

MPC MAJOR RESEARCH PAPER

BETWEEN RHETORIC AND PROPAGANDA:  
A CASE STUDY OF APPEALS TO PATHOS IN IRAQ WAR JUSTIFICATION  
SPEECHES

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## **Abstract**

This MRP explores the ethical dilemma inherent in the use of emotional appeals in political speeches. Taking a historical approach to the question of how ethics and emotion have played out in rhetorical theory and propaganda studies, I examine how political speakers use rhetorical appeals to pathos in order to gain support for controversial policies. I question where the “line” between legitimate rhetorical appeals to *pathos* and illegitimate, emotionally manipulative propaganda lies, and ask: do appeals to emotion constitute propaganda? What is the difference between a legitimate appeal to emotion and propaganda? What constitutes a “legitimate” appeal to emotion in political speech?

To answer this, I analyze three speeches made by Western political leaders justifying America’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003. My analysis distinguishes different kinds of appeals to pathos, or emotion, within my data set and weighs each speaker’s use of “legitimate” appeals to pathos against emotional appeals that are classified as “propaganda,” according to Elspeth Tilley’s Propaganda Index (2005).

My findings show that a large percentage of appeals to pathos in each speech analyzed meet the requirements for propaganda as defined by Tilley. Eighty-one percent of appeals to pathos in George W. Bush’s “Message to Saddam” constitute propaganda; sixty-eight percent of appeals to pathos in Tony Blair’s Speech to the British House of Commons constitute propaganda; and seventy-three percent of appeals to pathos in Stephen Harper’s Speech to the Canadian House of Commons are considered propaganda as defined by Tilley. My findings showcase the ambiguity of “ethical” communication in political contexts, and underline the importance of critical audience engagement in political processes.

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## **INTRODUCTION**

*“States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger ... The price of indifference would be catastrophic.”*

- George W Bush, State of the Union Address, 1/29/2002

This MRP explores the ethical dilemma inherent in the use of emotional appeals in political speeches. Taking a historical approach to the question of how ethics and emotion have played out in rhetorical theory and propaganda studies, I question where the “line” between legitimate rhetorical appeals to *pathos* and illegitimate, emotionally manipulative propaganda lies.

To answer this, I analyze three speeches made by Western political leaders justifying America’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003, for the purpose of finding Weapons of Mass Destruction concealed by Saddam Hussein. As an international conflict that was justified on the basis of finding weapons that were ultimately proven not to exist (Hinnebusch, 2007), the Iraq War, and specifically arguments made in favour of commencing operations in the Middle East, arguably used emotional appeals to strengthen claims for the need to intervene. As a case study, these speeches, given by George W. Bush, Tony Blair, and Stephen Harper, enable me to explore how, if at all, speakers use emotional appeals as a replacement for, rather than a complement to, legitimate, evidence-based arguments.

My analysis distinguishes different kinds of appeals to pathos, or emotion,<sup>1</sup> within my data set and weighs each speaker’s use of “legitimate” appeals to pathos against

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<sup>1</sup> Please note that the terms “appeals to pathos” and “emotional appeals” are used interchangeably throughout the course of this paper.

emotional appeals that are classified as “propaganda” according to Elspeth Tilley’s Propaganda Index (2005).

To fully understand the nuances of political oratory in this context, I look at how theorists including Aristotle, Pat Gherke, and James Herrick explore the question of ethics in rhetoric; examine questions of responsibility and pathos in political discourse by drawing on concepts from theorists such as Kenneth Burke and Ted Brader; and outline identifying features of propaganda as defined by Edward Bernays, Teun Van Dijk, and Elspeth Tilley.

\* \* \* \* \*

In times of international uncertainty and domestic unrest, democratic populations look to political leaders to guide them. These leaders, backed by their respective governments and constituents, are relied upon to provide domestic audiences with accurate information, reliable arguments, and decisive plans of action to steer their country to stability.

The facts of a crisis, however, are rarely simple; and in order to guide, political leaders face the hard task of presenting relevant information to audiences in ways that maintain public trust in the political administration of the day. A political leader’s role, then, lies less in *informing* the public of a crisis and solution than in convincing audiences that the government’s intended course of action is the right one.

For this reason, rhetoric is an essential component of political speechmaking. Rhetoric, the art of persuasion, has been linked to political oratory since the classical era; as one of the philosophical fields defined by Plato and Aristotle, rhetoric aims to win over audiences or discursive opponents through well rounded argumentation. Rhetorical discourse comprises three key components: *logos*, an argument that draws

upon the audience's critical reasoning faculties; *pathos*, an appeal to the audience's emotions; and *ethos*, an assurance of the speaker's own credibility (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I.I.I 355).

The second of these three rhetorical fields is of particular concern for this analysis. Rhetorical appeals to pathos are frequently used tools in the political arsenal; they allow speakers to make the leap from logic to passion, and can inspire the audience to pride, sadness, determination or fear at will – a tactic that helps make audiences more receptive to a speaker's logical argument, and, in turn, to the message or action call in question.

But what happens when a speaker manipulates audiences' emotions in lieu of providing them with facts? While emotional appeals are indeed an important component of rhetorical discourse as a whole, appealing to an audience's emotions without properly conveying the logical or necessary facts of an issue can be misleading – and in politics, using tactics such as fear-mongering in order to gain political support can be hugely detrimental to public policy. From a politician's point of view, however, resorting to such strategies in combination with providing a partial or distorted picture of the "facts" of a situation at hand may be seen as a necessary means of gaining support needed to pass controversial legislation.

Strategies such as these tend to appear in a more unscrupulous field than political rhetoric: propaganda (Black, 2001). As a means of effecting specific emotional responses in an audience in order to provoke predetermined action, propaganda relies upon appealing to an audience's emotions in a way similar to rhetoric; however, propaganda, with its negative implications, is seen as a more unethical form of emotional manipulation for political or material gain (Tilley, p.70).

## BETWEEN RHETORIC AND PROPAGANDA

Using Iraq War justification speeches as my case study, I explore the line between propaganda and pathos, relying upon Elspeth Tilley's Propaganda Index to identify and determine how illegitimate appeals to pathos are used in political oratory.

## **KEY DEFINITIONS**

*Appeals to Pathos/Emotional Appeals:* I have chosen to use Aristotle's classic definition of *pathos* as a rhetorical device used to "excite" the "emotions" of the audience for the purposes of persuasion (*Rhetoric*, I.I.1355). An "appeal to pathos", also known as an "emotional appeal," is any argument that uses emotion as a primary means of persuasion.

*Propaganda:* In "Responding to Terrorism Using Ethical Means: The Propaganda Index" (2005), Elspeth Tilley defines "propaganda" as "an argument containing ... claim and warrant, but lacking relevant supportive data" (p.70). A point of note in this definition is that propaganda includes a lack or deliberate omission of information in a persuasive argument.

*Illegitimate Propaganda:* I will be using Teun Van Dijk's definition of "illegitimate propaganda" as set out in his 2006 work, "Discourse and Manipulation". Illegitimate persuasion constitutes "forms of interaction ... that are in the interests of one party, against the best interests of the recipients" (p.360). A major identifying element of illegitimate persuasion is the presence of biased information, intended to cast the dominant or speaking party in a favourable light.

*Political Communication:* In "The Ethics of Political Communication" (1995), Manuel Pares i Maicas defines "political communication" as "not the same as political information ... It takes into account propaganda, disinformation, advertising, public relations as well as other forms of communication" for political purposes (491). A major caveat that I took into consideration through my study is pointed out by Maicas: namely, that "because of its very nature, political communication is primarily persuasive.

Thus ... its practice may include a more or less unabashed degree of propaganda or disinformation” (p.479). While this naturally complicates any discussion of ethics in political communication as a whole, the ultimate goal of my analysis is to uncover areas of political communication where a speaker chooses to rely on emotionally manipulative language for the purpose of gaining trust, rather than to communicate ideology. In his work, Maicas discusses the use of propaganda to communicate political *ideology* within or between party organizations – a context in which bias and propaganda are likely components of political speech. In my case study, I examine points where emotionally manipulative propaganda is used for the purpose of political and diplomatic gain – and where, it could be argued, emotional appeals are used in place of concrete evidence. For that reason, while I recognize that ideological bias will be a component of the speeches in my data set, I remain focused on political communication that uses emotional appeals as a potential replacement for, not as a complement to, a full argument.

\* \* \* \* \*

From here, I discuss the three theoretical streams that have guided the development of my case study and analysis of ethics and emotional persuasion in political speech.

## **LITERARY AND THEORETICAL REVIEW**

This section explores the three theoretical streams which inform the topic of appeals to pathos in political speech: rhetorical theory, political rhetoric and propaganda theory. In each section, I explore the various approaches to pathos in rhetorical, political and propaganda theory and discuss how the question of ethics in communication has played out in each theoretical stream.

### **Rhetorical Theory**

#### *Rhetoric as a Tool for Persuasion*

In its most general form, rhetoric is defined as the art of persuasive discourse. As a classical field of study, rhetoric takes its roots from Aristotle, who gives the term its longstanding formal definition:

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter ... But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I.I.1355b).

As such, the *subject* of a rhetorical argument is moot: rhetoric can be used to persuade an audience or opponent in any given field of study or discourse.

Aristotle outlines three ways by which an orator may persuade his or her audience: first, by appealing to the audience through the use of logic, or *logos*; second, through convincing the audience of his or her moral character, known as *ethos*; and finally, by appealing to the audience's emotions through *pathos*: the strategy by which, as Aristotle puts it, a speaker comes to "understand the emotions – that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes and the ways in which they are excited" (*Rhetoric*, I.I.1355). By effectively combining the three strands of rhetoric in a speech or

debate, a speaker will persuade his audience or opponent by arguing a point that is (1) logically valid; (2) ethically just; and (3) emotionally meaningful.

The concept of persuasion itself is well set forth by Kenneth Burke (1969) who, in *A Rhetoric of Motives*, states that “persuasion ranges from the bluntest quest of advantage, as in sales promotion or propaganda, through courtship, social etiquette, education and the sermon, to a ‘pure’ form that delights in the process of appeal for itself alone, without ulterior purpose” (p.xiv). Burke points to “identification” as a primary means of effecting persuasion: a strategy whereby a speaker attempts to gain his or her audience’s trust by aligning points of his or her speech with the audience’s interests or desires. Burke specifically notes the case of the politician who, when addressing an audience of farmers, says ‘I was a farm-boy myself’ (p.xiv). Such a discursive act assures the audience that the speaker implicitly understands their concerns and lifestyle, thereby making him a more credible speaker. This tactic aligns itself well with Aristotle’s *pathos*: Both rely on understanding and catering to listeners’ emotions in order to gain the allegiance of an audience.

