

EXAMINING POWER IN PROTRACTED SPACES: A FEMINIST APPROACH TOWARD
THE ELIMINATION OF REFUGEE WOMEN'S INSECURITY INSIDE DADAAB

by

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Amelia Galizia

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ABSTRACT

In Dadaab, a refugee complex located in eastern Kenya, the issue of refugee women's insecurity is ongoing and of high proportions. In this Major Research Paper, I seek to understand how the insecurity of refugee women in Dadaab is founded on the interlocking positionalities of its four major actors: the Kenyan government, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United States government, and the refugee community of Dadaab. Using a human security approach, along with intersectionality as the method of analysis, I demonstrate how the intersection of power relations by the major actors, along with the intersection of refugee women's identities, compound refugee women's livelihoods to produce a phenomenon whereby refugee women are particularly vulnerable to violence and insecurity. Furthermore, through a critical analysis, I aim to conceptualize a shared responsibility by the four major actors in Dadaab as a means to move toward the elimination of women's insecurity in the complex.

Key words: refugee women; insecurity; refugee camp; protraction; Dadaab; Kenya; UNHCR;
intersectionality; human security

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I dedicate this MRP to the refugee women of Dadaab.

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Introduction

In refugee camps, it is predominantly women and girls who are vulnerable to insecurity due to what Hyndman (2004) considers “a history of systematic political and economic marginalization” (p. 193). In the context of Dadaab, a refugee complex located in eastern Kenya, the issue of refugee women’s insecurity is ongoing and of high proportions. Scholars have unanimously pointed out a distinct and unyielding climate of danger that refugee women live in; a climate that renders them at times powerless and compliant. Since encampment may exist as a long-term, protracted humanitarian solution for refugees, women are consequentially placed in positions of isolation with a limited freedom of movement (Horst, 2006; Wilson, 2014). With the increasing phenomenon in which women make up a disproportionate percentage of forced displacement, known as the feminization of forced migration (Gusman, 2013), this overrepresentation leads itself to gendered experiences of forced migration and encampment thus, warranting further investigation. Indeed, insecurity in Dadaab imposes severe threats to the safety and livelihood of refugee women, manifesting in its most prevalent form as gender-based violence. Due to the fact that insecurity is known to show itself in myriad ways, it becomes further exacerbated much in part due to the protracted isolation of life inside Dadaab.

As of late, the scholarly research on the topic of women’s insecurity in Dadaab strongly suggests that this phenomenon is the symptom of a much larger and intricate chain of sequences. In fact, rather than being an isolated issue, the research points to a strong notion that refugee women’s insecurity emerges from an interplay of factors such as, the gendered processes of foreign aid distribution, structural and operational barriers within refugee camps, socio-cultural tensions amongst refugee populations, lack of camp security, and the geopolitics of the war on terror and securitization. Although programs and policies have been implemented in Dadaab to improve

conditions for women, no significant change has occurred to significantly reduce the prevalence of insecurity (Rawlence, 2016). Most concerning, there is no specific work that has directly pointed to one or a few distinctly responsible bodies. The research suggests that there lacks accountability on the part of Dadaab's major actors, making it difficult for any sustained improvement due to the fact that the root causes of the various conditions are not identified. Furthermore, it suggests that the lack of acknowledgement of power dynamics by the various actors is a shortcoming. Therefore, it becomes increasingly pertinent to imagine a new mode of addressing women's insecurity in Dadaab: one that is mindful of power relations and how overt and covert dynamics between major actors and refugee women produce a state of marginalization.

What is additionally lacking in the research on the topic of women's insecurity in Dadaab is the notion of responsibility. Parekh (2014) makes a philosophical argument that there should not only be a legal obligation to refugees by the international community, but also a moral obligation due to the ontological deprivation refugees experience as a result of their critical circumstances. She describes ontological harm as being "certain fundamental human qualities" (p. 646) refugees become deprived of once encamped, and thus, a moral imperative to consider. Additionally, there is an existing concept in international law known as "burden sharing", which is defined as "a subset of international cooperation in which States take on responsibility for refugees who, in terms of international refugee law, would fall under the protection of other States or assist other States in fulfilling their responsibilities" (Newland, 2011, p. 1). This concept has been used to address the macrocosm issues of forced migration in Europe and traditionally addresses the management and protection of large influxes of refugees when states cannot bear the burden alone.

The notion of burden sharing offers a strong point of departure into this MRP, as it provides a critical perspective toward viewing insecurity in Dadaab as a shared responsibility amongst the

major actors. Through a critical analysis of the major actors roles and positions of power within Dadaab, responsibility will become better imagined as a practical solution to the current state of insecurity for refugee women. However, in order to understand the severity of women's insecurity in refugee camps, and particularly within the context of Dadaab, it is crucial to examine a number of factors. Firstly, it is essential to examine the major actors that are present in Dadaab as institutionalized bodies that demonstrate the ability to exercise power. This involves an interrogation of if and how they enable and contribute to the aforementioned factors that foster this existing environment of insecurity. These actors are identified in this MRP as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Kenyan government, the United States government, and the refugee community itself.

Research Focus

In this Major Research Paper, I seek to understand how the insecurity of refugee women in Dadaab is founded on the interlocking positionalities of its four major actors: the Kenyan government, UNHCR, the United States government, and the refugee community of Dadaab. Using a human security approach, along with intersectionality as the method of analysis, I will demonstrate how the intersection of power relations by the major actors, along with the intersection of refugee women's identities, compound refugee women's livelihoods to produce a phenomenon whereby refugee women are particularly vulnerable to violence and insecurity. Furthermore, through a critical analysis, I aim to conceptualize a shared responsibility by the four major actors in Dadaab as a means to move toward the elimination of women's insecurity in the complex.

Organizational Structure

The structure of this MRP is organized into five chapters, with the first being the introduction. Following this, chapter two provides a detailed overview of the paper's methodology, which

includes the research problem, research questions, conceptual framework, the scope and significance, the research approach and strategy, and finally the researcher's positionality. In the section on MRP's conceptual framework, there is a thorough review provided of the two main concepts that frame the paper, which are human security and intersectionality. Together, these concepts act as the overarching structure from which the MRP interrogates the literature and finds its. Chapter three provides a detailed literature review on the topic of women's insecurity in Dadaab. It begins with an overview of the feminization of forced migration, the refugee regime in Africa, and the concept of encampment. Following this is a brief history of the refugee complex, which moves into a substantial review of what the literature tells us about women's experiences of insecurity, as well as some of the steps that have been taken to address the problem. Chapter four of the MRP is the analysis portion, which features a feminist intersectional analysis of the power dynamics between refugee women and the four identified main actors: the Kenyan government, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United States government, and the refugee community in Dadaab. In the final and fifth chapter, a conclusion is presented, which includes some recommendations and suggestions for future research on the topic of refugee women's insecurity in Dadaab, and more broadly.

Methodology

Research Problem

The purpose of this MRP emerges from three main factors. The first and most predominant factor is that insecurity for women in Dadaab has yet to cease and is therefore still an ongoing phenomenon that requires further research. The second factor stems from the fact that women's experiences are far too often excluded from international development discourse, and thus research is still catching up to adequately assess the specific needs of women and girls using a gender analysis framework (Freedman, 2015). The third factor of most interest in this MPR is that major actors are not given enough attention with regards to how their positions of power constitute responsibility of refugee women's insecurity. The literature speaks to the major actors, but there is no collective analysis of how their actions collectively reinforce the conditions of insecurity in Dadaab for refugee women.

Research Questions

The selected research questions for this MRP will identify systemic issues, interrogate key actors, and establish a conceptualized understanding of possible solutions. There are two main research questions, and while the first question will be answered by way of a literature and document review, the second will be answered through a critical analysis of the literature, using a selected theoretical and conceptual framework. The research questions are as follows: (1) What are the various forms of insecurity faced by women in the Dadaab refugee complex and why? (2) What responsibility do the four major actors—UNHCR; the Kenyan government; the United States government; and refugee community—have in creating the reality of insecurity faced by women housed in Dadaab?

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework that will shape the discussion of this MRP is influenced by both intersectional feminism and a human security approach. Human security as an approach is a crucial framework in this discussion because it shifts the obvious and prioritized focus of security away from the state and toward the insecurities faced by people (Tripp, et al., 2013). Indeed, in the context of this MRP, a human security framework will contrast the state security focus that we find as a dominant discourse regarding the topic of global migration, and of most concern in this MRP, as the motivation of the Kenyan government regarding their stance on Dadaab as it exists within their borders. Overall, a human security framework will ensure that the experiences and needs of the community at risk—in this case being refugee women housed in Dadaab—will be placed at the forefront of this MRP.

In addition, an intersectional feminist lens is employed to consider the various interlocking systems of oppression refugee women in Dadaab are described to experience in the literature. This consideration will be based on not only their gender, but also their race, class, religion and ethnicity by way of an examination of structural intersectionality. Indeed, patriarchy, the foreign aid regime, Islamophobia, and imperialism are all structures that work systematically to target refugee women in Dadaab, while producing conditions that contribute to shaping women's insecurity (Crenshaw, 1991). Moreover, structural intersectionality theory posits that the location of refugee women in Dadaab makes their specific experiences unique, and thus different from that of refugee women living in a camp in another part of the world, or coming from a different cultural, racial and social background (Crenshaw 1991). Thus, I aim to use an intersectional analysis to approach the topic of women's insecurity in Dadaab because I believe that the gender dynamics at play also intersect

with issues brought on by other identity markers, while all taking place within a geopolitical context underpinned by the assertions of power by the four identified actors. It is through the examination of the individual roles of the major actors, along with the varying levels of refugee women's marginalization that I will demonstrate how these dynamics intersect to compound insecurity in Dadaab for refugee women.

