s *Despacho-Normativo*, or Normative-Dispatch 63/91, which created the *Secretariado Coordenador dos Programas de Educação Multicultural*, or the Multicultural Education Programs Coordinating Secretariat inaugurated Portugal’s journey into multiculturalism. This program sought to promote and implement multicultural education at the primary and secondary levels. It envisioned multicultural education as one that would promote cohabitation, cross-ethnic discourse and harmony. This was accomplished by, amongst other things, through the creation of the *Projecto de Educação Intercultural* in 1993. In essence, although the PSD assumed a security platform, it also created social initiatives which acted as precursors for the PS’s ACIME.
After a governing hiatus of almost a decade, the PSD once again assumed office under the leadership of José Manuel Durão Barroso. Durão Barroso’s PSD formed the fifteenth Constitutional government, which took office 6 April 2002 until 17 July 2004.¹²⁹ The PSD continued its work of harmonizing Portugal’s immigration laws with the EU. This harmonization had two notable features, namely obtaining the maximum benefit from its immigrant workforce on the one hand, and the securitization of immigration policy on the other.

Having espoused a securitization viewpoint, Durão Barroso’s administration had to keep to EU policies vis-à-vis the economy as well. However, to do so would invite economic ruin. Like previous PSD and PS governments alike, Durão Barroso’s administration opted to enact special regularization campaigns. In so doing, the Portuguese state performed an end run around EU policies once again, technically allowing for the harmonization of Portugal’s economic and immigration policy within the EU context. The PSD’s economic regularization campaign kicked off in November 2001. This campaign was aimed at non-EU foreigners who had employment, with the result that approximately 185,000 people were rewarded with one-year stay permits, which allowed permit holders the possibility of extending their stay up to four times, provided they were able to provide valid work contracts. Within three years, the PSD enacted Normative-Decree 6/2004. This Normative-Decree, through Article 71 once again opened the possibility of regularizing non-EU workers, provided that potential claimants were active in the Portuguese labour market prior to 12 March 2003. This campaign successfully regularized a further 40,000 workers.¹³⁰
The seemingly exponential growth of the Portuguese economy and her acceptance to the EU in 1986 established Portugal as a viable and attractive destination country for non-EU citizens. Indeed, the increasing diversity of foreigners in Portugal is a testament to this. Within a decade, the proportion of PALOP immigrants declined from 45 per cent in 1981, to 40 per cent in 1990. There are now increasing numbers of migrants from Brazil, Senegal, China, the Congo, and from Eastern Europe. However, those migrants who could not immigrate through legitimate channels resorted to migratory chicanery. Some resorted to false asylum claims. These climaxd between the late 1970s to the early 1980s, and were associated with the outbreak of civil war and political harrying in the former colonies of Angola and Mozambique. A second peak was witnessed in the early and mid-1990s with the influx of Eastern Europeans. However, asylum, as an immigration alternative, was rapidly ruled out in Portugal. For example, between 1995 and 2001 an average of a meager 260 application were filed per annum, entrenching Portugal as the EU country with the lowest number of petitions for asylum and, as noted above, the EU nation with the lowest per capita approval rate.

It is in this context that illegal streams of immigration into Portugal began to flourish. For example, conservative scholarly estimates point to an annual flow of 5,000 aliens, whereas in 2003 the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights concluded that the number was closer to between 35,000 and 50,000 aliens. Despite the obvious disparity in numbers, the PSD was faced with a considerable illegal immigration stream that not only threatened Portugal’s internal balance, but also threatened to place Portugal outside of the EU’s policy framework. The PSD enacted stricter criteria for entry and more punitive measures for those guilty of contravening them. To this end, the PSD
ratified Decree-Law 34/2003. This law legislated tighter conditions under which foreigners could enter, reside, leave, or be expelled from Portugal. It also narrowly defined the concept of family. Its primary focus was on safeguarding the security and economic interests of the nation. More importantly, however, was the fact that this law drew to a close the stay permits system, opting to replace it with recruitment of foreign labourers physically resident outside of the country. The fact that the Portuguese government, irrespective of the party that formed it, had routinely resorted to regularization campaigns can be said to have sent the message that Portugal, in effect sanctioned illegal migration. This new law sent the explicit message that Portugal would not be held to economic ransom. Rather it would proactively exercise its sovereign right to choose whom it allowed within its borders rather than simply settling for whoever was already present therein.

Although the Durão Barroso administration, like most previous PSD administrations, had taken a securitization approach to immigration, they also enacted legislation that safeguarded immigrant human rights. For example, Laws 99/2003 and 18/2004 transposed EU 2000/43 CE Directive into Portuguese law. These laws prohibited racial prejudice in employment and instituted a legal framework that provided for the mechanisms by which to combat discrimination. Moreover, Decree-Law 67/2004 established a nation-wide registry of foreign minors without status in Portugal. Those whose names were on this list were guaranteed some of the basic rights afforded to nationals, namely access to health care and basic education.