### *Emotional Appeals (Pathos) in Rhetoric*

While any fully realized rhetorical argument will draw on all three strands of rhetoric to persuade an audience, appeals to pathos tease out the intangible and often illogical points of an argument: the points that can pull on heartstrings, rouse anger, create solidarity, or spark compassion – points that, in many cases, are the deciding factor between a rhetorical victory or defeat. In *Rhetoric*, Aristotle discusses how appeals to pathos serve to “change men so as to affect their judgment” (II.I.1378a). By changing the focus of a rhetorical argument from logic to emotion, a skilled orator will

affect how his or her audience perceives the issue at hand, enabling him or her to gain an advantage over his or her discursive opponent.

In ideal rhetorical discourse, appeals to emotion are used to complement and enhance the logical and moral aspects of a given argument; however, as Pat Gehrke (2009) points out, this rhetorical balance is not always struck:

Glenn W Merry voiced a belief in the zero-sum relationship between reason and emotion and stressed the moral priority of reason when he wrote that 'the spoken word may light the fires of passion and unreason or it may inspire to highest action and noblest sacrifice as a nation of freemen' (p.30).

In circumstances where rhetorical discourse prioritizes emotional appeals over reason, the resulting argument can lead an audience, intentionally or inadvertently, to conclusions made on the basis of heated emotion, rather than on balanced intellect.

In the political realm, such “heated” appeals can draw upon a wide range of emotions in the course of a speech or debate; however, as Ted Brader (2005) notes, fear appeals are a particularly effective method of persuasion in political speech. Fear appeals subvert audience expectations by prompting audience members to second-guess pre-established beliefs; as Aristotle notes, an orator using fear appeals “point[s] out that [a danger] has happened to others who were stronger than they are, and is happening, or has happened, to people like themselves, at the hands of unexpected people, in an unexpected form, and at an unexpected time” (*Rhetoric*, II.5.1382-5). Ted Brader, author of “Striking a Responsive Chord” (2005), provides a deeper look into how fear appeals influence audiences by upsetting pre-established thought patterns:

Fear breaks a person out of routines, directs attention to relevant portions of the environment, and activates thinking about alternative courses of action. The motivational impact of fear is less certain, as it can stimulate either constructive action to deal with a threat, withdrawal, or immobility, depending on the person and situation. Absent signs of threat, a person is calm and behaviour is governed by routines (Brader, p.390).

The advantage, then, to using fear appeals as a particular form of pathos lies in their ability to 'break' audience members out of established modes of thinking, enabling the speaker to provide alternative solutions to pressing problems.

### *Objectivity and Misuse of Rhetoric*

Having discussed rhetoric as a whole and appeals to pathos in particular, I will now discuss ways in which rhetoric can be ethically misused. At its core, rhetoric is a communicative tool to be used for the purposes of persuading opponents and gaining audience approval. In this sense, rhetoric itself is ethically objective: it can be used to support an argument regardless of whether the argument is ethical or not. Maggie Lam (2007) identifies this characteristic of rhetoric, stating that, while "persuasive strategies are fairly benign" on their own, "it is the purpose for which they are used that makes them unethical" (p.11). Aristotle also touches on this, pointing out that while a rhetorical argument may center on the merits of enslaving a neighbouring city, "the question of whether it is not *unjust* [to do so] often does not trouble [the speakers] at all" (1.3.1358b).

Because of its inherent objectivity, rhetoric, and the persuasive power it holds, can be used for good or base ends; but, as James Herrick (1992) asks, "who is to decide what is good and base?" (p.133). A speaker who misleads his audience knowing that he is arguing an ethically objectionable point can still use rhetorical tactics to great effect, thereby convincing an audience to support a position which they might otherwise oppose. Speakers who use rhetorical strategies to conceal or distort truth are nothing new: Aristotle points out that those who use rhetoric "rightly" can vastly improve a given state of affairs, while those who use it "wrongly" can "inflict the greatest of

injuries” upon an audience or people (I.I.1355b). In *The Ethics and Politics of Speech*, Pat Gehrke (2009) hits upon the core of this issue, asking: “What does it mean for communication and rhetoric if those skilled in its arts can put them to the purposes of extraordinary evil?” (p.1).

The most striking example of this is the way in which Adolf Hitler used the power of speech to gain support for the Nazi Party prior to and during World War II. As a skilled orator, Hitler was able to harness the persuasive power of rhetoric and use it to gain support for policies with unspeakably evil ends; indeed, Kenneth Burke (1939) considers it a duty of audiences to engage in an “anti-Hitler battle” of critical analysis to “find all available ways of making ... Hitlerite distortions [of language] apparent” (*Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle’*, p.84). Of course, as many theorists such as Gehrke point out, Hitler’s persuasive strategies were highly effective (p.53) – what’s more, the “strategies for persuasion condemned in Hitler’s oratory are simply extreme versions of those more mundane strategies generally to be found at the core of effective persuasion” (p.55). The question that naturally arises from the “Hitler Example” remains relevant today: what is the ethical line between an “extreme” and an “effective” use of persuasive techniques?

### *A Need for Ethical Standards*

As a result of instances like these, many theorists think that rhetoric itself should be measured against an ethical standard. James Herrick (1992) believes that rhetoric requires a “virtue ethic” – that is, an ethical standard based on the goods, or virtues, that arise through the proper use of rhetoric. Such “goods” as identified by Herrick include the search for and advancement of truth; the spreading of ideas; and the testing

of propositions and possibilities (p.144). An ethical standard based on emphasizing rhetoric's virtues would set truth as the primary goal of rhetorical discourse and would regard "unethical" rhetorical arguments as those that mislead or obscure truth from audiences.

Like Herrick, Gehrke (2009) sees merit in creating an ethical standard to guide rhetorical discourse; however, unlike Herrick, he believes that an ethical standard must be developed for the sake of regulating the orator, rather than the art form. "The justification of a rhetorical education require[s] a unique bulwark," Gehrke writes, "a safety mechanism that would provide a check against the possibility that a well-trained orator of ill intentions or unsavory moral character might turn the tools of rhetoric to antisocial ends" (p.67). Consequently, Gehrke feels that any ethical standard of rhetoric ought to be externally enforced, intended to identify and obstruct those who would use rhetoric for unethical purposes.

Essentially, any discussion of ethical guidelines for the use of rhetoric must consider that the idea of morality, or ethics, is not a fixed concept in contemporary society. Establishing an ethical basis by which to measure or regulate rhetorical discourse would, as Herrick points out, "run directly into the problem of contemporary urban society's divergent moral perspectives" (p.135). This suggests that Gehrke's conclusions for creating ethical standards fall short: to create an effective ethical standard for rhetoric, and for those who use it, we must look to rhetoric itself, rather than rely on the subjective moral standards of diverse audiences and users.

\* \* \* \* \*

This section explored questions of ethics and responsibility in regards to the use of rhetoric as an objective tool. In the following section, I will examine how political

rhetoric, as a particular category of rhetorical communication, makes use of appeals to pathos in ethical and unethical contexts.

## **Political Rhetoric**

### *Rhetoric as a Political Tool*

As an inherently persuasive field, political communication relies heavily upon rhetoric to create effective, diverse, goal-oriented messaging for a variety of audiences (Maicas, p.482). Consequently, it provides audiences and critics with ample ground to explore the benefits and drawbacks that persuasive speech has to offer.

In a democratic society, the role of managing or inducing cooperation between divergent audiences falls to political actors. According to Edward Bernays, Kenneth Burke and Noam Chomsky, without a political system to communicate societal goals and problems to mass audiences, community members would be incapable of prioritizing certain problems over others. As a result, “big picture” public issues would remain unresolved (Chomsky, 1983). It is for this reason that understanding how to effectively communicate such issues to audiences is a necessary component of any functioning society (Bernays, 1928). Edward Bernays (1928) felt that using “the psychology of public opinion” was an essential means of bringing about change and progress in political and social landscapes:

[Bernays] argued that since ‘public opinion is slow and reactionary,’ those who use the ‘psychology of public persuasion ... to bring about changes in public opinion are performing a great public service’ (Olasky, 1984, p.3).

Bernays terms this societal cooperation the “engineering of consent” – the process by which society’s decision-makers communicate political, social and institutional issues to audiences, providing them with a mental framework within which to consider and

prioritize tasks that need to be accomplished for the benefit of society as a whole (p.120).<sup>2</sup>

Rhetoric is a necessary component of political communication because it provides political figures with the tools to gain public support and consent. As Kenneth Burke (1946) states, rhetoric serves as a “symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols” (p.43); thus, it encourages cooperation between divergent audiences by providing them with a unifying structure within which to consider issues or topics relevant to society at large.

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As we have seen, rhetoric serves to induce cooperation between divergent audiences in the political realm and is thus an important field of political communication. Here, I will examine how emotional appeals can be used in specifically political contexts and discuss how ideology factors into discursive political persuasion.

### *Emotional Appeals in Politics*

As in other discursive genres, emotional appeals are heavily used in political discourse. Ted Brader (2005) discusses how emotional appeals trigger particular responses in the minds of political audiences. By drawing on the “images, sounds and words” that link public action to personal experience in the minds of audience members, political speakers can bring issues from the background of public life to the forefront of an audience member’s frame of reference:

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<sup>2</sup> Other social theorists, including Noam Chomsky, have shared the principles behind Bernays’s concept of “consent engineering”. Without the engineering of consent, Noam Chomsky (1983) argues, no social or political action would gain support except through violence or martial enforcement (Interview, *The Manufacturing of Consent*). Consequently, the tools of rhetoric help political speakers gain the consent of mass audiences, which facilitates cooperation between divergent audiences in the accomplishment of social goals.

## BETWEEN RHETORIC AND PROPAGANDA

Images, sounds or even words that tap personal experiences or deeply ingrained symbols of success, failure or danger, can help unleash the desired emotional response in an audience: foreclosure signs and pink slips target recession-affiliated workers; flags inspire patriots and veterans; the screams of sirens and echo of gunfire rattle a crime-wary public; a chant of 'no justice, no peace' invokes the specter of racial discord and urban riots among whites or structural discrimination and police brutality among blacks. Politicians use these cues to strike the responsive chord (Brader, p.390-1).

While Brader offers examples of using sensory cues to “strike the responsive chord”, he identifies the importance of verbal communication in “elicit[ing] emotional reactions” to political messages (392). By using emotional appeals to “link” audiences mentally to a public issue or debate, speakers can more effectively frame the way in which the audience perceives the debate as a whole.

### *Political Truth and Ideology*

In discussing ethics and political communication, one has to bear in mind that the notion of “truth” in political contexts is flexible. Fundamentally, political speakers seek to persuade an audience to believe in or follow one path over another; therefore, speakers with different political goals may present divergent versions of truth to audiences throughout the course of a political debate (Lam, p.16). Such a state of affairs, naturally, implies that each version of “truth” as expounded by various political entities comes about as a result of political ideology. for, as Teun Van Dijk (2006) points out, social-political communication “always involves ideologies, ideological attitudes and ideological discourse structures” (p.374).