Scope and Significance

The purpose of this MRP research is to contribute to the topic of women's insecurity in Dadaab and explore four main objectives, which are: (1) to identify the root causes of the various forms of insecurity for refugee women as a means of analyzing who and what entities must be held accountable; (2) to understand how establishing responsibility and an idea of burden sharing will work to produce more effective change in combating the various forms of insecurity for refugee women living in Dadaab; (3) to pave the way for solutions that are effective and durable that have yet to present themselves in the existing literature; (4) to contribute to the existing scholarly research on this topic and produce suggestions that may potentially be applicable to other cases similar to Dadaab.

This research is significant because it places women at the forefront of decision making processes within encampment settings and foreign aid policies and operations. In addition, it seeks to improve how refugee camps as an institution produce problematic living structures for women, which is not limited to the boundaries of Dadaab. Finally, what makes this research particularly important is that it works to shift the discussion away from any existing accounts of initiatives led by isolated actors to improve insecurity, towards one that considers future strategies of shared responsibility amongst all key actors. This is due to the fact that my analysis is interested in the collective outcome of the major actors' roles and actions.

An area of difficulty that arose during the research process stems from the somewhat outdated scholarly research on the topic. Most of the existing literature tends to have been written in the late 1990's and early 2000's, as well as around 2011 when the famine in Somalia broke out. In fact, few scholarly texts are less than two to three years old. Thus, the findings are only able to account for what has been documented, which may result in research gaps due to the fact that the topic relies on current, up-to-date reports. It is for this reason that I rely on up-to-date UNHCR documents. In fact, Somali refugees are involved in an ongoing voluntary repatriation project, which began in 2014 and suggests that there are shifts in demographics. However, with all this said, the strength that arises from this challenge is that my contributions on this topic will produce more updated research that can hopefully reenergize the discussion on women's insecurity so that solutions may be able to take into account developments in the current geopolitical events and the ongoing protracted state of Dadaab.

Research Approach and Strategy

My research is presented in the form of a qualitative literature and document analysis to answer the established research questions. This approach places the research problem into a specific context, "Through the process of systematically analyzing and summarizing the research literature" (Russell, 2015, p. 8). Both secondary scholarly literature and primary UNHCR documents reviewed and cross referenced to ensure accuracy in not only what forms of insecurity exist, but also to target if and when improvements have been made. I accessed RULA and the UNHCR website to obtain secondary scholarly literature and primary UNHCR documents, and I also conducted searches in digital libraries such as JSTOR, ProQuest, and Google Scholar. Furthermore, I incorporated some recently published books on the topics of Dadaab and foreign

aid in refugee camps, which were discovered through basic Amazon searches and book recommendations.

Researcher Positionality

As a researcher with a feminist approach to research, I choose to reflect on how my privileges as researcher inform the dynamics at play between myself and the research population within this MRP. Drawing on Harding's (1995) work with feminist standpoint theory, I aim to recognize some of my biases and subjectivities so as to acknowledge the inherent power dynamics present within my own research as I examine power dynamics in Dadaab. Therefore, I wish to be transparent about the fact that my position shapes the outcome of research, but also that as I choose, I use my position to create a space for a marginalized population's stories and experiences to receive more attention. I have been specifically mindful of placing women at the centre of the research, which by virtue must acknowledge the fact that although many of them may be routinely forced into dangerous and insecure positions, there is a certain degree of agency that refugee women in Dadaab maintain (Horst, 2006). In doing so, I am to bring social locations to the forefront of this MRP.

I acknowledge that the biggest area of weakness of my research is my outsider status and inherent privileges. I am not East African, but a Canadian born woman, of European settler identity. I have never experienced forced displacement, survived famine, or faced the levels of insecurity detailed in this MRP. I am relatively free to exercise my democratic and human rights and experience no direct impact from the political insecurity such as women do in the Horn of Africa. Finally, I maintain a level of privilege and power as someone who is university educated and the researcher of the MRP's research population. As a result, I am compelled to acknowledge my biases and ignorance when it comes to the privilege it is to tell the story of refugee women despite knowing them personally or having been able to conduct primary research on them.

Therefore, I recognize that the result of this MRP lacks specificity as it does not come from refugee women's direct accounts of their lived experience. However, I also recognize that I may have been unaware of certain cultural factors at play during my research process due to my outsider status, and consequentially perpetuated a Eurocentric perspective that can perpetuate certain epistemologies already present within the existing literature. Despite these shortcomings, I find strength in the fact that as a woman and as someone with a background in feminist research, I am somewhat connected to this topic and these women. Furthermore, what is of most of value in this MRP, is that I have been motivated and determined to improve the lives of refugee women living in Dadaab in any capacity possible. Therefore, this MRP is my attempt.

Conceptual Framework

The MRP's conceptual framework is motivated by a gender approach to migration studies. I argue that feminist research that is grounded in a gender approach can be more successful at tackling issues within the field of migration due to the approach's ability to capture qualities about migration that may otherwise go unaddressed, such as, but not limited to, gender relations and power structures. Nunez-Sarmiento (2013) informs that a gender approach "helps our understanding of the multiple and simultaneous incorporation and construction of identities that transnational migrants experience individually and as members of groups in their home countries and in those countries where they migrate" (p. 161). Indeed, this method is inclusive in that it works to understand gender as akin to other structures and inequalities within all levels of society, which may be brought on by power and domination. Therefore, in the context of Dadaab, a gender approach will be employed to guide the research toward developing a sense of how refugee women's identity, along with their daily experiences, are shaped by the forces that dominate their environment. Thus, it is with this in mind that I have chosen to employ both a human security and intersectionality approach to capture the elements of a gender approach. Together, they will act as the theoretical framework that guides this MRP's research.

Human Security

Human security was first introduced in 1994 by the United Nations Development Program as the notion of prioritizing the security of humans over the security of the state, which at the time offered a new and opposing stance from the more traditional sense of security (Abass, 2010). Much due to the efforts of Canada and Norway, the push to prioritize a humanitarian agenda on security was established, when in 1999 the concept was introduced during a bilateral talk in Lysøen, Norway (Abass, 2010). Countries such as Canada and Norway aimed to shift the perspective of security

away from solely that of territory or governments, towards one that placed people as the focal point. With this evolution of the concept of human security, states “became responsible not only for their citizens, but also for people outside their country” (Tripp, et al., 2013, p. 7). Moreover, this meant that states became responsible to protect people when their own states are unable or unwilling to do so. In the 2005 UN General Assembly, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was established out of this to include the intervention of military as a means of intervention when states “fail to protect their citizens from massive loss of life” (p. 7). However, this MRP looks not to favour R2P, but rather to acknowledge its existence as a part of the security discourse. Indeed, R2P has arguably become a problematic approach to managing state security issues because it has brought on situations where imperial powers intervene in authoritarian states for political motives rather than humanitarian ones.

Today, “human security has become the dominant frame for international regulation” (Tripp, et al., 2013, p. 3). In fact, Giles and Hyndman (2004) believe human security offers a “potentially radical new site of accountability to more feminist security studies” (p. 11), because gender concepts have become more mainstream in international development discourse. Human security is characterized as being a universal humanitarian approach to achieving safety from the threat of hunger, disease, repression, as well as the “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily life” (Abass, 2010, p. 3). Empowerment is another component of the term. The Commission on Human Security states that the concept works to not only protect people against numerous threats to safety, but to also “empower them people to act on their own behalf” (O’Sullivan, 2010, p. 167) Conversely, Tadjbaksh & Chenoy (2014) describe human security as vague. They suggest that because the term has evolved so much over the years into an amalgamation of ideas from varying interpretations by scholars, states and NGO’s, it has become

challenging to fully work with the concept in practice. Thus, Tadjbaksh & Chenov argue that in order for the term security to be meaningful, it must “be redefined as a subjective experience at the micro level in terms of people’s experience” (p. 10).

Tripp, et al (2013) state that feminist positions have become a prominent feature of the evolution of human security. In fact, UN resolutions have heavily benefitted from women’s involvement in peacekeeping. This is much in part due to the fact that feminist security scholars and practitioners have challenged the status quo and brought otherwise unrecognized threats to security into human rights discourses. Their contributions to broaden the definition has worked to include “interpersonal violence, rape, poverty, and environmental destruction” (p. 9), as well as shine light on patriarchal, and masculinist qualities of war that essentialize women’s roles in peacemaking. Overall, feminist security scholars and practitioners have been able to draw more attention to the relationship between security and gender, as well as make sure that women are crucial contributors to development and humanitarian affairs. Feminists’ critical positions of how human security discourse informs gendered forms of violence will shape the analysis portion of this MRP.

Using a gendered approach to address human security, this MRP employs a number of steps in its analysis, as found from the vast perspectives of feminist scholarship on human security (Tripp, et al., 2013). Firstly, it is crucial to examine the linkages between different forms of security issues to understand how various forms of violence experienced in the camp intersect and inform one another. Thus, some attention will be placed on critically analyzing Kenya’s securitization methods to understand how state security threatens the human security of refugee women in Dadaab. Second, an analysis that examines how power is played out between the main actors and refugee women is important, as it will help make sense of how power is exercised and expressed

within Dadaab and how outcomes of insecurity manifest in response. Third, global inequalities must also be considered in order to understand how political powers influence decision-making processes that have direct effects on those within the camp. Another key feature of the human security approach is recognizing that there is still agency of refugee women in Dadaab. Thus, attention placed on the ways in which refugee women contribute to their communities inside the camp is crucial in order to emphasize the concept of human security. Finally, although emergencies may produce gender-based inequalities, there must be an examination of the ways that structural inequalities exist as dynamic problems that incite human insecurity. Thus, I aim to draw attention to various and interlocking intersectionalities of race, gender, sex, ethnicity, etc., as a means to expose political, social and economic structures that underpin insecurity inside Dadaab.