The PSD assumed office in fiscally and geo-politically sensitive times. That it allowed its ideological position to influence its immigration policy goes without saying.
Its hard-line position on illegal immigration only moderately differed from the PS’s. Conversely, its social integration mechanisms, while limited compared to those of the PS, were still groundbreaking for their times. Yet, like the PS, it also cleverly manipulated its legislative authority to circumvent EU requirements when it suited Portugal’s domestic needs. The only major difference between the two parties vis-à-vis immigration was the times in which they governed, not necessarily their legislative results.

With an increasing immigrant presence in Portugal, and a diverse one at that, the social context is ripe to be exploited by organized xenophobic and racist organizations. The increasing presence of different racial and religious groups has impressed deep social changes upon the nation. Although immigration is not a politically divisive issue in Portugal, the general Portuguese population demonstrates low levels of social tolerance vis-à-vis foreigners. This seemingly dichotomous position renders Portugal a formally anti-racist country, yet one where private racist attitudes are still flourishing and proliferating. For example, in 1991 a survey of the twelve member states of the EU found that an average of approximately 51 per cent of respondents believed that there were too many foreigners present. Likewise, Eurobarometer polls in 1989 of the EU found only 12 per cent of respondents felt that the presence of non-EU foreigners in their nation was a “good thing.” 34 per cent felt that it was “good to some extent.” Over half of the respondents did not conclude that a foreign presence in their nations was a “good thing.”  In 1993, the European Value Systems Study Group concluded that Portugal outranked her neighbours with regards to demonstrated low levels of intolerance, generally, vis-à-vis their neighbours who were ethnic minorities and to those who were of a different ‘race’ altogether.  In 1995 the Universidade Católica conducted a survey on
the request of daily newspapers Pública and TVI. This survey concluded that the vast majority of respondents did not wish to live in racially mixed neighbourhoods despite the fact that 80 per cent of them identified themselves as non-racists. One must, however, contextualize these data results in the historical period, which has been discussed above. The dissolution of communism, entrance into a market economy, globalization of the economy, and a new world order obviously generated a culture of fear, which was directed at those who were socially marginalized. Nevertheless, these sentiments have continued and such a general popular feeling would be a fertile breeding ground for organized racism. It is in this context that one must consider the extreme right in Portugal.

**Partido Nacional Renovador.**

The extreme right in Portugal, like in most other nations, is highly fragmented. The Partido Nacional Renovador, or the National Party of Renewal (PNR) represents the extreme right in Portuguese politics, whilst the Frente Nacional, or the National Front (FN) are its militant arm. The PNR envisions itself as a pro-fatherland, pro-family, and pro-life party. It is of note that the PNR refuses to position itself on the political spectrum, maintaining, rather, that it votes on the issues. The PNR denies that it is either racist or xenophobic. It identifies itself as a nationalist entity, which lobbies against uncontrolled immigration, the wholesale importation of cheap labour, against low salaries and high unemployment, and against the rising levels of criminality, ghettos, and lawless zones. The PNR maintains that until these social ills are rectified, that the Portuguese government should cease all further immigration and reject the Schengen Agreement.

José Pinto-Coelho, the PNR’s leader, recently addressed the nation on the Portuguese National Day. In his speech he claimed that while the Portuguese have every
historic reason to celebrate, their contemporary history is less than sterling. He decries, amongst other things, an unemployment rate of 8 per cent; the breakdown of the family unit; 2,000,000 people, or one-fifth of the nation, living in poverty; high levels of criminality and violence; cultural and social humiliation due to the EU’s yoke; and a lowering birth rate coupled with unregulated immigration. While some of these claims may seem pretty vague, Pinto-Coelho is able to concretely lie out where he believes the blame should be put. He, and the PNR, maintain that the government’s attempts at multiculturalism are traitorous and they are killing the Portuguese national character.139 This sentiment is echoed by one of the parties online publications, Causa Nacional which stated in an editorial that while “its true that numerous Portuguese emigrated to other countries, like France, Germany or Switzerland… the characteristics of Portuguese emigration are not similar to the current invasive migratory patterns to Portugal. … the Portuguese did not bring with them mafias, drugs, and prostitution.”140 In essence, the PNR firmly believes that if only Portugal could go back to the glory days of Salazar’s Estado Novo, than everything would be all right again. Unfortunately, this position ignores the historical and geo-political realities of the latter half of the twentieth century.

A brief word should also be made of the FN, which is led by Mario Machado. Machado is attempting to unite extreme right wing and neo-Nazi groups, like the Hammerskin Nation, under his flag. His main outlet has been the Internet through which he posts numerous blogs and video-based propaganda through websites like youtube. Further, Portugal has witnessed a proliferation of the Far Right groups in the tail end of the twentieth century. Neo-Nazi and fascist manifestations have gathered momentum and targeted ethno-racial minorities and immigrants. These groups have expressed themselves
through violent acts targeting immigrants, culminating in the murder of Alcino Monteiro, a naturalized Portuguese citizen on the Portuguese National Day, 10 June 1996. The rapid growth of extremist groups seems like a logical conclusion when one considers that evidence points to the prevalence of racist attitudes within Portuguese society. More importantly, one must also factor in the shock that the loss of Empire caused to the Portuguese system. Although by the mid twentieth century the Portuguese Empire had lost its luster, it was still considered vital to the understanding of Portuguese identity. The decolonization process in and of itself was a painful experience, yet the massive influx of foreign colonial subjects in the guise of immigrants bred contempt and resentment amongst the host society. It is these feelings that the extreme right hopes to exploit in their fight against multiculturalism and immigration to Portugal.