Because ideology is central to political discourse, objective truth is rarely ever the goal of political speech. Manuel Pares i Maicas (1995) discusses this aspect of political rhetoric, arguing that the discursive space between objective truth and political ideology often leaves room for unethical tactics of persuasion:

One should take into consideration that, because of its very nature, political communication is primarily persuasive. Thus, even if political communication is basically political information, in practice it may include also a more or less unabashed degree of propaganda or disinformation, or the message may be elaborated upon via the technique or language of public relations or advertising (Maicas, p.479).

Thus, any ethical standard of political rhetoric must take into consideration that the primary goal of political persuasion is to communicate political goals and ideology, not objective truth. This does not, however, exempt politicians from ethical standards. The point at which emotional appeals are used to distort or omit evidence, even within ideological constraints, are considered unethical; and whether a politician inadvertently misrepresents facts or knowingly misleads audiences for “the greater good,” maintaining an awareness of the ethical implications of such discursive acts remains an important part of establishing credibility as a speaker.

### **Propaganda Theory**

I have discussed how both rhetorical and political communication theorists have considered emotional appeals and ethics in discursive contexts. From here, I will explore how propaganda theorists have dealt with the question of using rhetorical tactics to explicitly manipulate emotion and therefore opinion. Unlike classical orators who use rhetorical tactics in *spite* of the possibility of ethical misuse, propagandists use rhetorical tactics specifically *because* they allow the user to manipulate his or her audience. This section looks at how three theorists – Edward Bernays (1928), Teun Van Dijk, (2006) and Elspeth Tilley (2005) – have dealt with the question of propaganda and ethics.

### *Defining Propaganda*

As a cultural and theoretical construct, the term “propaganda” is hugely loaded with social and political implications. While the original sense of the word was neutral,<sup>3</sup> “propaganda” has come to have extremely negative connotations; it is often associated with negative communicative practices in corporate public relations firms, media organizations and governmental organizations (Sproule, 1994, p.10). Approaching the term from an ethical standpoint, Jay Black in *Semantics and Ethics of Propaganda* (2001) provides a useful definition for the purposes of this paper:

Students of ethics should be struck by certain commonalities among most (but certainly not all) of the ... definitions [of propaganda]: a presumption of manipulation and control, if not outright coercion, that dehumanizes the audiences or intended ‘victims’ of propaganda; a power imbalance – rhetorical, political, economic and so forth – between propagandists and propagandees [sic]; and a presumption that principles of science, rhetoric, semantics and enlightened or open-minded education serve as powerful antidotes to propaganda (Black, p.121).

Of particular note in Black’s definition is the aspect of manipulation and control that propaganda encompasses. Unlike persuasive techniques that draw on *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos* to allow audiences to make informed decisions on a topic, propaganda overrides an audience’s ability to make a rational decision, often drawing heavily upon emotional appeals to overshadow a rational argument.

### *Bernays and Propaganda*

According to Edward Bernays (1928), propaganda is “simply the establishing of reciprocal understanding between an individual and a group” (*Propaganda*, p.161).

Unlike theorists who deem propaganda to be a negative and manipulative form of social

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<sup>3</sup> Propaganda: “(1) [*mass noun*] information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view ... (2) A committee of cardinals of the Roman Catholic Church responsible for foreign missions, founded in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV. Origin “Italian, from modern Latin *congregatio de propaganda fide* ‘congregation for propagation of the faith’ dates from the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.” (Oxford English Dictionary, ‘Propaganda’).

control, Bernays sees it as a necessary tool for peacefully expediting social and democratic processes: by combining Freudian perspectives on emotion with traditional PR and marketing strategies, propaganda becomes “a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group” (p.52). Through “understanding the mechanisms and motives of the group mind,” Bernays argues, users can “control and regiment the masses according to [their] will without [the masses] knowing about it” (p.71).

Bernays sees emotional appeals as central to a successful propaganda campaign, calling them “the steam which makes the social machine work” (p.74). By subtly manipulating the fears and desires of the audience, a propagandist or speaker can sway audiences into unconsciously thinking or acting in certain predetermined ways; through the course of a speech, a political speaker may “[create] circumstances which set up trains of thought” for the audience, thereby “mold[ing] the minds of the voters in conformity with his own ideas” on the topic at hand (p.119). Indeed, using emotional appeals in social and political campaigns is central to Bernaysian propaganda; for, as Bernays points out, “the public is not made up merely of Democrats and Republicans. People are largely uninterested in politics, and their interest in the issues of [a] campaign must be secured by coordinating [the issues] with their personal interests” rather than on the basis of politics or policy alone (p.117).

While his methods are considered controversial, even “Machiavellian”, by many theorists (Olasky, 1984, p.6), Bernays believes that using propaganda to spread ideas is a necessary means of effecting institutional communication. However, he recognizes that propaganda can be used for “antisocial” ends. The “responsible” leader, therefore, must “be constantly aware of the possibilities of subversion” – by which Bernays means the

misuse of propaganda tactics – and ensure that he “applies his energies to mastering the operational know-how of consent engineering, and out-maneuvering his opponents in the public interest” (Bernays, *The Engineering of Consent*, 1947, p.115). The ethical responsibility for using propaganda lies, therefore, with the user: like Aristotle, who believes that “if another man argues unfairly, we on our part [must] be able to confute him” (I.I. 1355), Bernays believes that responsibility for using propaganda lies with the speaker him- or herself, both in terms of using it to “push only those ideas he can respect”, and for “outmaneuvering” those who seek to abuse propaganda’s ability to control and manipulate emotion (*The Engineering of Consent*, 1947, p.116).

### *Van Dijk and Manipulation*

While Bernays sees merit in using propaganda techniques for “social” purposes, Teun Van Dijk (2006) regards propaganda as an illegitimate form of audience manipulation. In *Discourse and Manipulation*, Van Dijk distinguishes between ethically “legitimate” and “illegitimate” persuasive tactics in political contexts, arguing that the ultimate goal of illegitimate discursive manipulation lies in furthering the political agenda of those in control of the message, violating the audience’s best interests.

According to Van Dijk, manipulation is “a communicative and interactional [*sic*] practice, in which a manipulator exercises control over other people, usually against their will or against their best interests” (p.360). He points to propaganda as a particular form of emotionally manipulative discourse, stating that such discourse “focus[es] on those cognitive and social characteristics of the recipient to make them feel more vulnerable and less resistant to manipulation” (p.376). Thus, Van Dijk’s concept of manipulation aligns with Bernaysian propaganda: both seek to break down an

audience's cognitive barriers, using psychological manipulation and emotional appeals to make audiences more susceptible to manipulative messaging. Van Dijk identifies several key ways that manipulative messages "break down" those cognitive barriers: these methods include providing audiences with "incomplete ... knowledge"; appealing to "fundamental norms, values and ideologies"; focusing on "strong emotions, traumas, etc. that make people vulnerable"; and using social power constructs of "social positions, professions, [and] status" to "induce people into tending to accept the discourses [and] arguments of elite persons, groups or organizations" (p.375).

According to Van Dijk, a key factor that distinguishes legitimate persuasion from illegitimate manipulation is the presence of power abuse; that is, manipulators "make others believe or do things that are in the interests of the manipulator and against the best interests of the manipulated" (p.360). Manipulative messaging presents audiences with incomplete or distorted knowledge of a situation, which allows the manipulator to frame discourse according to his or her own purposes (p.360). Conversely, legitimate persuasive messaging allows audiences to "believe and act as they please, depending on whether or not they accept the arguments of the persuader" (p.361). As such, manipulation involves hiding the manipulator's true agenda or intentions from the audience. Much like the Orwellian politician who misleads audiences in a "consciously dishonest way" (Orwell, 1946) Van Dijk's manipulator provides audiences with one picture of reality while actively pursuing another.

*Tilley and the Propaganda Index*

While both Bernays and Van Dijk provide theoretical context to the question of propaganda and ethics, Elspeth Tilley offers both a comprehensive look at propaganda from a theoretical perspective and a tool for identifying illegitimate propaganda within political discourse. In *Responding to Terrorism Using Ethical Means: The Propaganda Index* (2005), Tilley creates the Propaganda Index, a tool that I use in my analysis to distinguish legitimate persuasion from propaganda.

Propaganda, in the colloquial sense of the word, is fairly easy to identify. The word conjures up images of heroic young men in military dress, posters of women tilling verdant fields, caricatured enemies committing unspeakable acts, all underlined with catchphrases championing the “party line”. According to Elspeth Tilley (2005), this kind of “black” propaganda is easy to identify: it is morally objectionable, “deliberately deceptive” in all senses of the word. Tilley points to a second category of propaganda that is much less easy to spot – “gray” propaganda, which is “not obviously untruthful but much more subtly manipulative” (p.70). In *Responding to Terrorism Using Ethical Means: The Propaganda Index*, Tilley identifies categories of gray propaganda in contemporary political settings, and offers a rhetoric-based approach to detecting gray propaganda – a more subtle, but no less ethically objective, form of emotional manipulation.

Like Van Dijk, Tilley believes that one of the major identifiers of propaganda is an omission or misinterpretation of relevant information in a message:

Propaganda is understood [...] as a communication that uses a specific set of rhetorical devices and cognitive heuristics to make claims or assertions, and to generalize (often unstated) broader assumptions from those claims, without providing evidence (p.70).

While recognizing that “even when provided, ‘evidence’ is always in some way ‘slanted’ because truth is infinitely multiple, contested and subjective,” Tilley believes that communicators must abide by some ethical standard when conveying information; rather than relying on a “familiar grab-bag of propagandistic rhetorical devices,” communicators must move towards using a “pluralist, evidence-based communication style that offers data, research, history [and] context” to persuade audiences (p.70).

Tilley believes that the onus lies on communication theory to provide guidelines to “communication practitioners to assess their methods and messages” based on “ethical ends and ethical means” (p.69). While a communicator may not mean to mislead, his or her messaging may possess the characteristics of gray propaganda; consequently, Tilley believes that any productive identifier of propaganda must look at “textual criteria” rather than communicator intent as its base (p.71). To accomplish this, Tilley developed the “Propaganda Index”, a table that assists communicators in identifying propagandistic elements in political messaging.<sup>4</sup> In developing a text-based approach to identifying propaganda, Tilley has created a method that responds well to Herrick’s call for finding an ethical basis to communication that operates outside of “independent moral maxims” of a society.

\* \* \* \* \*

I have considered the question of ethics and emotional appeals from three different theoretical backgrounds. With rhetorical theory, I examined the classical definition of rhetoric as provided by Aristotle; looked at rhetoric, and specifically, *pathos*, as a persuasive tool; discussed the danger inherent in using rhetoric for “undesirable” ends; and looked at the possibility of establishing ethical standards by

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<sup>4</sup> Tilley’s Propaganda Index (2005) may be found in Appendix A, Table 2.

which rhetoricians could operate. In discussing political rhetoric, I explored the ultimate end of upholding ideology, rather than objective truth, in political discourse and discussed rhetoric's role in enabling political discourse and the democratic process. In the section on propaganda theory, I outlined three approaches to the idea of propaganda: Bernays's contention that propaganda is a necessary means of communication to be used at the ethical discretion of the propagandist; Van Dijk's notion of propaganda as a form of unethical manipulation, intended to reinforce the views and agenda of those in power; and Tilley's distinction between "black" and "gray" propaganda, as well as her contention that any criteria for monitoring propagandistic content in political discourse must be text-based, rather than contingent upon the communicator's often-unknown intent.