Intersectionality

The term ‘intersectionality’ was first introduced by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) as a Black feminist critique to challenge the single-axis framework within feminist and antiracist discourses for its “tendency to treat race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis” (p. 139). Crenshaw (1989) argued that this single-axis framework made it difficult to valorize the unique experiences and social injustices of black women because it erased forms of their oppression. She proposed an intersectional approach as a solution that would reflect the interlocking nature of social categories. In the context of black women’s oppression, Crenshaw’s (1989) introduction of intersectionality worked as a way of acknowledging the experiences of black women as distinct from those with whom they shared social categories, such as race (i.e. black men) and gender (i.e., white women) categories. In addition, Crenshaw believed that her approach would “reveal how Black women are theoretically erased” within institutionalized systems and discourses (p. 139).

Not only does intersectionality recognize that one's various social determinants are interconnected, it specifically looks at the interlocking nature of these categories: how they inform one another and how they embody distinctive forms of oppression. In other words, the intersectionality of social divisions is not an additive but a constitutive process (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Although, intersectionality initially came about as a mode for conceptualizing what the 'intersection' of race and gender meant specifically for black women's identities and their subjective experiences, today Crenshaw's contributions to feminist thought remain essential in feminist research and praxis. Furthermore, as a social analytical framework, it has made its way into international political arenas such as the United Nations (UN) and other Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) forums, as a tool to tackle issues around gendered barriers (Yuval-Davis, 2006).

Numerous scholars have employed the application of intersectionality within the academy to explore "how issues of race, migration status, history, and social class, in particular, come to bear on one's experience as a woman" (Samuels, et al., 2008, p. 5). Intersectionality has since been described as a process in which women are recognized for experiencing womanhood in different ways, and although facing multiple forms of oppression, are not all powerless by default (Samuels, et al., 2008). It is also a theory that accounts for various other forms of intersectionality, including political, representational, and structural intersectionalities (Shields, 2008). For example, structural intersectionality "reflects the ways in which the individual's legal status or social needs marginalize them, specifically because of the convergence of identity statuses" (p. 304). Indeed, as previously mentioned, there are social and institutional structures in Dadaab that converge with the class, race, gender, and various other dimensions of refugee women's identity. These convergences are what will be examined to uncover how power is exercised against refugee

women. Thus, this particular form will shape the analysis chapter of this MRP to analyze how the different forms of disadvantage intersect, given the role of major actors in Dadaab.

Intersectionality theory can apply to any number of lists of social classifications. Scholars such as Lutz (2002) have produced their own extensive list of possible social divisions, which incorporates “gender; sexuality; ‘race’/skin-colour; ethnicity; nation/state; class; culture; ability; age; sedentariness/origin; wealth; North–South; religion; stage of social development” (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 202). Similarly, Hyndman’s (2004) research on UNHCR policies and their effect on gendered forms of insecurity in Dadaab used an intersectional analysis to examine “the transformation of unequal relations of power across relations of culture, sexuality, nationality, class, gender” (p. 194). In conducting a structural intersectional analysis, Hyndman was able to examine refugee women’s particular positions of subordination under UNHCR as they exist also within the context of Dadaab. Like Hyndman, I aim to conduct a similar analysis, however the aim is to examine how the intersection of the major actors compound the state of refugee women’s insecurity.

It is important to consider gender perspectives of women in conflict so that an intersectional framework is complimentary to the conditions women in conflict are in. A gender perspective is useful because it aids in producing insights into how power places refugee men and women into positions of subordination and oppression in differing ways. Giles and Hyndman (2004) state that “feminist analyses of gender in conflict situations address the politics of social and economic disparities and explore possibilities for changing power imbalances that include gender relations” (p. 4). Indeed, it is because of the very social and political institutions that reproduce gender relations and identities, such as governments and militaries, that an understanding of how gendered politics perpetuate violence is necessary to properly conceive of resolutions.

Cockburn's (2004) gender perspective on women in conflict zones astutely indicates that often gender is both "present and absent in popular perceptions" (p. 25); gender is mentioned but it is not analyzed. In order to effectively develop strategies to reduce conflict and restore peace, she argues that a gender perspective is necessary because it "reveals features of conflict and conflict resolution" (p. 24). Cockburn further suggests that the functioning of gender must be recognized as a relation of power "that compounds other power dynamics" (p. 25). Evidently, a gender perspective cannot be missed if one is attempting to fully grasp how power works in sites of conflict and war.

To expand on these scholars' views, I argue that refugee communities themselves cannot be considered homogenous, especially when taking into account the fact that intersectionality theory works to validate how all social classifications intersect for particular social groups. Indeed, as refugees' individual experiences are not homogenous, refugee women will face their own barriers depending on the refugee community in which they are located. For example, Syrian refugee women in a refugee camp in Lebanon would face distinct barriers to that of Rohingya refugee woman in a refugee camp in Bangladesh. This is because the experiences and challenges of these two groups vary based on not only their intersecting identities, but also as a result of the context in which they are located. Thus, in order to avoid essentializing all refugee women's experiences within similar social classifications, this MRP is mindful that its analysis can largely speak to the presented characteristics of the Dadaab complex.

As Crenshaw (1989) put forth: "With Black women as the starting point, it becomes more apparent how dominant conceptions of discrimination condition us to think about subordination as disadvantage occurring along a single categorical axis" (p. 140). To support this stance, Giles and Hyndman (2004) state that "Knowledge of the ways in which violence occurs provides crucial

clues to its antecedents and consequences and ultimately may serve to prevent its repetition, particularly in the context of war” (p. 4). In this same vein, refugee women as a starting point provides crucial insights into exposing why and how systematic methods to humanitarian assistance render women less visible and their experiences less valorized by institutional powers inside refugee camp spaces. Indeed, an intersectional examination of the Dadaab complex as a site of violence, insecurity, and protracted exile for refugee women will inform the positionality of the main actors in Dadaab that will be identified as the agents of institutional power. These actors will be identified and addressed and in the following chapters.

Literature Review

Forced Migration

The term forced migration has been at the centre of much debate, while during decades of internationally political and economic shifts, scholars have worked to expand the term's parameters to not only represent persons traditionally defined as forced migrants, but to also land on a definition of the term that reflects the movement of persons within an ever-changing globalized world (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, et al., 2014). Forced migration is defined as the involuntary movement of persons due to conflicts and war, environmental/human-made disasters, persecution, and famine (Betts, 2009). Those affected by these movements are defined as displaced persons (DP), internally displaced persons (IDP), asylum seekers, and in many cases, refugees. Forced migration differs from the term voluntary migration in that it is linked to persecution or conflict, whereas voluntary migration is driven by economic factors.

The main concern that has been taken up regarding the term's focus is that it results in the exclusion of migrants who embody both voluntary and involuntary factors. Betts (2009) posits that this distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration is problematic, arguing that "all migrating individuals face structural constraints and all retain a degree of agency to choose between different options" (p. 4). Indeed, although the immediate cause to flee may be what forces someone from their home, Betts suggests that there may still be choice in pursuing actions recognized as voluntary, such as the choosing of a destination, be it internally or externally. However, I would like to add that that this 'choice' should also be considered as a way of mitigating an already harmful situation and minimizing any of the hardship that will most likely arise. In the case of refugee women in Dadaab, this contextualization is crucial in order to recognize the limited ways refugee women make choices when faced with hardship. Furthermore,

it suggests that refugee women, while they maintain agency, also fall victim to power dynamics and conditions surrounding them in camps. Overall, the intersection of internal and external displacement, with voluntary or involuntary migration, demonstrate the complicated nature of reducing a term that represents the ever-changing experiences of migrants.

Refugees who flee to Dadaab are described as forced migrants because for the most part, they are persons who experience two specific forms of displacement. The first is known as conflict and crisis induced displacement, and the second is known as environmental displacement. These forms of displacement will be detailed more thoroughly later on in the literature review. For now, it is important to understand the definition of the two types of displacement. Firstly, conflict and crisis induced displacement refers to political violence occurring in the country of origin” (Kenyon Lischer, 2014, p. 317). It often prompts a decision-making process that factors an individual’s, community’s, or family’s choice to either stay and fight, attempt an escape, or do nothing—this choice typically resulting in negative consequences. More commonly, “threats to children or other vulnerable relations are likely to prompt flight” (p. 325). Furthermore, there are both root causes and proximate causes that motivate conflict and crisis. Proximate causes are known as ethnic cleansing, riots and war, and root causes are seen as political oppression, inequality or historical hatred (Kenyon Lischer, 2014). Both proximate and root causes are characteristic of why people flee to Dadaab.

Environmental displacement on the other hand, is more increasingly recognized as one of the main drivers of population displacement in the twenty-first century as a result of rapid and declining environmental conditions that cause rising sea levels, land erosion and extreme weather patterns, to name a few (Zetter e al., 2014). Unfortunately, the force of environmental degradation is not the only influence of forced migration, as it is also extremely important to address the socio-

political factors that curtail fair and equal opportunity to mobilize in anticipation of environmental destruction. Often it is political and economic power inequalities that “render certain groups more vulnerable to environmental stresses and disasters, while the redistribution of resources in the aftermath of such events frequently acts to further entrench those self-same inequalities” (p. 345). As Somalia is prone to severe droughts and floods, political and environmental instability has caused a total of 2.4 million Somalis to be of concern as of March 2017 (UNHCR, 2017). Of this 2.4 million, 35% are refugees who have crossed into neighbouring states, 62% are IDP and 3% are returnees. Many of these refugees are found in Dadaab to this day.

With regards to refugee flows in Africa, O’Sullivan (2010) informs that there are characteristics specific to this region of the world that make many asylum host states “developing countries with fragile economic and political structures” (p. 155). She notes that mass influx is what constitutes a refugee flow. Historically, forced migrants in Africa have been granted *prima facie*—the recognition by UNHCR or the hosting state of refugee status due to apparent and obvious circumstances that require such persons in need of protection—due to the large-scale nature of refugee flows brought on by severe political, economic, and cultural instability. Additionally, forced migrants in Africa are known for having limited freedom of movement. It is for this reason that refugee’s have been known to seek refuge in neighbouring developing nations because of how restricted their mobility to flee further out often is, speaking to the state of our modern-day refugee regime, which will be further described.