However, both the PNR and the FN need to be placed in context. While both movements are especially vocal, they are in reality inconsequential. Machado has been under preventative detention for the last thirteen months, and the PNR registered 0.07 per cent of the popular vote during the last elections. These movements gain prominence in the public eye due to their adept manipulations of public space and new technology. Thankfully they have not yet been able to make any political inroads with the Portuguese nation. A cautionary word might prove beneficial. These movements are consistently written off in Portugal as right-wing extremists unrepresentative of the nation. History is littered with examples of men and movements who have hijacked nations given the politically opportune moment. As odious and preposterous as their positions might be by mainstream standards, one cannot and should not ignore them.
Conclusion.

So, does racism abound in the Portuguese Republic? The data demonstrates that private citizens do indeed harbour some racist sentiments, and the existence of groups like the PNR indicates that these feelings are finding political expression, however minute. Portuguese society is, however, a rather complex thing. To suggest that society is generally racist simply because one’s personal opinions are not considered politically correct simply will not suffice. Some critics point to biased news media coverage of racial minorities, specifically blacks, as proof-positive that institutionalized racism does not only exist in Portugal but is daily reproduced. Studies suggest that the Portuguese media is complicit in its use and reproduction of stereotypical ethno-racial representations. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the media is increasingly focusing their reports on ethnic violence on the one hand, and on increasing manifestations of racism on the other. One cannot accept media representations of racist attitudes in Portugal as accurately representative of the nation. Indeed, if they were groups like the PNR would have formed the government a long time ago.

To be sure, comprehensive declarations of inherent Western racism lack any real empirical basis and Portugal is no exception. After all, despite the persistence of racism amongst the Portuguese citizenry and the seemingly exponential growth of the Far Right in Portugal, these groups are not only minute in size, but they have also failed to commute this general sentiment into political capital. There is a general feeling that racism can coexist with a belief in democratic and fundamental rights. The majority of the populace believes that their society should be inclusive, humanitarian, and willing to extend equal rights to all citizens, minorities and immigrants alike.141 Most Portuguese
are proud of their membership in the EU and have embraced political anti-racism. As such, irrespective of their personal feelings, they are unwilling to support active and political forms of organized racism. The consequence of this has been that, on the whole, Portuguese society has rejected the far right, and as such an adequate vehicle for the communication of organized racism and anti-immigrant sentiment has failed to materialize in the Portuguese Republic.

This is reflected in the fact that the PS and the PSD consistently alternate in forming the government. Despite their differing ideologies, they have, by and large, passed numerous beneficial pieces of legislation and created various regularization schemes that have legitimized foreigners in Portugal. This is no small political feat. Indeed, one need only consider the seismic political shifts that Portugal has witnessed in the latter half of the twentieth century. Within a twelve-year period, from 1974 to 1986, the Portuguese people were ruled by a fascist corporatist regime that gave way to a military junta which ceded control to Portugal’s first democratically elected government. Before the government was able to fully appreciate its newfound sovereignty and political will, geo-political considerations ensured that Portugal would become a member of the EU, and thus cede some sovereignty in key areas, like immigration.

Yet, despite these numerous political shifts and social cleavages Portugal has risen to these new challenges. Notwithstanding the apparent hardships that may be encountered on the road to a multicultural state, the Portuguese have made a concerted effort to accept both the geo-political situations de jure, and the impacts that they have forced upon the nation. Although this road has been anything but smooth, to expect otherwise or to label the current realities racist would be ludicrous. Indeed, nations like
Canada and the UK, which celebrate multiculturalism, however contrived, have had accusations of cultural racism lobbied at both their people and their governments. The fact that Portugal is tarred by the same brush as the aforementioned two G8 nations is a testament to how well Portugal has been able to survive the machinations of contemporary geo-politics and her shifting social character, which had stood for nearly a millennia. The fact that Portugal boasted a 500-year colonial heritage, which was cut short due to violent civil insurrections in her former colonies could have lead the Portuguese to react adversely to an increased black presence. Indeed, the exponentially increasing black presence could have been viewed as a perpetual reminder of a stolen birth rite and an entire generation maimed. Alternatively, the Portuguese could have fully embraced their newfound principles of democracy and universalism. They could have completely adopted EU norms and embraced EU stances on anti-racism. However, given Portugal’s recent history and contemporary geo-politics, this scenario is untenable.

Portuguese reaction has blended elements of both potential reactions. Given the circumstances, not much else could have been expected. That there are rudiments of racism in Portugal goes without saying. That Portugal is a racist state is a non-starter. Portugal has merely begun to test the waters of multiculturalism. If her current record is anything to go by, a multicultural and –racial state will one day thrive in the Portuguese Republic.
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