Now I will begin discussing my analysis itself, providing a context to my case study as a whole before explaining the methods that I used to analyze emotional appeals in political speeches.

## **CASE STUDY: FRAMING THE RHETORIC OF THE IRAQ WAR**

The Iraq War has arguably been one of the defining political events of a generation. The conflict, which lasted from 20 March 2003 to 15 December 2011, led to the eventual capture and execution of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, yet remains one of the most controversial military operations to date. Indeed, while some academics such as David Mellow (2006) believe that the American intervention in Iraq served to accomplish vital military and humanitarian goals (p.297), others, including Richard B Miller (2008), argue that the Iraq conflict will be remembered as a war “lack[ing] a just cause” (p.65). While issues surrounding the causes and consequences of the Iraq War can be deliberated endlessly, the contextual focus for my case study lies in examining the ways in which pro-war governments presented the invasion to domestic and international audiences.

The question that bears asking at this point is: why does the Iraq War constitute a relevant case study for ethics in political discourse? Many believe that the war itself was unethical and see fault in how pro-war governments presented the war to domestic audiences. Scott and Ambler (2007) call the invasion “unethical”, asserting that it violated terms of the UN Charter and that the public was “knowingly misled” on the topic of Iraq’s alleged noncompliance with UN Security Council resolutions requiring the country to disarm (p.70). John Dumbrell (2004) believes that “despite the [Bush] administration’s best efforts, it proved difficult, indeed impossible, to establish a clear link between [Saddam Hussein] and the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001” (p.34). Ryan and Switzer (2009) note that “few in the media seemed to notice that Hussein was complying with UN directives or that Bush kept raising the bar for peace” (p.51), while

Altheide and Grimes (2005) point out that reports by “the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Energy, the Defense Intelligence, the State Department and the Air Force, as well as key White House Cabinet members and advisors,” actively “denied or cast serious doubt on Iraq’s possession of WMD” (p.627).

Given the critical backlash to how governments presented the war to domestic and international audiences, the question of ethics is an important one. In analyzing how pro-war administrations rhetorically “framed” the war for audiences, I hope to reveal how and where unethical appeals to pathos can lie in political speech. By using war justification speeches as my case study to analyze the dividing line between rhetoric and propaganda, I hope to demonstrate the extent to which ethically ambiguous rhetorical tactics can be used in modern political discourse.

### **Justifying Military Action**

The Bush administration relied on several key claims to justify invading Iraq in March 2003. The most prominent justifications centered on allegations of Saddam Hussein’s noncompliance with UN Security Council directives to disarm Iraq’s nuclear weapons programmes, as well as its suspected participation in the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre (Kumar, 2006, p.54). The Bush administration argued that Iraq, given its alleged links to Al Qaeda, posed a direct and immediate threat to the national security of the United States of America and other Western democracies: using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) previously concealed from UN weapons inspectors, Iraq could “help” terrorists obtain “chemical, biological, or, one day, nuclear weapons” to “kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our

country or any other” (Bush, *Message to Saddam*, 2003). The necessary course of action was to invade Iraq before it could build its weapons capabilities to the point where it could strike against the United States. Subsequent reports, as Altheide and Grimes (2005) point out, would show that these claims were false:

There was very little reporting by major news media about contrary views cautioning that this attack was not necessary at the time, that [UN] weapons inspectors had not found such weapons and needed more time to work, and that sanctions already in place were working (p.618).

Richard B. Miller agrees that the reasons provided to western audiences for the invasion were misleading, stating that “there is not, nor was there at the time, sufficient evidence to say that the United States was in danger from Iraq, to conclude that the UN resolutions authorize the use of force to depose Saddam, or to argue that existing mechanisms of legal enforcement were ineffective ... Nor is there sufficient evidence to say that his dictatorship was such that humanitarian intervention was justified in 2003” (p.65).

### **Framing The Rhetoric of War**

The use of fear appeals in the context of the Iraq war is well documented. Using the emotionally laden rhetoric of 9/11, and labeling Hussein and the Iraqi government as “terrorists” or terrorist sympathizers, the Bush administration was able to draw upon a “politic of fear” to instill a sense of fear and urgency in its audience (Altheide, 2006, p.416). Fear appeals used by the Bush and Blair administrations drew heavily on 9/11 rhetoric to make broad and explicit claims of collusion between Iraq and Al Qaeda operatives. These claims, notes Richard Falk (2004), were adopted by the mainstream media and presented as fact:

[T]he national trauma induced by the Al Qaeda attacks generated a series of responses based on a national climate of fear and anger impressively orchestrated by the Bush leadership and a

## BETWEEN RHETORIC AND PROPAGANDA

compliant mainstream media: the immediate uncritical adoption of a war mode of discourse as the basis of anti-terrorism (and the associated degeneration of prior reliance on a law enforcement mode) ... the mobilization of American patriotism; an insistence on defining the struggle as against 'terrorism' in general, including anti-state movements of self-determination; the enunciation of a vague and self-serving doctrine of pre-emptive war; and the insistence that all governments either join with the United States or be regarded as aligned with 'the enemy' (p.25).

These claims, and others like them, set the stage for war justification rhetoric in relation to Iraq as a whole. As Deepa Kumar (2006) points out, a major means of substantiating these claims was through "guilt by suggestion". By mentioning Iraq and Al Qaeda in the same sentence, accusers effectively "linked" the two parties in the minds of their audience:

The implication is that Iraq must support Al Qaeda. While Iraq may have had ties to organizations that the US considered to be 'terrorists,' and while there may have been Al Qaeda stationed in Iraq, juxtaposing the two sent the message that Iraq supported Al Qaeda and encouraged them to set up camp in Iraq (Kumar, p.55).

By drawing connections between the Iraqi government and Al Qaeda, political speakers effectively mobilized and politicized national opinion, "influence[ing] audiences' mental models" by "polariz[ing]" the war debate into "a case of Us (good, innocent) and Them (evil, guilty)" (Van Dijk, p.370).

A particularly effective way that speakers achieved this was through labeling the Iraqi government terrorists or terrorist sympathizers. Labeling, as Maggie Lam (2007) notes, "attempt[s] to impart value judgments and thus express[es] an ideology that is biased". It thus "empowers and marginalizes simultaneously", lending credibility to the speaker as a voice of reason against those labeled (Lam, p.41). This enabled politicians and media outlets to "market and frame fear and dread of terrorism as part of a national

identity... Terrorism became a very broad symbol that encompassed fear, consumption, and international intervention” (Altheide & Grimes, p.620).<sup>5</sup>

I have discussed how rhetoric used by pro-war governments was used to mobilize audiences in support of war efforts. Through the use of fear appeals, Us/Them polarization and labeling, speakers gained popular support for a fundamentally polarizing military initiative. From here, I will be explaining the methods used to analyze emotional appeals in political speeches, using Elspeth Tilley’s Propaganda Index to identify illegitimate emotional manipulation and propaganda in my case study speeches.

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<sup>5</sup> The effectiveness with which the Bush administration linked the Iraqi government and Hussein to terrorism, “evil”, and the 9/11 attacks can be seen in surveys cited by John Dumbrell (2005): in March 2003, 88% of American respondents believed that Iraq supported terrorist organizations that threatened the US, and 51% felt that Saddam Hussein was personally implicated in the 9/11 attacks (34). To further condemn Iraq, the United States “emphasized Iraq’s alleged lack of compliance with international law,” accusing the country of harbouring WMDs – on 26 August, 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney publicly stated that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us” (as qtd in Scott & Ambler, 2007, p.75).

## **METHODS**

To this point, I have discussed the context in which Iraq War justification speeches were given, providing a particular focus on the kind of rhetoric which pro-war speakers used to “frame” the war and have provided readers with an appropriate theoretical background from which to consider questions of rhetorical ethics and propaganda theory. In the following section, I will discuss how I conducted my analysis, outlining the methods used in my case study.

### **Aims**

My research sought to identify what differentiates rhetorically legitimate appeals to pathos from propaganda as a negative, manipulative form of discourse. I used Iraq War justification speeches as my case study because many of the reasons given to audiences for invading Iraq drew upon points that truly hit the emotional core of international audiences: the September 11 attacks, global terrorism, and threats to the democratic system of governance. The use of these highly emotional arguments in the speeches analyzed in my case study provided me with ample ground to explore the question of appeals to pathos in political speech and enabled me to discuss the topic in a critically engaging light.

#### *Research Questions:*

- 1.0 What is the difference between a legitimate appeal to emotion and propaganda?
- 2.0 What constitutes a “legitimate” appeal to emotion in political speech?

I used a threefold method to analyze appeals to pathos in my case study. First, I identified appeals to pathos using a “Pathos Code” developed for the purposes of this

MRP. Second, I determined whether each appeal was ethical or not based on whether or not it is considered “propaganda” under Elspeth Tilley’s Propaganda Index. Finally, I measured the frequency of “ethical” appeals to pathos as compared to “unethical” appeals to pathos in each speech, which resulted in a final determination of how much each speaker relied upon unethical appeals to pathos.

### **Pathos Code**

I developed the Pathos Code in order to identify different kinds of appeals to emotional appeals within my data set. To create it, I studied various kinds of appeals to pathos outlined by different theorists. From there, I refined those appeals into different categories based on the context and subject matter of the speeches themselves. The final form of the Pathos Code consists of six categories into which relevant appeals to pathos may fall.<sup>6</sup>

While researching the theoretical background for my paper, I discovered three broad themes of emotional “tactics” that theorists point to as a means of persuading audiences. These tactics fell into three main categories that informed the development of the Pathos Code: fear appeals, key words and labels, and ideology (as shown in Fig. 1, below).

Fear appeals are relevant components of rhetorical and propagandistic discourse because they allow speakers to upset audience members’ feelings of complacency or security (Brader, p.390). Incorporating fear appeals into speeches allows speakers to reset fundamental audience expectations, a necessary rhetorical step, for, as Aristotle points out, “if fear is associated with the expectation that something destructive will

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<sup>6</sup> Full details of the Pathos Code may be found in Appendix A, Table 1.

happen to us, plainly nobody will be afraid who believes nothing will happen to him” (II.5.1382). Consequently, a speaker must make the audience believe they are in danger – which, as Van Dijk notes, “makes [them] more vulnerable and less resistant to manipulation, more credulous and willing victims” of propaganda (p.376).