The Feminization of Forced Migration

The feminization of forced migration incorporates the above description of forced migration however, it is furthered by the recognition of the patterns found from the disproportionately high representation of women in positions of involuntary movement. Gusman (2013) describes the

feminization of forced migration as “the phenomenon in which women represent an increasingly disproportionate percentage of displaced population worldwide” (p. 429). In Africa, women and children make up roughly 80 percent of all displaced persons (Matlou, 1999). There are numerous reasons why women and even girls are forcibly displaced, however sexual and gender-based violence are of some of the most prevalent factors. Perhaps the most disturbing phenomenon is the use of women and girls as targets of rape and violence. These acts against them symbolize weapons in the context of war and crisis (Matlou, 1999, p. 133).

Gusman (2013) argues that the only way to understand the growing development of this phenomenon requires use to also recognize that “the factors that drive displacement are inherently tied to the consequences of gender discrimination (p. 431). Indeed, this MRP is interested in how the very factors that cause women to flee are also tied to institutionalized forms of insecurity, and further exacerbated within spaces of protracted encampment. In the Horn of Africa, the feminization of forced migration speaks not only to the disproportionate representation of women in positions of insecurity, it also speaks to the nature of conflict in this specific region, as women in this region are faced with the “worst forms of domestic and cultural violence on record” (Abass, 2010, p. 11).

The Refugee Regime

Historically, the international refugee regime emerged out of a response to the Second World War, which left millions of Europeans displaced (Betts, 2010). At this delicate point in history, which coincided with the Cold War, the United Nations (UN) believed it was necessary to form a body to oversee refugee issues. Thus, in 1950, the UN General Assembly formed UNHCR by establishing a High Commissioner and appointing him with an Office to form a multi-lateral, intergovernmental institution (Loescher, 2017). Originally, UNHCR was to work within Europe

for a total of three years. However, due to the persistence of humanitarian crises world-wide years following the war, the Office of the High Commissioner continued to be appointed the task of managing emergencies beyond the confines of Europe and outward into the international community. Today the 1951 Refugee Convention is a pillar of international law.

The 1951 Refugee Convention is the main treaty that defines the term ‘refugee’, and outlines the rights of the refugee, as well as the legal obligations of those states signed onto the Convention (UN General Assembly, 2007). During a United Nations conference on July 28, 1951, the 1951 Refugee Convention was initially ratified, and held a focus on assisting European refugees (McBride, 2009). Found in Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention, the UN defines a refugee as a person who, “is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (UNHCR, 2010, p. 3). This definition was originally intended for those fleeing persecution as a result of the events of World War II, and thus, it originally upheld restrictions that only addressed those fleeing persecution before January 1, 1951 within the continent of Europe. However, in 1967, an amendment was made to the definition and the geographic and temporal restrictions were dropped (McBride, 2009). The 1967 Protocol addressed the limitation of geography and time, expanding the term ‘refugee’ to include those outside of Europe due to international needs. In the Convention, the most stressed principle is that of non-refoulement, meaning that a refugee should not be sent back to a country where their life is in danger. However, in regions such as Africa, forced repatriation has been a common practice, despite there being many African states that uphold this provision (O’Sullivan, 2010).

Betts (2010) defines the global refugee regime as “the set of norms, rules, principles, and decision-making procedures that regulate States’ responses to refugee protection” (p. 17). As

outlined in the UN Convention, states are to contribute to protecting refugees through the provision of asylum or by participating in burden sharing. However, due to the increase in “globalization and growing interdependence” (p. 20), institutionalized cooperation has caused ‘regime shifting’. Indeed, Betts theorizes that a new form of refugee regime took shape, becoming what he calls a “refugee regime complex” (p. 12). The refugee regime complex accounts for the overlapping dimensions of various institutions, such as the travel and mobility regimes, and their influence on states’ responses to refugees. In particular, Betts draws attention to the fact that the travel regime accounts for the reduction in international cooperation to provide asylum, in particular by Northern states. Traditionally, states provide the provision of asylum by protecting refugees within their borders, and also by contributing to burden-sharing with other states through resettlement or financial donations. However, due to the emergence of a travel security focus that began around the 1980s, states were able to “bypass without overtly violating” their responsibility to the refugee regime.

Consequentially, regime shifting has allowed states to bypass the refugee regime by focusing more on human mobility regulations, which has increasingly resulted in the securitization of borders as well as the securitization of travel (Betts, 2010). Castles (2013) refers to this as the securitization of migration, which is characterized by Western states’ emphasis on state security in the face of increasing threats to human security in the global south. With no political or ideological motives for Western states to resettle African refugees, protracted situations become the norm. Furthermore, the current refugee regime under which Dadaab has made its existence offers little promise for anything but a climate of suspended limbo of encampment, whereby International-Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are reliant on the camps’ impermanent status (Cannon & Fujibayashi, 2018).

Encampment

Loescher & Milner (2005) describe cases of forced migration in Africa as being the “most complex and pressing” (p. 154) protracted refugee situations in the world. They note that these protracted situations are “characterized by long periods of exile, stretching to decades for some groups” (p. 153) within camps, rural settlements and urban centres. Protraction hinders peacemaking and threatens the chance at any future for economic development, and the authors state that the average duration of refugee situations has more than doubled in the past twenty years. Consequentially, refugee camps in African have gained a reputation of being known as protracted spaces privy to security concerns both within and outside camp grounds within the region. Some of these security concerns include militia threats and the “forced recruitment of refugees by armed groups” (p. 160). Furthermore, the possibility to migrate out of Africa and into Western nations in close geographical proximity, such as Europe, is known to be extremely difficult, and thus the protracted nature described persists.

Refugee camps in Africa have become the norm for managing mass influxes of refugees due to resource constraints, disinterest by Western states to share the burden through resettlement, as well as hosting states’ aversion to enabling local integration. In fact, Kenya has one of the most “challenging and protracted refugee situations in Africa” (Loescher & Milner, 2005, p. 154). Refugees are forced into a process that places them into positions of powerlessness once they are trapped inside a space fraught with tensions of power. Indeed, Wilson (2014) argues that although “refugee camps may emulate nomadic encampments in material infrastructure and alleged non-permanence” (p. 40), they represent spaces of control and mobility due to political and practical operations. Similarly, Jaji (2011) argues that encampment in Kenya is justified as “a form of social

technology designed to curb the potential threat posed by refugees to the order created around the nation-state unit of organizing, governing, controlling and containing populations” (p. 222).

Wilson (2014) argues that although “refugee camps may emulate nomadic encampments in material infrastructure and alleged non-permanence” (p. 40), they represent spaces of control and mobility due to political and practical operations. Indeed, refugee camps straddle between sedentary and temporary status; existing as both short-term solutions, and long-term spaces of containment. Refugee camps are often designed with the intention to isolate refugee populations so that more stringent systems of management may be imposed, ultimately segregating refugees from society outside camp borders, and limiting freedom of movement (Horst, 2006). This particular approach to encampment has been argued to negatively impact not only refugees more broadly, but particularly refugee women. This is because of how camp restrictions impede on women’s ability to perform their social responsibilities within their families and communities, as well as to avoid forms of violence, domestic or otherwise.

The Dadaab Complex

Due to famine and ongoing wars in Somalia, “somewhere between one third and one half of the six-to-eight million inhabitants [have] fled their homes” (Rawlence, 2016, p. 11). What had originally opened in the early 1990’s to provide temporary refuge for 90,000 Somali refugees, has now grown into the world’s largest refugee camp known as Dadaab (Kumssa et al., 2014, p. 146). By 2011, the population spiked to roughly half a million (Rawlence, 2016) and is now over 27 years old. Although official UNHCR numbers estimate a population much lower and more controlled than this, there is really no real way to measure the numbers considering that some refugees go unaccounted for due to undocumented pregnancies, etc. (UNHCR, 2010b).

Dadaab is a town and refugee complex, located in Garissa district in the desert of Northeastern Kenya, 110km from the border of Somalia (Adelman, 2005). There is a total of five camps within the Dadaab complex: Ifo, Ifo 2, Dagahaley, Hagadera and Kambioos. The majority of those living in Dadaab come from Somalia, making up more than 94%, along with refugees from Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Burundi (Vu et al., 2). These Somalis have been displaced by economic instability, famine and armed conflicts carried out by the extremist group, al-Shabaab, and refugees from neighboring states have fled for similar reasons.

The living conditions in the Dadaab complex are sub-par to UN standards, and rations are insufficient (Horst, 2006). In fact, the name Dadaab can be translated to mean “the rocky hard place’, because two inches below the red sand are sheets of diamond-hard stone” (Rawlence, 2016, p. 33). This geological feature has meant that Dadaab is located in a part of the Kenyan region that is privy to frequent floods and severe droughts, which has “affected camp infrastructure and transportation logistics, leading to severe consequences for vital services such as the food supply and medical referrals to Garissa and Nairobi” (Chkam, 2016, p. 84).

Due to overcrowding and improper infrastructure, living conditions for refugees are unfavourable, which inflicts a great sense of longing for resettlement, as refugees patiently wait for the day when they can eventually begin their life in a new country (Campbell et al., 2011). This longing is understood in a single word used in Dadaab as, *buffis*, which describes the “...longing, desire or dream to go for resettlement” (Horst, 2006, p. 163), as well as “the madness that at times occurs when the dream to go overseas is shattered” (p. 163). Rather unfortunately, people can begin to go mad or commit suicide while waiting for resettlement, which greatly impedes on their psychological well-being. *Buffis*, therefore, is representative of the in-between state refugees

straddle, as they hope and wait for a better future. Moreover, due to the fact that there is “no proper legal basis for protecting refugees in Kenya” (p. 86) and refugees are not issued proper identity cards, their status is not officially recognized by the Kenyan government.

As a result of the mass influxes of Somali and Sudanese refugees in the 1980’s and 1990’s, Kenya lost control of its ability to manage the numbers and thus sought help from the international community (Horst, 2006). In order to receive proper funding, Kenya “agreed to designate specific areas to house refugees in camps” (p. 19), which the UNHCR assumed responsibility of. Although the passing over of responsibility to UNHCR attracted more donors, resulting in a positive advancement, the government of Kenya required that refugees be organized into larger camps to avoid the spreading of refugees throughout the country (Horst, 2006). This negatively affected refugees because they lost the freedom of movement, along with the ability to integrate into the local communities. Dadaab was remotely developed to achieve just this; to isolate the refugee population from Kenyan society where UNHCR could manage the issue out of sight and mind.

Refugee Women

In refugee camps in East Africa, women make up more than half the refugee population, and UNHCR has considered them at risk and in urgent need of resettlement due to gendered threats to security (Veney, 2007). As of present, women’s gendered experiences of persecution are not found within the international definition of a refugee, and thus, it remains more difficult for women to qualify for resettlement (Kelley, 2002). Consequently, encampment may exist as a long-term, protracted humanitarian ‘solution’ for refugee women while they remain on the margins and in the midst of displacement. The contained nature of encampment has been argued to impact refugee women negatively because of how camp restrictions impede on their ability to perform their social responsibilities to their families and communities. Most concerningly, it also exposes women to

the threat of various forms of sexual and gender-based violence (GBV) due to the pervasive nature of this phenomenon within Dadaab.

As previously stated, more than 94% of refugees living in Dadaab are Somali. In the case of Somali women, Veney (2007) points out that there are a number of factors to consider for why they flee from their homes and seek refuge in Dadaab. Firstly, due to the high demand of combatants, men may stay behind during civil conflicts and wars for either volunteering or being enlisted to fight alongside military or rebel groups, leaving women to be forced to flee. Another factor is that women become no longer able to cater to household and farming tasks because the threat of violence is in their communities. Women may also be subjected to sexual violence and rape during times of conflict and war, and thus have no choice but to flee or face unimaginable violence. As a result of these potential manifestations of insecurity, refugee camps are recognized as viable options for women who may have children, are pregnant, or are caring for elders and sick family members. This is because there is a standard level of assistance and care that the camps provide so as to share some of the burden women face.

Despite these aforementioned circumstances taking place outside camp boundaries, women may also endure rape and the loss of children while en-route to reach Dadaab (Dar, 2011). Lacking protection, they arrive at an enclosure where “sexual exploitation, enslavement and rape are prevalent” (Lee, 1989). The insecurity of women, particularly while alone and without a male family member, is woven into the daily lives inside the complex and can occur under many circumstances (Veney, 2007). The most prevalent problem facing women in camps is GBV. GBV can occur from the threat of both strangers and family members and is a symptom of larger overarching issues within the camp that exacerbate women’s safety, such as poor infrastructure and lack of security, to name a few (Kumssa, 2014). Consequently, GBV is not an isolated issue,

despite the fact that it “remains largely under-reported and unrecognized among refugee ... populations” (Vu et al, 2017).

Freedman (2015) points out that solidarity is not always experienced within refugee camps because the structure of the family goes through a process of disruption during their transition into the camps, and as such, women may be particularly vulnerable to forms of domestic violence. The new and imposing structure within the camp that shifts power from the men of the family to the camp staff may be perceived as oppressive and threaten the man’s sense of identity, thus potentially leading him to act out against the women in their communities. Another way women experience GBV in Dadaab is when they are required to fetch firewood and food rations in unsafe and far-off places (Kumssa, 2014). The UNHCR had not always provided the means for gathering firewood at a central locality within the complex grounds. It has been reported that women who range in age from 12 to 50 (Crisp, 2000) have not only had to travel long distances to fetch firewood, they have often done so alone. Due to this, they can be easily targeted by local ‘bandits’ or *shiftas*, who travel in large packs and carry with them weapons that may be used during attack (Freedman, 2015). In addition to this encounter, these *shiftas* may also attack women when they are within the confines of their home while they are going about important daily tasks in the camps.

One woman’s experience of gender-based violence is highlighted in Jane Freedman’s *Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate*. This account demonstrates the negotiation women must go through in order to survive. The following passage is a clear example of a refugee women in Dadaab explaining that she must accept encounters of rape over the possibility of death:

Intruders come into your house in the middle of the night. They know the door to your dwelling, search the house, and when they don’t find anything, they take you away and

rape you. You come back to your house and then tomorrow you are raped again. There is no security whatsoever here. How many times have we been raped now? We have become grateful that it is only rape. Being only raped by this stranger becomes a luxury. When you have to choose between being raped and being killed, you think that it is better to be raped (Freedman, 2015, pp. 39-40).

Here, rape is described as a normalized and more preferable alternative to the real and prevalent possibility of death; an option that women in fact hope for. Not only are women unsafe when alone and unaccompanied, they are also unsafe within the privacy of their own home, and during hours of rest. This account also speaks to the poor housing conditions and lack of proper infrastructure within the Dadaab complex, which aids in perpetuating a high level of pervasive insecurity. Moreover, due to the “climate of fear” women live in (Horst, 2006), they refrain from reporting cases of rape for fear it might lead to ongoing harassment, or, extend further onto the family and threaten the life of their male partners. For fear of their male partners being killed by the accused bandits if they attempt to collect the firewood themselves, men do not get involved. Moreover, it has been cited by survivors that police are complicit and lax with shiftas, which increases the level of shame women experience and also builds distrust and loss of hope. Ultimately, it becomes the responsibility of women who are left with no choice but to submit to their state of insecurity as they silently go about daily tasks and obligations (Freedman, 2015).

There have been attempts to curtail the threat of violence against women in Dadaab, but little success has been made. For example, in the late 1990’s the United States Government funded The German Organisation for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) to implement the ‘Firewood Project’ to regularly distribute firewood within the complex, however a study in 2001 concluded that there was no real proof that rape had decreased (qtd. by CASA Consulting, Horst, 2006). In a more

recent account as of 2016, Rawlence reasserts in *City of Thorns* that limited access to firewood is still an issue, and women are returning from their journeys showing signs of assault.

Veney (2007) informs that UNHCR has guidelines in place that aim to specifically improve living conditions for women. These guidelines involve proper camp designs that place washrooms close to dwellings and closer food distribution centres, as well as adequate services to protect women. However, the lack of funding has proven difficult to achieve these guidelines, and so insecure conditions persists. In addition, international and human rights laws, such as the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination and Platform of Action (1993) and the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action (1995), that various countries have signed onto to ensure the safety of women, are not always enforced. Regardless of these aforementioned guidelines that exist on paper, little of it exists in practice and women bear the brunt of the neglect.

As these insecurity issues demonstrate, women's experience of violence is a violation of their human rights, particularly because of the explicit nature of these issues being categorized as GBV. There is no mention in the literature that the Kenyan government has recognized and condemned these heinous acts, nor does the international community hold Kenya responsible for improving the currently inadequate security measures that directly target women. Furthermore, the attempts mentioned that the UNHCR has made to improve conditions for women have not nearly reduced the numbers of rapes, and lack of funding is a consistent hindrance on the development of social and health programs.

An Intersectional Analysis of Power in Dadaab

The main question this chapter seeks to address is: how can an analysis of power between refugee women and the four major actors in the Dadaab refugee complex help us better understand how different forms of harm by the major actors converge to negatively impact the lives and well-being of refugee women? I echo that of Ssenyonio (2010) who puts forth the idea that distinct forms of discrimination disproportionately affect refugee women in Africa due to the intersection of their various and overlapping identity categories. Certainly, Dadaab is no exception. However, it is the very nature of these overlapping identity categories additionally intersecting with institutional structures in Dadaab that prompt further analysis. Therefore, I will approach the analysis by first examining the role of each major actor in isolation. I seek to understand how the actors' positions of power place refugee women in severe and fixed states of oppression. In doing so, I will then lay out evidence to support the notion that each actor's exertion of power is intricately woven together to exacerbate refugee women's insecurity in Dadaab.

In addition, I aim to set up the analysis so as to lay out a strong and concise argument that will initiate the conceptualization of the shared responsibility of refugee women's insecurity in Dadaab. Indeed, to return back to Parekh's (2014) argument, the ontological deprivation of refugees ought to be of more concern within discourses—philosophical or otherwise—that tend to favour legal considerations and injustices. Morally, a refugee's state of existence must be measured beyond legal protections seeing as social conditions are still subpar in Dadaab. Furthermore, a burden sharing approach to women's insecurity in Dadaab will be proven a reasonable approach to the collective state of power held over refugee women. The analysis begins by examining the role of the Kenyan government. Following this, I look at the role of UNHCR, then the more

abstract, yet still noticeable presence of the United States government, and finally that of the refugee community in Dadaab.

1st Actor: The Kenyan Government

Kenya is identified as a major actor in Dadaab by virtue of them being the hosting state. For over a quarter of a century, Kenya has played host to over half a million refugees in Dadaab alone and are also host to refugees in the North-West of the country, with the establishment of Kakuma refugee camp (UNHCR, 2015). Refugee camps in Kenya have grown a reputation of being protracted spaces of control and refugees have long been viewed by the government as threats to security (Mogire, 2009; Wilson, 2014). As long as Kenya has had the responsibility and authority to manage high refugee influxes, they have dealt with this phenomenon through a number of state-centred approaches, which prioritize state security over human security. Consequentially, through some of these approaches, Kenya has disregarded Human Rights Law, as well as the country's commitment to ensuring the safety of refugees as a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). However, because the OAU encourages political and economic development between nation states, the 1969 Convention subserves as a guide to Kenya's security responses by taking away the human and political rights of refugees. In fact, it was not until 2006 that Kenya put into effect a national refugee law. Their reasoning for it being postponed was because they felt it "would impose restrictions on what the government can legally do with regard to refugees" (Mogire, 2009, p. 20).