Focusing on a series of key words and labels enables a speaker to define the terms by which his or her speech will be received. As Maggie Lam (2007) states, “lexical terms carry with them a value judgment” – consequently, labeling makes audiences more receptive to the ideas that a speaker wants them to hear; or rather, these acts “[make] judgment for the hearers” (p.16). In *Politics and the English Language* (1946), George Orwell points to the inherent emptiness that politically loaded terms often carry, stating that such terms “are almost completely lacking in meaning.” He identifies *fascism* as an example of a word that “has now no meaning insofar as it signifies ‘something not desirable’”; this particular term has arguably been replaced in modern political discourse with the equally laden terms “terrorist,” “terrorism” and “terror” (Van Dijk, p.370). Using such phrases predisposes audiences to perceive the recipient of such a label in a negative light, regardless of what their true intentions may be.

As previously discussed in this paper, political discourse involves a measure of ideology that informs and directs its communicative strategy. Consequently, emotional appeals are often used to enhance ideological arguments. Van Dijk identifies the kinds of emotional appeals that are directed by ideology, stating that “such manipulative policies and discourses [involve] nationalist feelings, Us/Them polarization and a systematic negative representation of the Other in terms of negative values, characteristics and actions” (p.374). These appeals attempt to distance audiences from opposing political

parties or ideas, and rationalize the speaker’s point of view as, ostensibly, the most reasonable or logical solution under consideration.

Fig. 1

Broad Categories of Appeals to Pathos Identified in Theory

<b>Emotional “Tactic”</b>	<b>Theorist</b>
Fear Appeals	Aristotle, Brader, Van Dijk
Key Words/Labels	Lam, Orwell
Ideology	Van Dijk, Maicas

Using the framework provided by the three major emotional “tactics” defined above, I identified six categories of emotional appeals within the speeches in my data set. Edward Bernays argues that emotional appeals must “coincide with the broad basic plans of the campaign” (p.116), so I refined the Pathos Code to address the specific subject matter of my data set as a whole. With that, I developed six categories into which appeals to pathos fall (Fig. 2):

Fig. 2

Pathos Code

<b>Category</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Threat to National and/or Global Welfare	Emphasis upon nationalistic/patriotic sympathies; suggestion of imminent threat to the nation or world at large. Includes references to “protect[ing] the “nation”, “world” / “national interests” or “global security” against “enemy invasions”. Invokes need to “defend” the homeland or western way of life.
Fear and Urgency Appeals	Emphasis upon the need for immediate or offensive action. Invokes sense of time “ticking down” to impending “doom” or “terror”. Speculation of dangers yet to come and need to meet them immediately.
Vilification of the “Other”	Projection of negative or aggressive tendencies and biases upon the “enemy” or “unsupportive” UN member states. Use of politically charged terms and labels to refer to or imply that the “other” is the “enemy” or resistant to the “needs” of the world.
Historical Allusion	References to: (a) prior dictatorships, authoritarian regimes or international conflicts (b) September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers Invocation of specific emotional response in audience that connects current situation to past injustices
Fate of Iraq	Condemnation of the injustices against Iraqi people; invoke feeling of outrage or indignation in audience, encourage need to intervene and provide “noble” assistance

Further details pertaining to the Pathos code may be found in Appendix A, Table I.

## **Propaganda Index**

After coding appeals to pathos within my data set using the Pathos Code, I determined their ethical legitimacy based on whether or not they constituted “propaganda”, as defined by Elspeth Tilley’s Propaganda Index (Fig. 3). The Propaganda Index identifies illegitimate persuasive arguments within a text based on whether or not the argument contains propagandistic elements: it “identifies what particular rhetorical devices typically characterize propaganda” and provides a “reliable means of measuring [propaganda’s] presence” in a given argument (Tilley, p.71).

As an effective and useful means of identifying propaganda, Tilley’s Propaganda Index is an appropriate device to distinguish legitimate persuasive techniques from propaganda as illegitimate persuasion. Theorists such as Ryan and Switzer (2009) have drawn upon the Propaganda Index to study propaganda in media settings. As Ryan and Switzer note, Tilley’s work allows “ethical communicators” to avoid “serv[ing] someone’s narrow agenda, mak[ing] claims that are not evidence-based, spread[ing] lies and deception, supply[ing] incomplete or misleading information” (p.49). In her own study, Tilley uses the Propaganda Index to identify propagandistic content in an Australian government terror information package. While my use of the Index is comparable on the basis of subject matter (terrorism), it does not overlap with her case study so much as to be redundant.

The Propaganda Index defines seven categories of propaganda-based arguments: Name Calling, Glittering Generality, Transfer Positive, Transfer Negative, Plain Folks, Band Wagon and Manifest Destiny (Fig. 3):

Fig.3

Elsbeth Tilley’s Propaganda Index

Device	Description
Name Calling	Negative or “bad” labels or stereotypes (e.g. terrorists, extremists, fanatics, ferals, “rent-a-crowd”) that encourage a summary negative response without examining history, complexity, or evidence related to an issue
Glittering Generality	Abstract positive labeling using virtue connotators (e.g., intelligence for covert surveillance); positive-sounding euphemisms (e.g., collateral damage and friendly fire for civilian or own-troop deaths; biosolids for sewerage); broadly affirmative unverifiable adjectives (e.g., state-of-the-art, high-tech); positive abstractions (e.g., prosperity, freedom, rights, democracy, respect, common sense); vagaries (e.g., significantly increasing or highly trained, where the level of increase or training is not defined); subjective adjectives or adverbs (beautiful, stunning) which give positive effect without evidence
Transfer Positive	Process of association whereby the “good” of one thing rubs off onto something else (e.g., through appropriation of symbolic objects such as national flags or anthem, sponsorship, celebrity or “expert” endorsement)
Transfer Negative	Express or implied association with negative incidents, places, people or symbols to “rub off” negative qualities to the issue being discussed or discredit by implication an opposing viewpoint (e.g. <i>may have links with Al Qaida [sic] has been seen in the company of known terrorists, etc.</i> )
Plain Folks	Implication that ideas are “of the people” (e.g., references to family values, hard working decent folk, normal people, or middle Australia). PF is a values-based device that implies normalcy [sic] or rationality for an opinion and thereby demonizes other views as aberrant and unreasonable, even if they are majority
Band Wagon	Peer pressure or spiral of silence device (e.g., implication that everyone, most people, many people or any large collectivized group of people such as our school, our company, or our neighbourhood thinks a particular, singular and uniform way). Includes references to imagined communities such as states, nations, organizations, and phrases such as we, our, all, everybody that invite solidarity with an implied large and inclusive group, suggest mass support for an opinion, marginalize alternative views as minority, suggest collective ownership of and responsibility for the actions of a group (e.g., “our army”) or obscure internal division within a group
Manifest Destiny	Deterministic invocation of God (of any kind or faith), destiny, fate, natural processes, or universal design, to lend support to an argument; removal of accountability for an idea or issue from individuals and attribution of responsibility to deterministic “greater forces” (God’s will, karma, tradition, luck, History, Nature)

As my analysis focuses solely on appeals to pathos, certain categories of the Propaganda Index were more applicable than others. Therefore, I modified one category of the Index to fit more comprehensively within the parameters of my study. In my analysis I altered “Glittering Generality” (not broadly evidenced in the speeches) to “Grim Generality”, which I define as the use of abstract negative labeling intended to give negative effect without evidence. Figure 4 expands upon this category.

Fig 4:

Propaganda Index Modification

Device	Description
Grim Generality	Abstract negative labeling using vice connotators; negative-sounding euphemisms; broadly negative unverifiable adjectives (e.g., danger, chaos); vague speculation of negative eventualities (e.g., “should our enemies strike”); negative abstractions (e.g., evil, danger, immoral); subjective adjectives or adverbs which give negative effect without evidence

## BETWEEN RHETORIC AND PROPAGANDA

After identifying appeals to pathos within each speech and determining their ethical legitimacy with the Propaganda Index, I compared the number of legitimate to illegitimate appeals to pathos within the entire document, making a final determination of how much of each speech, if any, has made use of unethical propaganda.

## **ANALYSIS**

My results show that a large percentage of appeals to pathos in each of the three speeches analyzed meet the requirements for propaganda as defined by Elspeth Tilley.

George W Bush's speech, "Message to Saddam," given on March 17, 2003, is a presidential address that formally declares America's intention to invade Iraq within 48 hours of airing. It provides reasons why it condemns Iraq for not disarming at the UN Security Council's wishes, and threatens military consequences, enforced by the United States and their allies in lieu of UN Security Council members who, according to Bush, have not "lived up to [the UN's] responsibilities" to oust the Iraqi dictator.<sup>7</sup>

Rhetorically, the speech draws heavily on pathos to support its argument for why the United States must invade Iraq without the formal sanction of the United Nations. I identified 26 appeals to pathos in the speech, 81% of which constitute propaganda as defined by Tilley's Propaganda Index. The most common forms of propaganda found in the speech are Name Calling (9 counts) and Grim Generality (6 counts).<sup>8</sup>

Bush uses appeals to pathos in this speech to inform US citizens both of the inevitable need to invade Iraq ("We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater") and to assure his audience that all military action is undertaken with the long-term interests of the Iraqi people in mind ("The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near"). While the latter assurance is literally spoken to Iraq's listening audience in a "translated radio broadcast", its inherent emotional appeal is directed at US audiences and serves to comfort domestic listeners that the campaign is

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<sup>7</sup> Full text of my analysis of Bush's "Message to Saddam" may be found in Appendix B, Article 2.

<sup>8</sup> Full details may be found in Appendix B, Article 1 and 2.

set against “the lawless men who govern Iraq”, rather than against the Iraqi people themselves. This strategy rhetorically overlooks the impact that such a campaign would inevitably have on civilian life, leading audiences away from thinking about the human toll that military action requires in much the same way that the term “friendly fire” is used to euphemistically skim over deaths involved in its action.

Bush’s speech enables him to provide a comprehensive character portrayal of Hussein as a dictatorial tyrant, thereby allowing him to “frame” the terms of the invasion to his domestic audience. Bush’s use of Name Calling (9 counts) helps him establish a negative image of Hussein to his audience, thus polarizing the debate between one of Good (“We are a peaceful people – yet we’re not a fragile people”) and Evil, as personified by Hussein and the Iraqi government (“The regime has a history of reckless aggression ... It has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harboured terrorists”). By restricting his condemnation of Iraq to the government and Hussein himself, Bush allows himself room to follow a humanitarian theme in his argument, the implications of which I have already discussed.

Tony Blair’s Speech to the House of Commons, given on March 18, 2003, draws upon similar emotional rhetoric used by Bush while providing a more detailed account of the events leading up to the invasion of Iraq. Like Bush, Blair seeks to convince his audience of the ideological and military necessity of ousting Saddam Hussein from Iraq. However, unlike Bush, Blair attempts to persuade his audience that his recommended plan of action – namely, allying with the United States in invading Iraq – is politically as well as morally necessary. This aspect of the speech underlies the difference between the kind of audience Blair is addressing and Bush's audience. While Bush’s “Message” communicates a predetermined plan to the American people, Blair, like Harper, seeks to

convince his political audience to take a necessary course of action – namely, allying with the United States. This need for support greatly influences Blair’s use of appeals to pathos throughout this speech, for he seeks not only to condemn Hussein, but also to invalidate the alternatives offered by his political opponents.