Although the Kenyan government stepped away from its direct responsibility from Dadaab for the obvious fact that they could not manage the numbers alone, it was also because they did not have the desire to do so. In fact, the progression and ongoing nature of Dadaab is not of long-term interest to the Kenyan government. In 2016, Kenya went so far as to attempt to close the

Dadaab complex, however a High Court ruling blocked it on the grounds that it went against the country's constitution (Bloom, 2017). In response, the government claimed they'd appeal this decision for security reasons (Bloom, 2017), as their main complaint with Dadaab was that the complex produces dangerous persons that threaten the security of the state (qtd. in IRIN, Rutledge & Roble, 2010). Prior to this, Kenya had closed its border with Somalia on numerous occasions on the account that they wanted to prevent Somali refugees from crossing over, such as in July 1999 and again in January 2007 (Mogire, 2009). The uncertainty as to whether or not Somali refugees were in fact disingenuously seeking refuge for ulterior motives was enough of a justification for the government.

The unprecedented influxes of refugees in the 1990's—which followed a period when Kenya practiced a more open-door policy—prompted the denial of asylum, detention and forced repatriation of refugees ensued (Mogire, 2009). As a result, encampment became a “working policy” and refugees were punished if found outside of complex grounds (Campbell et al., 2011, p. 6). Mogire (2009) notes that the Sudan People's Liberation Army, as well as Somali militias have controlled refugee populations, recruited refugees, as well as “forced refugees to make financial and food contributions to support their armed activities” (p. 18). It is for this reason that the government has been determined for some time to close their borders with Somalia, notwithstanding the fact that it goes against international law. They are concerned that “terrorists could utilise refugee channels to infiltrate the country, cover their activities or to recruit the dissatisfied refugee population” (Mogire, 2009). Furthermore, it has been argued that Kenya maintains a religious prejudice toward Somalis (Rutledge & Roble, 2010).

The securitization practices of the Kenyan government reinforce a state security approach to addressing humanitarian issues found within their borders. Although Kenya is landlocked

between a number of countries, including Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania, the refugees they have hosted are not limited to these states. Their geo-strategic location has both targeted them as hosting state and has also given them the political clout to decide the fates of migrants forced to flee towards their borders and seek refuge within. Furthermore, there is an underlining Islamophobic tone that emerges out of the security rhetoric from the government because of the fact that the majority of Somalis are predominantly Muslim, while Kenya is a majority Christian state (Rutledge & Roble, 2010). In fact, Kenya's 'fear' of Muslim refugees has gone so far as to 'other' Somalis and has "served as sufficient cause to deny forced migrants both their human rights and their humanness in the discourse of violence and of existence" (p. 161).

Kenya's strategic selection of the geographical location of Dadaab has rendered the area exposed to militia entering the camp and attacking refugees (Jaji, 2010). The belief is that such a location allows the government to maintain control over the refugee population until full repatriation is made possible, whilst maintaining a highly securitized border (Mogire, 2009). Undoubtedly, militarization on the part of rebels, extremists and refugees has disrupted order and brought on banditry and arms trafficking inside Dadaab. However, the result being a classification of refugees as security threats does speak to the Kenya's problematic approach of othering and homogenizing refugees. Militarization in this context exposes the political and social insecurities within the region, and it is this homogenization underlines Kenya's effort to reinforce state security over human security.

The government's attempt to close down Dadaab also highlights some cracks in the overall refugee regime system. Firstly, it proves that the current refugee regime is inherently flawed. This can be argued because without the full support and endorsement by Kenya to maintain Dadaab and improve its infrastructure, refugees housed within are destitute, as there are no other states who

demonstrate a willingness to share any of the burden with Kenya. Secondly, there is an irony found within the fact that Dadaab being characterized as a space of control presents impermanence in favour of the Kenyan government, whilst representing a space of “rootedness” (Wilson, 2014) for refugees. In other words, Kenya benefits while Dadaab remains impermanent, while for refugees, the complex persists as a space of restriction, control, permanence, and protraction. In Kenya, the up-to-date UNHCR figures show that 78% of the state’s refugees are women and children (UNHCR Kenya, 2018). Consequently, the environment in which refugees seek protection is disproportionately unstable for women due to its highly securitized, yet highly insecure status (Tripp, et al., 2013).

There are multiple tensions that can be found at place. Seeing as the human security argument seeks to challenge the pre-established notion that considers state security a priority over human security, it could be argued that by virtue of the government disregarding human security as a means to prioritize the security of their borders, the site of Dadaab as protracted and controlled reinforces violence within. As women are deterred from leaving the complex, it can have particular consequences for those who may be required to travel further outside the complex grounds to collect firewood and food rations (Veney, 2011). Furthermore, the protracted and controlled nature of Dadaab indicates that insecurity remains prolonged so long as conditions are unaddressed. Indeed, a shift away from state security is the only reasonable solution seeing as the government also hinders how humanitarian assistance is managed.

Furthermore, as will be discussed in the following section, UNHCR is limited with how they can go about providing humanitarian assistance to refugees. If we find a state security focus as the backdrop of Dadaab, this means it sets the tone for the climate in which UNHCR works and refugees live. First, it devalues the life of a refugee by suggesting that their presence is only

welcome temporarily and that their security is less important than that of the state. Second, Kenya causes direct challenges for UNHCR's programming, as it limits how far UNHCR can effectively go in order to provide above sub-par assistance. This complicated dynamic between Kenya and UNHCR works to erase refugees of their ontological right to protection because the focus on state security remains the control of the state and UNHCR is therefore unable to intervene. It can not be denied that Kenya presents an intimidating stance to ensure that their power is visible over other parties. In doing so, the ignorance of refugees' vulnerability and dependency results in a choice by the Kenyan government.

2nd Actor: UNHCR

UNHCR is recognized as the second major actor in Dadaab due to the fact that they manage and run operations of the refugee complex. UNHCR is also the main humanitarian and non-governmental organization (NGO) that works with Kenya to adhere to the state's laws and refugee policies, while controlling and providing aid to the refugee population. The NGO's work in Dadaab has been occurring since Kenya relinquished control of the influxes in the 1990s. In fact, it is generally believed that UNHCR is more efficient than Kenya because "they are smaller and have less complex organizational structures" (Matlou, 1999, p. 131).

In Dadaab, UNHCR registers and keeps track of the population, provides core relief items and life-saving aid, as well as maintains housing, WASH, food distribution and healthcare programs within the camps, alongside the consultation of other local and international NGO's who help UNHCR with the operations of such programs. Outside this context, UNHCR's broader work also involves engaging in international diplomacy between nation-states on the subject of migration to improve international relations, as well as to assist in repatriation, resettlement, local integration, and in some cases, to help improve conditions for the internally displaced.

In Kenya, local integration into urban areas is not permitted by the Kenyan government, as it goes against their non-integration policy, despite there already being a small refugee population residing outside Dadaab and Kakuma (UNHCR, 2015; Jaji, 2011). Additionally, outside refugee camps, urban spaces provide more relative security, a sense of community and the freedom to work and make independent decisions (Jaji, 2011). To exacerbate the situation, a very small portion of refugees will ever be selected as the lucky who will resettle in hosting countries (Campbell et al., 2011). Indeed, as previously stated, most refugees in Dadaab long for resettlement without ever having the chance (Horst, 2006). In fact, statistics show that less than one percent of refugees residing in camps will ever actually make it into a major resettlement country (Rawlence, 2016).

On November 10, 2013, a Tripartite Agreement was signed between UNHCR, Kenya and Somalia to initiate a voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees (UNHCR, 2015). Since December 2014, UNHCR has been working together with both governments to implement an operations strategy that assists in the safe and guided voluntary repatriation for Somali refugees to return back to their homes. Refugees are given cash assistance and core relief items to help with their transition, and reintegration assistance is also made available. This strategy is one way to mitigate Kenya's encampment policy, and UNHCR suggests that a total of 82% of Somali refugees "would like to return home if peaceful conditions prevailed" (p. 5). Unfortunately, however, conditions in Somalia remain unsafe for returning home. UNHCR's plan to repatriate up to 10,000 refugees by 2015 resulted in a mere 2, 589 repatriations (p. 5). Furthermore, refugees remain dependant on UNHCR for money and assistance, which can perpetuate the existing power structures within Dadaab.

Despite UNHCR's work being to ensure the protection and rights of all refugees, there seems to be some contradicting opinions notably by staff. For example, some staff believe that

refugees are better off living outside camps, due to their dangerous nature (Smith, 2004), whereas others believe that camps are the best option for refugees because of the unstable state of the region. For example, Jaji (2011) found in her study on refugee camp administration in Kenya that UNHCR staff held a general opinion that normalized the protracted nature of refugee camps. Overall, staff believed that a refugee's only chance at being freed of encampment would be when peace was restored in their respective countries. Moreover, the UNHCR Community Services Officer supported the fact that refugees were required to remain inside camps as it was "in conformity to the Kenyan government's encampment regulation" (p. 225). Furthermore, the UNHCR Global Consultations on International Protraction defines a protracted refugee situation as "one where, over time, there have been considerable changes in refugees' needs, which neither UNHCR nor the host country have been able to address in a meaningful manner" (Smith, 2004, p. 38). This proves that UNHCR is aware of the fact that refugees are left in a state of dependency and stripped of basic rights, however as an organization, they lack consistency.