In his speech to the House of Commons, Blair uses pathological appeals to (a) vilify Hussein and the Iraqi regime; and (b) point out the multiple diplomatic and military dangers inherent in not enforcing UN sanctions against Hussein.<sup>9</sup> Twelve of Blair’s 44 arguments that draw on appeals to pathos argue that the UN will be “weakened” should it not enforce Security Council resolutions: he asks “What would any tyrannical regime possessing WMD think viewing the history of the world’s diplomatic dance with Saddam? That our capacity to pass firm resolutions is matched only by our fear in implementing them”. Such a condemnation alludes to the risks involved in limiting the UN’s scope of action – namely, that other “tyrannical regimes” could follow the same path that has led Hussein to, ostensibly, challenge the western world. Blair continues this line later in his speech, openly articulating this same danger:

To retreat now, I believe, would put at hazard all that we hold dearest, turn the UN back into a talking shop, stifle the first steps of progress in the Middle East, leave the Iraqi people at the mercy of events on which we would have relinquished all power to influence for the better.

By stating both the political and military threats posed by regimes which undermine and threaten western democracies, Blair gives his audience multiple reasons to reconsider any reluctance in supporting the United States.

Blair further works to discredit Hussein as an authoritative political figure by referring to him by his first name rather than his last (“What will Saddam feel?”). In doing this, Blair diminishes, even denies, conferring upon Hussein the authority that he

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<sup>9</sup> Full text and analysis of Blair’s speech may be found in Appendix C, Article 3 and 4.

would otherwise command as a political leader. In this way, Blair, like Bush, “frames” the way in which his audience perceives Hussein – as an illegitimate dictator, rather than as a valid authority.

Blair uses rhetorical questions to great effect in providing readers with propagandistic instances of “Grim Generality”. By asking his audience to imagine their own (vision of a world where Hussein has won), Blair turns the argument from an objective debate into a personal issue.

A final point of note in analyzing Blair’s use of emotional appeals is the way in which he argues the wide-ranging implications of allowing Iraq to “flout” UN authority. Rather than focusing on domestic concerns and issues as Bush does, Blair emphasizes the threat that Hussein’s actions pose to the wider world, pointing to both the UN and western values as targets of terrorist aggression. He speaks of how terrorism “poisons the chances of political progress” in the Middle East and Africa, and of how terrorists, aided by Iraq, “detest the freedom, democracy and tolerance that are the hallmarks of our way of life”. In giving the “threat” a global focus, Blair effectively broadens the scope of the debate, enabling his audience to picture the threat as an ideological assault on western civilization as a whole. Sixty-eight percent of Blair’s appeals to pathos in this speech constitute propaganda as defined by Elspeth Tilley’s Propaganda Index; of that, twelve appeals to pathos refer to the threat of weakening the UN, with ten of those appeals constituting propaganda.<sup>10</sup>

Stephen Harper’s Speech to the House of Commons, given on 20 March, 2003, encompasses many of the same arguments used by Blair and Bush. Indeed, the three speakers use extremely similar discursive phrases through the course of their speeches,

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<sup>10</sup> The results of Blair’s analysis in the Propaganda Index may be found in Appendix C, Article 3.

which, I believe, contributes to the comparable levels of propaganda as defined by Tilley in each. Like Bush, Harper articulates the threat of Hussein and other “tyrannical regimes” in possession of WMDs, and, like Blair, he discusses the dangers of weakening the UN. Harper’s most prominent argument, however, pertains to the diplomatic danger of Canada “abandoning” the United States. In not supporting the United States, Harper argues, Canada would “inevitably undermine one of the most important relationships that we have” and risk abandoning “our British and American allies in their time of need.”<sup>11</sup>

Harper makes use of some arguments that Tilley would consider propaganda on the basis of her Index, but which do not use appeals to pathos in order to persuade audiences. For example, his allusion to Operation Desert Fox as a successful military campaign against Iraq would be considered an example of Transfer Positive;<sup>12</sup> however, as the argument does not make use of pathos as outlined in the Pathos Code, I chose not to include it in my final analysis (Appendix D, Article 6, point 15).

As the voice of dissent for a government that had already chosen not to join the “Coalition of the Willing,” Harper’s message differs slightly from Blair’s. Unlike Blair, Harper speaks for the opposition party in the Canadian government and is voicing his support for the United States after the Canadian government has already decided not to join. As a result, his speech is heavily critical of the majority government. He makes very effective use of Tilley’s propagandistic categories Plain Folks and Name Calling to alienate his political opponents, condemning both the Parti Quebecois’s and the Liberal

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<sup>11</sup> The full text and analysis of Harper’s Speech to the House of Commons may be found in Appendix D, Article 5 and 6.

<sup>12</sup> Transfer Positive, as defined by Tilley: “Process of association whereby the ‘good’ of one thing rubs off onto something else (e.g., through appropriation of symbolic objects such as national flags or anthem, sponsorship, celebrity or ‘expert’ endorsement)”.

government's "abandonment" of Canada's traditional "values and vision". Harper's use of Name Calling and Plain Folks tactics against his political adversaries enable him to nominally discredit the anti-war stance of his political adversaries, thereby presenting his summary of the issue as the only "logical" one to consider. A particularly effective example of such Name Calling rhetorically aligns the Liberal majority government with Hussein's regime: after accusing Hussein of "play[ing] a game of cat and mouse", he accuses the Liberal government of "playing irrelevant and contradictory games". In doing this, Harper implicitly aligns the two groups, thereby reinforcing the inherent "reasonableness" of the point of view that he offers.

Harper's speech contains 22 arguments that make use of appeals to pathos. Of these 16, or 73%, constitute propaganda as defined by Tilley.<sup>13</sup> Many of Harper's appeals to pathos closely echo those used by Bush and Blair – a similarity to be expected, given the context and subject matter in question. Like Bush and Blair, Harper refers to the "hatred" and "detestation" that Iraqi terrorists have for Western civilization; he discusses the looming "threat" posed by rebel regimes in possession of WMDs, and paints a picture of the eventual "liberation" of the Iraqi people from the "tyranny" that oppresses them. Harper and Blair both state that "force" is the only language that Hussein understands and refer to the "games" played by Hussein in flouting UN resolutions, while Bush and Harper both allude to the global justice that will be served by the removal of Saddam Hussein.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Full details may be found in Appendix D, Article 5.

<sup>14</sup> Please refer to Appendix A, Table 3.

## **CONCLUSION**

This study examined war justification speeches given by pro-war leaders on the eve of the Iraq invasion. These speeches allowed Bush, Blair and Harper to “frame” aspects of the diplomatic context that surrounded the issue at the time: their use of emotional appeals greatly influenced how the war was perceived by domestic audiences, many of whom, as a result of such discourse, believed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction intended to be used in attacks on the western world. By providing audiences with a particular framework within which to perceive the conflict, these political speakers actively manipulated how their audience viewed it – but is this unethical, or merely a necessary function of political speech as a whole? The question turns on the idea of political “truth” as an intangible or subjective concept – yet political ideology cannot be a defense against unethical discursive practices.

My research questions focused my inquiry into looking at how truth and ethics played out in my data set. As an integral and classically grounded part of rhetoric as a whole, appeals to emotion, or *pathos*, can be effective and legitimate components of a well-rounded rhetorical argument. The defining line between a legitimate appeal to emotion and “propaganda” as negative emotional manipulation lies in the context surrounding the appeal itself: that is, legitimate appeals to pathos occur when a speaker has provided audiences with enough evidence to enable them to make an objectively informed opinion on the issue at hand. More simply put, when emotional appeals are used to obscure or distort truth, they are illegitimate. In political contexts, however, “objectivity” or “truth” is often driven by political ideology. Thus, remaining aware of

bias and recognizing when it is and is not an appropriate part of political discourse, may help audiences make informed opinions.

This point leads me to address bias in this paper. While I attempted to remain objective through the course of my analysis, some degree of bias is inevitable in researching political case studies. By remaining aware of this possibility and editing specifically for bias, I believe that I have accomplished a largely objective analysis of political persuasion.

Like so many before me, I believe that that which asks us to question political communication is highly important to the political process. Studies such as these which expose the extent to which propaganda may be a part of political speech help to draw back the veil and remind us of why being engaged and informed is such an essential part of our social responsibilities. Rhetoric is a tool, yes – but by knowing how to use it ethically, and by seeing where persuasion can transform into propaganda, we, as an audience, can be critical consumers, rather than passive observers, of the political agenda.

## Appendix A

Table 1

### Pathos Code: Appeals to Pathos Analytic Categories and Descriptions

Category	Definition	Key Words	Example
Threat To National and/or Global Welfare	Emphasis upon nationalistic/patriotic sympathies; suggestion of imminent threat to the nation or to the world at large. Includes references to “protect[ing]” the “nation”, “world” / “national interests”, “global security” against “enemy invasions.” Invokes need to “defend” the homeland or western way of life.	“nation” “security” “interests” “defense” “global interest”	“In desperation, [Hussein] and terrorist groups might try to <b>conduct terrorist operations against the American people</b> and our friends” (Bush, Message to Saddam)
Fear and Urgency Appeals	Emphasis upon the need for immediate offensive action. Invokes sense of time “ticking down” to impending “doom” or “terror”; speculation of dangers yet to come and need to meet them	“threat” “doom” “horror” “pain” “now” “immediate” “danger”	“ <b>Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act</b> , this danger will be removed ... We choose to <b>meet that threat now</b> , where it arises, <b>before it can appear suddenly</b> in our skies.” (Bush, Message to Saddam”
Vilification of “Other”	Projection of negative or aggressive tendencies and biases upon the “enemy” or “unsupportive” UN member states. Use of politically charged terms and labels to refer to or imply that the “other” is the “enemy” or resistant to the “needs” of the world	“hate” “evil” “terrorist” “dictator”	“Looking back over the last twelve years, we have been victims of our own desire to placate the <b>implacable</b> ... To hope that there was some genuine intent to do good in <b>a regime whose mind is in fact evil.</b> ” (Blair, Speech to the House of Commons”)
Historical Allusion	References to: (a) prior dictatorships, authoritarian regimes or international conflicts (b) September 11 <sup>th</sup> attacks on Twin Towers  Invocation of specific emotional response in audience that connects current situation to past injustices	“Hitler” “authoritarian” “dictatorship” “September 11 attacks”	(a) “In the <b>great wars of the last century</b> , against <b>authoritarianism</b> , against <b>fascism</b> , against <b>communism</b> , Canada did not merely stand with the Americans, we, more often than not, led the way” (Harper, Speech to House of Commons)  (b) “Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, <b>not in a post-September 11<sup>th</sup> world.</b> ” (Colin Powell, Speech to the UN)
Fate of Iraq	Condemnation of the injustices against Iraqi people; invoke feeling of outrage or injustice in audience, encourage need to intervene and provide “noble” assistance. Expression of future potential of Iraq if “freed” from the “oppression” of current regime	“oppression” “brutality” “torture” “suffering” “liberation”	“The brutality of the repression [of the Iraqi people] – the death and torture camps, the barbaric prisons for political opponents, the routine beatings for anyone or their families suspected of disloyalty ...” (Blair, Speech to House of Commons)