With regards to the security and safety of refugee women, UNHCR has a gender-mainstreaming policy that requires all actors in the refugee regime to abide by. These actors include but are not limited to: politicians, administrations, researchers and experts, NGO's and supranational institutions, as well as the media (UNHCR, 1998). UNHCR states that there needs to be a political will as a prerequisite for gender mainstreaming. Indeed, it seems that in the case of Dadaab, UNHCR displays strong policy rhetoric, however struggle to implement necessary policies into practice. Furthermore, policies lack meaning if they are not actually taken seriously by Kenya, which seems to be evident regarding the fact that they maintain a strict encampment policy. Consequentially, UNHCR is working within an already restrictive climate that is

disinterested in the everyday consequences of camp life for refugees, and specifically refugee women.

Women under UNHCR programming are also subject to gender essentializing. Hyndman's (2004) research suggests that one of the biggest concerns of UNHCR is that its work tends to essentialize 'woman' and 'culture' in its response to humanitarian emergencies because its "policy subsumes cultural difference within a single framework of emergency planning" (p. 194). More specifically, she argues that "the frequent use of the category 'women' by UNHCR as a primary organizing concept often essentializes and reinforces the primacy of female difference over ethnic, clan, and other dimensions of difference" (p. 200). Despite gender differences being a focus of UNHCR's humanitarian assistance program, the work is not always realized in practice because "Less attention is paid to the everyday ways in which the institutional culture of humanitarian organizations is gendered" (p. 193).

The fact that context specific characteristics of Dadaab culture and the needs of the specific community of women are overlooked speaks to the unsuccessful programmatic attempts to improve women's daily tasks, such as the firewood project (Horst, 2006). If UNHCR acts on policies that are standardized across cultures and fails to focus attention on what needs make the Dadaab community unique, the implementation of improved policies will cease to succeed. Additionally, if the specific conditions that constitute refugee women's needs in Dadaab are glossed over because UNHCR's policies position refugee women within a standardized framework, women's insecurity will also not be eliminated, let alone significantly reduced.

Another problematic outcome of UNHCR's programming is the fact that "refugees remain the objects—rather than the subjects—of humanitarian planning" (Hyndman, 2004, p. 203). Objectives by UNHCR tend to be applied universally, although they may not easily translate from

one refugee camp to the next. For example, programming that targets women often focuses on traditionally gendered female roles, such as women the production of tie dye clothing and fabric, or caring for children with disabilities, whereas programming targeted to men seem to promote roles such as tailoring and participating in community leadership workshops (Matlou, 1999).

We can also identify this objectification to the ways UNHCR perpetuates itself and conducts fundraising strategies. Yanguas (2018) argues that there is a stronger emphasis in humanitarian aid on delivering relief rather than providing refugees with the tools necessary to allow them to overcome their state of vulnerability because of the idea that donors are more attracted to camps if they can see immediate results, which are often temporary. This is known to keep donors committed to the cause. Similarly, Cannon & Fujibayashi (2018) argue that UNHCR is an example of an organization that works to perpetuate themselves because “their first priority is to attract charitable contributions by being seen to be active in high-visibility situations” (p. 29). Indeed, with the shift in the refugee regime, it is not surprising that UNHCR has to reinvent their traditional role amongst the politics of other regimes (Betts, 2010). This also means that fundraising, diplomacy, and programming may compromise on being attentive to the nuances within refugee camps because they are not necessarily relevant to the short-term goals the organization has.

Development and humanitarian programs such as those of UNHCR, reappropriate normalized and essentialized constructions of the refugee woman. Indeed, it can be argued that UNHCR pushes their political and bureaucratic agendas at the expense of refugees daily lived-experiences. I do not suggest that UNHCR is unconcerned with the well-being of refugee women, or that they intentionally inflict enduring harm within the operations of the complex. UNHCR is limited with how they can manage the camp because of their responsibility to the Kenyan

government for providing the land on which Dadaab rests (Routledge & Roble, 2010). While UNHCR is required to follow through with Kenya's policies, they still control, operate and design programming that is used universally inside the complex, and they also construct an image to the public as a means to attract donors. What I put forth as a crucial argument that there requires more of an understanding of how UNHCR exercises and uses their power to advance, which consequently targets the security of refugee women. To some degree, UNHCR controls the image of refugee women in Dadaab, aids in perpetuating a state of dependency women are forced within, as well as controls an environment that is not conducive to refugee women's needs within Dadaab.

3rd Actor: The United States Government

The United States government, although not directly affiliated with Dadaab, plays a crucial role in the state of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as in the fate of resettlement for African refugees. Therefore, the United States should be included as a major actor in Dadaab in order for the discussion to incorporate a holistic understanding of the various dimensions of power: power as localized, but also power that is enacted externally and on a global scale. With the recognition in this MRP of encampment as Africa's current and ongoing refugee policy, it is also pertinent that we understand what other, non-African, nations are doing in response to such a policy. The United States is an important nation to interrogate, as it is the largest donor country to UNHCR (UNHCR, 2007), and also of importance is the fact that its geographical location means that it does not directly deal with mass migrant influxes the way that Kenya inevitably does, but does so through a selective resettlement program. Furthermore, The United States has a history of military presence in the Horn of Africa, which cannot be set apart from the discussion. Their political objectives intersect with those of the other major actors in Dadaab to compound refugee women's insecurity.

Within the refugee regime, rich nations--often located in the West—hold political and economic clout over other nations, in particular, over nations who produce the majority of the world’s refugees (Betts, 2010; Castles, 2013). The United States has the largest resettlement program in the world, despite the fact that numbers have dropped significantly since the 1990’s. Indeed, the ‘war on terror’ finds its expression in this era of the refugee regime. Yacob-Haliso (2016) argues that the events of 9/11, the economic recession of the early 2000’s, and increasing xenophobia, all speak to reasons why the United States and other Western nations have reduced the number of refugees they resettle. Similarly, Esbenshade (2011) makes an interesting contribution through the argument that DNA testing on “African refugees who claimed to be family members of refugees already in the United States” (p. 176) also speaks to this decline. In 2008, the government performed DNA testing on seven African nations, with Kenya included. Ironically, this genetic profiling, which prompted a termination of the Priority 3 program (family reunification program), is a reinforcement of the United States’ international dominance over other nations globally, as it clearly illustrates how the government is able to decide the level to which they wish to support other nations in burden sharing.

In addition to the aforementioned facts to support the argument that the United States is a major actor of Dadaab, the country’s long-standing military presence in Africa warrants further scrutiny. Through the mid-late 1900’s, superpowers like the United States played a key role in conflicts in Africa, which has persisted as ongoing civil conflicts into the present day (Loescher & Milner, 2005, p. 156). Not only did the United States forces remain in Somalia until 1993, the government has also intervened in Somalia alongside Kenya to fight the Islamic extremist group, Al-Shabaab (qtd. in IRIN, Rutledge & Roble, 2010). Thus, once their decision was to withdraw

from the region, it only further exacerbated conflict, which consequentially contributed to the rise in refugee numbers by the end of the 1990's. (Loescher & Milner, 2005).

Loescher & Milner (2005) add to the discussion by stating that repatriation is not favoured by either donor countries or countries of origin. They argue that: "So long as refugees were engaged in guerrilla warfare against enemy countries, the United States showed little interest in large- scale return" (p. 156). In fact, the United States dropped from close to 9000 resettlement submissions in 2011 to less than 1000 submissions by 2017 (UNHCR, 2018, p. 8). Throughout the years, the United States has also been increasingly asserting their control within the travel regime. For example, "carrier sanctions, more intricate bilateral visa regimes, readmission agreements, detention, international zones at airports, and the use of biometric data have emerged as common practices to regulate travel" (Betts, 2010, p. 24).

These examples support the notion that the United States holds a leading position of power internationally, which cannot be ignored when discussing context specific issues, such as women's insecurity in Dadaab. Certainly, the actions of the United States are larger, overarching consequences that trickle down and touch the lives of refugees. In addition, the United States plays the largest role in fighting terror in Africa by putting money into strengthening the government in Somalia (Brune, 1998). In doing so, they play into the already dominant state security discourse, which does not concern the human security of forced migrants. Thus, refugee women are consequently the last group on their radar, and as a result, civil conflicts, reductions in resettlement numbers and encampment is an unavoidable reality that bolsters the already insecure environment that refugee women live within.

4th Actor: Refugee Community

The final actor I wish to include as one of Dadaab's major actors is the refugee community itself that resides in Dadaab, which is comprised of predominantly Muslim Somalis. I argue that this group is particularly sensitive to interrogate, as the research strongly points out that the refugee population overall is vulnerable to many of the factors that have been detailed in this MRP. Thus, it is for this main reason that I wish not to place any direct blame on the community or target them in any specific way without being mindful of their experiences of unfair treatment in relation to their assertion of power over refugee women. In essence, the harm inflicted on the refugee community can be argued to be what produces sequence reactions, which in turn create some of the social issues perpetrated against refugee women. Therefore, I posit that the MRP's analysis is incomplete if it overrides this important contextual element: the power dynamics between the refugee community and refugee women is by virtue symptomatic of the larger dynamics at play between the refugee community and the other major actors.

Traditionally, Somalis are pastoral nomads (Wilson, 2014). For centuries, they have roamed freely throughout East Africa, however inside Dadaab, they are argued to be culturally unequipped to handle the more immobile lifestyle that is thrust upon them. This is further exacerbated by the fact that they are at the mercy of UNHCR policies and staff authority, and under the political framework of the Kenyan regime. Indeed, the nature of the refugee regime means that refugees are forcefully propelled out of their homes and into a systematic process where they are then scrutinized, categorized, and even stripped of their individual identities whilst given protection letters and ration cards in place of passports (Jaji, 2011). Furthermore, refugees are treated as dependents and given little autonomy, and as previously stated, they are denied the

freedom of movement (Horst, 2006). In essence, the refugee community feels mistreated for being homogenized and stripped of their mobility rights (Loescher & Milner, 2009).