Table 2

**Propaganda Index**

<b>Device</b>	<b>Description</b>
Name Calling	Negative or “bad” labels or stereotypes (e.g. terrorists, extremists, fanatics, ferals, “rent-a-crowd”) that encourage a summary negative response without examining history, complexity, or evidence related to an issue
Glittering Generality	Abstract positive labeling using virtue connotators (e.g., intelligence for covert surveillance); positive-sounding euphemisms (e.g., collateral damage and friendly fire for civilian or own-troop deaths; biosolids for sewerage); broadly affirmative unverifiable adjectives (e.g., state-of-the-art, high-tech); positive abstractions (e.g., prosperity, freedom, rights, democracy, respect, common sense); vagaries (e.g., significantly increasing or highly trained, where the level of increase or training is not defined); subjective adjectives or adverbs (beautiful, stunning) which give positive effect without evidence
Transfer Positive	Process of association whereby the “good” of one thing rubs off onto something else (e.g., through appropriation of symbolic objects such as national flags or anthem, sponsorship, celebrity or “expert” endorsement)
Transfer Negative	Express or implied association with negative incidents, places, people or symbols to “rub off” negative qualities to the issue being discussed or discredit by implication an opposing viewpoint (e.g. may have links with Al Qaida, has been seen in the company of known terrorists, etc.)
Plain Folks	Implication that ideas are “of the people” (e.g., references to family values, hard working, decent folk, normal people, or middle Australia). PF is a values-based device that implies normalcy or rationality for an opinion and thereby demonizes other views as aberrant and unreasonable, even if they are majority
Band Wagon	Peer pressure or spiral of silence device (e.g., implication that everyone, most people, many people or any large collectivized group of people such as our school, our company, or our neighbourhood thinks a particular, singular and uniform way). Includes references to imagined communities such as states, nations, organizations, and phrases such as we, our, all, everybody that invite solidarity with an implied large and inclusive group, suggest mass support for an opinion, marginalize alternative views as minority, suggest collective ownership of and responsibility for the actions of a group (e.g., “our army”) or obscure internal division within a group
Manifest Destiny	Deterministic invocation of God (of any kind or faith), destiny, fate, natural processes, or universal design, to lend support to an argument; removal of accountability for an idea or issue from individuals and attribution of responsibility to deterministic “greater forces” (God’s will, karma, tradition, luck, History, Nature)
Other	A phrase that appears either neutral, with no rhetorical or persuasive effect, or persuasive but does not fit into any of the above categories

Courtesy of Elspeth Tilley (2005): Responding to Terrorism Using Ethical Means: The Propaganda Index. *Communication Research Reports*, 22.1 p. 69-77

Table 2(a)

**PROPAGANDA INDEX MODIFICATION**

<b>Device</b>	<b>Description</b>
Grim Generality	Abstract negative labeling using vice connotators; negative-sounding euphemisms; broadly negative unverifiable adjectives (e.g., danger, chaos); vague speculation of negative eventualities (e.g., “should our enemies strike”); negative abstractions (e.g., evil, danger, immoral); subjective adjectives or adverbs which give negative effect without evidence

Table 3

**Rhetorical Similarities in Bush, Blair and Harper Speeches**

<b>Bush</b>	<b>Blair</b>	<b>Harper</b>
"As we honour the just demands of the world"		"The world has judged"
	"...it is dangerous. It is dangerous if such regimes disbelieve us"	"...it is inherently dangerous"
"The Iraqi regime has uniformly defied Security Council resolutions demanding full disarmament"	"in that hesitation he senses the weakness and therefore continues to defy"	"...continue to defy international resolutions"
"We choose to meet that threat now"	"The threat is chaos."	"...direct, undeniable, lethal threat"
"It has a deep hatred of America and our friends"	"They detest the freedom, democracy and tolerance that are the hallmarks of our way of life"	"...hatred they direct toward us and our civilization"
"The US did nothing to deserve or invite this threat"	"and when the threat returns from Iraq or elsewhere, who will believe us?"	"we cannot walk away from the threat"
"Peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime have failed again and again – because we are not dealing with peaceful men"	"What changed his mind? The threat of force. And what makes him now issue invitations to the inspectors, discover documents he said he never had, produce evidence of weapons supposed to be non-existent, destroy missiles he said he would keep? The imminence of force"	"Force has been the only language Saddam has ever understood"
	"To retreat now, I believe, would put at hazard all that we hold dearest, turn the UN back into a talking shop..."	"to do so will inevitably undermine one of the most important relationships we have"
"The tyrant will soon be gone"	"We will confront the tyrannies and dictatorships and terrorists who put our way of life at risk"	"His final bloody chapter is being read"
"The day of your liberation is near"	"... the Iraqi people, whose only true hope of liberation lies in the removal of Saddam"	"We will pray for the liberation of the people of Iraq"

## **Appendix “B”**

*Article 1*

### **Analysis: George W Bush’s “Message to Saddam”**

#### **Analysis Summary**

#### **Propaganda in “Message to Saddam”**

Total arguments that use appeals to pathos in Message to Saddam: 26

**Total legitimate appeals to pathos: 5**

**Total illegitimate appeals to pathos: 21**

**Propaganda Percentage: 81%**

*Applied Pathos Code Legend*

<b>Code Colour</b>	<b>Appeal Category</b>
Red	Threat to Global/National Welfare
Orange	Fear and Urgency Appeals
Green	Vilification of the “Other”
Pink	Historical Allusion “A” (prior dictatorships/international struggles)
Purple	Historical Allusion “B” (September 11 attacks on Twin Towers”
Blue	Fate of Iraqi People

Article 2

**George W Bush’s “Message To Saddam” Analyzed by Argument**

	Summary	Passage	Identified Appeals to Pathos	Propaganda Index / Justification
1	We have tried peaceful resolutions, but must act now	My fellow citizens, events in Iraq have now reached <b>the final days of decision</b> . For more than a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient and honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war. That regime pledged to reveal and destroy all its weapons of mass destruction as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War in 1991.  Since then, the world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy. We have passed more than a dozen resolutions in the United Nations Security Council. We have sent hundreds of weapons inspectors to oversee the disarmament of Iraq. <b>Our good faith has not been returned</b> .	Fear/Urgency Appeal Vilification of the “Other”  <i>Intent:</i> To demonstrate that US has acted with “good faith” but that Iraq has not responded in kind; stress upon the need to act because all alternative measures have been tried.	<b>Not Propaganda:</b> It “frames”/provides context to the question of Iraq possessing WMD, but does not make untoward allegations against the regime
2	The Iraqi regime has deliberately defied UN orders	The Iraqi regime has <b>used diplomacy as a ploy</b> to gain time and advantage. It has <b>uniformly defied</b> Security Council resolutions demanding full disarmament. Over the years, UN weapons inspectors have <b>been threatened by Iraqi officials</b> , electronically bugged, and <b>systematically deceived</b> . Peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime have failed again and again – because <b>we are not dealing with peaceful men</b> .	Vilification of the “Other”  <i>Intent:</i> To portray Iraq as aggressors in the face of UN (note: not US) wishes	<b>Name Calling:</b> Use of terms such as “ploy”, “systematic deception” encourage a summary negative response to Iraq.
3	Iraq possesses and has already used WMD’s against their enemies	Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that <b>the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised</b> . This regime <b>has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq’s neighbours and against Iraq’s people</b> .	Fear/Urgency Appeal Vilification of the “Other”  <i>Intent:</i> Uses strong language to stress importance of the issue and frames Iraq’s possession of WMD as a global concern. Demonstrates Iraq’s propensity for using WMDs	<b>Grim Generality:</b> Unverifiable accusation of Iraq possessing these “most lethal” weapons; no concrete examples given of Iraq using them against neighbours or own people.
4	Iraq is demonstratively aggressive and pro-terrorist	The regime has a <b>history of reckless aggression</b> in the Middle East. It has a <b>deep hatred of America and our friends</b> . And <b>it has aided, trained and harboured terrorists</b> , including operatives of Al Qaeda.	Vilification of the “Other”  <i>Intent:</i> Provide character portrayal of Iraq regime as dangerous and threat to US. Builds upon Iraq’s propensity for using WMDs, with USA as specific target for Iraqi/terrorist aims	<b>Name Calling:</b> Summarily affixes labels of “deep hatred” and “reckless aggression” onto Iraqi regime  <b>Transfer Negative:</b> No definitive evidence that Iraq has “aided, trained and harboured terrorists” and Al Qaeda operatives
5	Iraq could help terrorists attack the United States	<b>The danger is clear:</b> using chemical, biological, or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, <b>terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other</b> .	Threat to Global/National Welfare Fear/Urgency Appeal  <i>Intent:</i> Provide “worst-case scenario” to audiences involving the danger of allowing Iraq to possess WMDs	<b>Grim Generality:</b> Worst-case-scenario given to audiences in extremely graphic language  <b>Transfer Negative:</b> Aligns Iraq with terrorists in definitive, collusive terms
6	The United States must fight against this potential future	The United States and other nations <b>did nothing to deserve or invite this threat</b> . But we will do everything to defeat it. <b>Instead of drifting along toward tragedy</b> , we will set a course toward safety. <b>Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed</b> .	Threat to Global/National Welfare Fear/Urgency Appeal  <i>Intent:</i> Underline need to act immediately, before aggressor has the chance to bring “horror” upon American people	<b>Grim Generality:</b> Stresses need to counteract the broadly general picture of a “day of horror” to provoke fear in audience