As a consequence of the community's process of destabilization once adjusted to encampment, women are subject to marginalization in disproportionate ways in Dadaab. Ssenyonjo (2011) argues that this is due to the fact that their lives are primarily found within the private sphere. As already mentioned in the Literature Review chapter, the traditional structure of the family is threatened within the complex enclosure due to UNHCR bureaucracy (Freedman, 2015). Staff are inserted into many familial and community decision-making processes where they are able to exercise power over the patriarchal figures of the household. As such, hierarchies of authority are replaced in Dadaab, causing the patriarchal figures—predominately the male figures of the household—to act out against the women. This disruption of social order within families produces tensions within the community where women may be targeted (Kumsaa, 2014; Freedman, 2015).

It is reportedly not uncommon for violence against women to occur from a family member due to familial tensions. Scholars (Freedman, 2015; Crisp, 2000) suggest that women are subjected to myriad forms of violence such as rape, domestic abuse, and genital mutilation—a tradition widely practiced tradition amongst Somalis in Dadaab (Crisp, 2000). Such incidents by the refugee community on refugee women strongly correlate to support the argument that power in Dadaab intersects to compound refugee women's insecurity. Although the actions of larger actors, such as Kenya, may affect the refugee population on a whole, and particularly refugee women, it also ripples outward and prompts additional violations. Therefore, despite some of the problems stemming from other factors and other major actors within this group, it is important to include

the refugee community because it is exemplary of how pervasive power hierarchies can target women.

Discussion

When analyzed in isolation, the research strongly demonstrates that the presence of each of the four major actors in Dadaab produce conditions that disfavour refugee women. However, it is the intersection of patriarchal, imperial and geopolitical domination that, when woven together, reinforces and strengthens this uneven relation of power to construct women in subordination. The research strongly shows that women are not only targeted for their gender in Dadaab, they are also targeted for their position of class, and religious affiliation, arguing that the interlocking identity categories of refugee women in Dadaab are unique and must therefore be examined as an isolated case. Furthermore, gender-based violence due to a lack of proper human security measures, the reinforcement of gendered roles in the complex, the forcible isolation of refugees into protracted spaces, and domestic abuse, have all been demonstrated to ensue under a geopolitical and humanitarian structure that displays both exertions of power, as well as a delineation of power. In effect, a phenomenon occurs in Dadaab whereby refugee women are particularly vulnerable to many forms of violence on varying levels due to what I call a discordance of power amongst the major actors.

To elaborate on this discordance, or lack of harmony amongst major actors, I turn first to the dependence of the Kenyan government on the United States government. As the refugee regime currently exists, Kenya will need to rely on the help and support of Western states to bear the burden of refugees. The United States is therefore the most important relationship that Kenya can maintain, seeing as they are the largest hosting country and that their influence in fighting Islamic extremism continues. However, without the United States' support to resettle refugees or intervene

in political conflicts, Kenya is vulnerable to withstanding this burden independently. It also suggests that Kenya must accept the drawn-out status of Africa's geopolitical situation. Indeed, power is not evenly distributed on even the most macro level of Dadaab's political climate. Consequentially, the Kenyan government is faced with constraints that prompt decision making processes that favour state security while disregarding their obligation toward ensuring that human security is upheld in confines of the complex.

The relationship between the Kenyan government and UNHCR is another crucial element to consider. Due to the fact that the Kenyan government refuses to recognize Dadaab as a place of permanence, despite the complex's age, UNHCR becomes essentially restricted from implementing programs that have more stability and longevity, such as improving infrastructure within the camps. This exertion of power on the part of the Kenyan government results in a situation where UNHCR is constrained from improving upon or fulfilling their duties and responsibilities. As the leading humanitarian NGO on the ground that is responsible to protect and advocate for the rights and well-being of refugees, they fall short. This power dynamic can also be seen to restrict UNHCR from being able to exercise more of their institutional power since their basic functions as the humanitarian body are in constant control by Kenya. To expand even further on this example, the contentious relationship between UNHCR and Dadaab's refugee community exacerbates the lack of harmony amongst major actors. Indeed, UNHCR exercises their power in a way that threatens the refugee community, which also restricts those of patriarchal domination in the community from asserting their power, as well. Unfortunately, as I have demonstrated, refugee women are always found as the recipients of the harmful consequences of failed power struggles amongst the major actors.

My analysis demonstrates that the convergence of power of the major actors forms a reinforced mechanism of subordination against refugee women in Dadaab, due to a dissonance between the actors. In essence, any reasonable change to occur in order for women's safety to improve relies heavily on a concerted effort amongst all actors to mindfully alter how decision-making processes impact the lives of the most vulnerable living in Dadaab. Based on my research findings, I would like to suggest only two real and steadfast options for the long-term improvement of refugee women's insecurity, although this is not limited to just women but the well-being of all refugees. My belief is that only with more mobility rights and geopolitical stabilization will the phenomenon of women's insecurity in Dadaab be relatively reduced. Without these major adjustments, insecurity for refugee women will most likely worsen in time, due to the continuation of protraction.

The first suggestion I would like to put forth is two-pronged. I suggest that refugees should be allowed more mobility rights. This includes both the right to exit and enter the camps and migrate into urban centres, as well as placing more attention on improving and strengthening resettlement assistance in Western nations. This may require a concerted effort on the part of donor countries, hosting countries, NGO's, etc. so that a more reliable resettlement process may ensue. However, I would like to add that it is my firm belief that no person should be forced to say goodbye to their home, customs and communities in order to seek safety, and therefore this suggestion is only one that mitigates the real issue of encampment all together. Furthermore, this suggestion would require a lot of work on the part of the major actors, Kenya, UNHCR, and the United States, as there are currently no real mobility rights for refugees in Dadaab, nor is there any promising resettlement program on the part of the largest donor and resettlement country in the world—the United States. As a result of this suggestion, I firmly believe that women would not

only have the option to remove themselves from an isolated and dangerous climate, but they would also have access to more resources found within the urban centres, which would allow them to reclaim more control over their livelihoods. Of course, the utopic ideal would mean that encampment would no longer have a reason to exist as the only site for refuge, if refugee women and their communities so choose.

The other conceivable option for real improvement—however it being perhaps the most complex—is for Western nations, NGO's, the UN and other influencing bodies to collectively find solutions to the political and economic instability in Africa, and the Horn of Africa in particular. The civil warfare in the Horn of Africa is destructive on many counts and creates a climate of insecurity that multiplies and is magnified onto refugee women's identities, livelihoods, and lived-experiences. This process must involve a shift in the order and systemization of these actors to become more mindful of how their formations cause social and ontological harm to marginalized groups that are reliant upon or found within the fabric of these institutional powers that be. If neither of the two suggestions are plausible, camp infrastructure must be taken more seriously. This will require that Kenya view Dadaab as permanent, with the potential to serve both refugee community and Kenyan state. Indeed, a human security approach that does not ignore state security is possible, however, more attention to the myriad ways insecurity manifests into the lives of refugee women is critical at this stage in Dadaab's existence.

Conclusion

The initial aim of this paper was to better understand how a more effective approach to eliminating women's insecurity in Dadaab could be conceivable. I asked myself: how is it that women are still, to this day, suffering from violence and insecurity in Dadaab, despite the fact that the camp has been the only home many of these refugee women have ever known? I felt deeply concerned by the fact that more than twenty-five years later, refugee women were still left to fend to their own devices, which has resulted today in the self-acceptance of their situation simply due to a lack of responsibility on the part of those who hold significant influence in Dadaab. Therefore, I was certain that with decades of research behind us, the only approach moving forward would be to examine all actors that had a longstanding history throughout Dadaab's existence, and also remained influential today.

In this MRP, I sought to place feminist approaches at the centre of the research by employing both human security and intersectionality to make up the theoretical framework. Human security has supported the increasing need to shift the focus away from state security approaches and place refugees at the forefront of international discussions about forced migration in Africa. Furthermore, intersectionality has been a critical concept to accurately and thoroughly assess refugee women's identity alongside influential institutions that underpin much of the insecurity documented to date inside Dadaab. I have also demonstrated that institutionalized power creates conditions that target refugee women in myriad ways, affecting their ability to perform daily tasks and familial/community duties, as well as severely threatening their safety and well-being.

Through an intersectional analysis of the major actors, I have opened up a discourse that seeks to not only grapple with the individual roles and responsibilities of each actor, but more

importantly, I have evolved the discourse toward understanding the inseparable union between them. Thus, in doing so, I have called for us to recognize how the convergence of the major actors produces an occurrence whereby women's insecurity is further exacerbated in Dadaab. Indeed, the current dissonance between the major actors mustn't go unignored as it creates a consequence that is experienced at the social level within the refugee community. Refugee women, due to the nature of gender-based violence that is ongoing, are most susceptible to harm, and the feminization of forced migration suggests that refugee women's needs must be made a stronger priority.

I have laid the groundwork for future research to consider ways that a shared responsibility to women's insecurity in Dadaab may be possible. However, as previously mentioned, the only real opportunity for change requires that more mobility rights, as well as a more of active role on the part of Western states to increase their settlement intake, become the focus of Dadaab's future. Regardless, if the four major actors—the Kenyan government, UNHCR, the United States, and the refugee community—begin to take accountability for the ways in which their power manifests into a condition whereby refugee women are oppressed, such an acknowledgement will be the first crucial step. As we now know, legal humanitarian frameworks might put a roof over a refugee's head, however they don't guarantee the protection of their livelihoods. Stringent encampment policies in the Horn of Africa and geopolitical tensions persist, and protracted solutions to respond to mass influxes of refugees offers no sustainable and safe environment. Therefore, if refugee women are to be expected to uphold their duties as the primary caregivers in a conflict zone they require more security. Indeed, if the current and ongoing attitudes, actions, and objectives of the major actors are held accountable, their self-recognition of power will be the first step to making any sort of long-lasting change.

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