BETWEEN RHETORIC AND PROPAGANDA

7	USA has the authority to use force in assuring national security	The United States of America has the sovereign authority to <b>use force in assuring its own national security</b> . That duty falls to me, as Commander-in-Chief, by the oath I have sworn, by the oath I will keep.	Threat to Global/National Welfare  Assertion of speaker's authority to authorize attack on Iraq  <i>Intent:</i> Provide justification for declaration of invasion	<b>Not Propaganda:</b> Statement of fact
8	USA has tried to work with UN to resolve issue	Recognizing the <b>threat to our country</b> , the United States Congress voted overwhelmingly last year to support the use of force against Iraq. America tried to work with the United Nations to address this threat because we wanted to resolve the issue peacefully. We believe in the mission of the United Nations. <b>One reason the UN was founded after the Second World War was to confront aggressive dictators, actively and early, before they can attack the innocent and destroy peace.</b>	Threat to Global/National Welfare Historical Allusion "A" (prior dictatorships)  <i>Intent:</i> Draw upon authority of UN as international peacekeeper; discuss prior attempts to resolve issue peacefully; align Hussein with other "aggressive dictators" that UN has dealt with	<b>Transfer Negative:</b> Implicitly align Hussein with other "aggressive dictators" to justify UN/US intervention
9	UN gave USA authority to force Iraq to disarm	In the case of Iraq, the Security Council did act, in the early 1990s. Under Resolutions 678 and 687 – both still in effect – the United States and our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. This is not a question of authority, it is a question of will.  Last September, I went to the UN General Assembly and <b>urged the nations of the world to unite and bring an end to this danger</b> . On November 8 <sup>th</sup> , the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, finding Iraq in material breach of its obligations, and vowing serious consequences if Iraq did not fully and immediately disarm.	Threat to Global/National Welfare  <i>Intent:</i> Argue that USA is drawing upon previous authority granted to compel disarming of Iraq ; demonstrate the unity of Security Council in condemning Iraq's actions	<b>Not Propaganda:</b> Statement of action
10	Iraq will not voluntarily disarm	Today, <b>no nation can possibly claim that Iraq has disarmed</b> . And <b>it will not disarm so long as Saddam Hussein holds power</b> .	Fear/Urgency Appeal Vilification of the "Other"  <i>Intent:</i> Point out need to disarm Iraq without Hussein's cooperation; unity of countries in agreeing that Iraq has not disarmed	<b>Band Wagon:</b> Reference to "all nations" as in unanimous agreement about Iraq's actions
11	Other countries in UN agree that Iraq is dangerous, but will not agree to enforce resolutions	For the last four-and-a-half months, the United States and our allies have worked within the Security Council to enforce that Council's long-standing demands. Yet, some permanent members of the Security Council have publicly announced that they will veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq. <b>These governments share our assessment of the danger, but not our resolve to meet it.</b>	Vilification of the "Other" (both Hussein and anti-invasion states in UN) Threat to Global/National Welfare  <i>Intent:</i> Differentiate USA from UN members who don't agree with invasion; imply that they agree with the danger (thereby legitimizing USA's actions) but are not prepared to meet it	<b>Band Wagon:</b> Implication that while "other governments" won't agree to act, they agree with what the US is doing, lending credibility to US actions
12	We have allies who support what we are doing	Many nations, however, do <b>have the resolve and the fortitude to act against this threat to peace</b> , and a broad coalition is now gathering to <b>enforce the just demands of the world</b> . <b>The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities</b> , so we will rise to ours.	Threat to Global/National Welfare Vilification of the "Other"  <i>Intent:</i> Show that it is a global threat and that USA is not alone in acting against Iraq; justify why the USA <i>must</i> act outside the UN Security Council; legitimize US actions by alluding to allies	<b>Plain Folks:</b> Implication that UN is "shirking" its responsibilities and duties; a values-based criticism of Security Council actions
13	Middle East governments also recognize the threat posed by Hussein	In recent days, some governments in the Middle East have been doing their part. They have delivered public and private messages <b>urging the dictator to leave Iraq</b> , so that disarmament can proceed peacefully. He has thus far refused.	Vilification of the "Other"  <i>Intent:</i> Show that Middle East countries likewise support US intent to rid Iraq of the "dictator"	<b>Not Propaganda:</b> Statement of actions taken by other countries

BETWEEN RHETORIC AND PROPAGANDA

14	The ultimatum has been delivered. We cannot wait any longer to act.	All the <b>decades of deceit and cruelty</b> have now reached an end. Saddam Hussein and his sons <b>must leave Iraq within 48 hours</b> . <b>Their refusal to do so</b> will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing. For their safety, all foreign nationals – including journalists and inspectors – should leave Iraq immediately.	Vilification of the “Other” Fear/Urgency Appeal  <i>Intent:</i> Give impression that decision of whether or not to invade rests with Hussein; turns the rhetorical onus onto Hussein as perpetrator of the invasion	<b>Name Calling:</b> Starting the argument with allegations of “deceit and cruelty” encourages a summary view of the demand; i.e., it predisposes audience to condemn Hussein and view USA and allies as legitimate force
15	Message to Iraqi people – promise to improve quality of life once we enter Iraq	Many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast, and I have a message for them. If we must begin a military campaign, <b>it will be directed against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you</b> . As our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you need. <b>We will tear down the apparatus of terror and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free</b> . In a free Iraq, <b>there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbours, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms</b> . <b>The tyrant will soon be gone</b> . <b>The day of your liberation is near</b> .	Vilification of the “Other” Fate of Iraq  <i>Intent:</i> Lends credibility to USA as acting honourably (i.e. to save Iraqis from oppression); allows USA to frame themselves as liberators and provides audience with graphic image of Iraq under Hussein’s “tyrannical” rule	<b>Name Calling:</b> Accusing current regime of being “lawless” and operating under a “tyrannical” ruler  <b>Grim Generality:</b> Provides a broad, general image of the “horror” of Iraq under current regime without offering concrete examples
16	Message to Iraq Military – Please work with our coalition forces and not against us	<b>It is too late</b> for Saddam Hussein to remain in power. It is not too late for the Iraqi military to act with honor and protect your country by permitting the peaceful entry of coalition forces to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Our forces will give Iraqi military units clear instructions on actions they can take to avoid being attacked and destroyed. <b>I urge every member of the Iraqi military and intelligence services, if war comes, to not fight for a dying regime that is not worth your own life</b> .	Fear/Urgency Appeal Fate of Iraq  <i>Intent:</i> Provide audience with sense that US is working with Iraq military, or would like to, as a legitimate force	<b>Plain Folks:</b> Implication that the regime is already “done for” and that US forces will provide Iraq military with a “fair deal” upon entry to the region
17	Iraqi people should comply with coalition forces	And all Iraqi military and civilian personnel should listen carefully to this warning. In any conflict, <b>your fate will depend on your action</b> . Do not destroy oil wells, a source of wealth that belongs to the Iraqi people. Do not obey any command to use weapons of mass destruction against anyone, including the Iraqi people. <b>War crimes will be prosecuted</b> . <b>War criminals will be punished</b> . And it will be no defense to say, ‘I was just following orders’.	Fate of Iraq  <i>Intent:</i> Reminder of the strength and force of USA	<b>Plain Folks:</b> “Your fate depends on your action”; note specific emphasis on not destroying the oil wells  <b>Name Calling:</b> War crimes and war criminals will be punished
18	Reminder of American resolve in the face of war; expression of the strength of US people as a whole	<b>Should Saddam Hussein choose confrontation</b> , the American people can know that every measure has been taken to avoid war, and every measure will be taken to win it. <b>Americans understand the costs of conflict because we have paid them in the past</b> . War has no certainty, except the certainty of sacrifice.	Vilification of the “Other” Historical Allusion “A”  <i>Intent:</i> Onus is on Hussein “choosing” conflict; USA going to war as a “last resort”; drawing parallels with prior US wartime acts against dictators	<b>Transfer Positive:</b> Association with stoicism of Americans in the face of past “sacrifices”
19	War required to meet the threat before it occurs	Yet, the only way to reduce the harm and duration of war is to apply the full force and might of our military, and we are prepared to do so. <b>If Saddam Hussein attempts to cling to power, he will remain a deadly foe until the end</b> . In desperation, <b>he and terrorist groups might try to conduct terrorist operations against the American people and our friends</b> . These attacks are not inevitable. They are, however, possible. And this very fact underscores the reason <b>we cannot live under the threat of blackmail</b> . <b>The terrorist threat to America and the world will be diminished the moment that Saddam Hussein is disarmed</b> .	Vilification of the “Other” Fear/Urgency Appeal Threat to Global/National Welfare  <i>Intent:</i> Provide audience with “worst case scenario”; allegation of Hussein as “blackmailer” and “foe” of USA	<b>Grim Generality:</b> Broad general image of what may happen if Hussein remains in power  <b>Name Calling:</b> Referring to Hussein as a “deadly foe” aligned with “terrorist groups”

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20	America is taking steps to protect itself against enemies	Our government is on heightened watch against these dangers. Just as we are preparing to ensure victory in Iraq, we are taking further actions to protect our homeland. In recent days, American authorities have expelled from the country certain individuals with ties to Iraqi intelligence services. Among other measures, I have directed additional security of our airports, and increased Coast Guard patrols of major seaports. The Department of Homeland Security is working closely with the nation's governors to increase armed security at critical facilities across America.	Threat to Global/National Welfare  Intent: Reassure audiences that steps are being taken to ensure national security	<b>Not Propaganda:</b> Provides examples of steps being taken
21	Qualification that attacks are possible	Should enemies strike our country, they would be attempting to shift our attention with panic and weaken our morale with fear. In this, they would fail. No act of theirs can alter the course or shake the resolve of this country. We are a peaceful people – yet we're not a fragile people, and we will not be intimidated by thugs and killers. If our enemies dare strike us, they and all who have aided them, will face fearful consequences.	Fear/Urgency Appeal Vilification of the "Other"  Intent: Upset potential complacencies; provide strong rhetoric of united country	<b>Bandwagon:</b> America as united against an external foe  <b>Name Calling:</b> Enemies as a broad category massing against USA
22	We must strike before they do	We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater. In one year, or five years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies could choose the moment of deadly conflict when they are strongest. We choose to meet that threat now, where it arises, before it can appear suddenly in our skies and cities.	Fear/Urgency Appeal Threat to Global/National Welfare Vilification of the "Other" Historical Allusion "B"  Intent: Justify need to act immediately, rather than in the future; allusion to September 11 when attack came "from the skies"	<b>Grim Generality:</b> Remind audiences of terrorist capabilities and need to act first  <b>Name Calling:</b> Reaffirmation of Hussein's "terrorist" links
23	Past shows that allowing dictators to grow in strength is dangerous; new realities underline this fear	The cause of peace requires all free nations to recognize new and undeniable realities. In the 20 <sup>th</sup> century, some chose to appease murderous dictators, whose threats were allowed to grow into genocide and global war. In this century, when evil men plot chemical, biological and nuclear terror, a policy of appeasement could bring destruction of a kind never before seen on this earth.	Historical Allusion "A" Vilification of the "Other" Threat to Global/National Welfare Fear/Urgency Appeal  Intent: Align Hussein with past dictators and stress that the threat he poses is even worse	<b>Grim Generality:</b> Very broad, very extreme version of what "appeasement" could entail  <b>Transfer Negative:</b> Association of Hussein with 20 <sup>th</sup> century dictators and allusion to World War II
24	We must attack now, not later	Terrorists and terror states do not reveal these threats with fair notice, in formal declarations – and responding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not self-defense, it is suicide. The security of the world requires disarming Saddam Hussein now.	Vilification of the "Other" Fear/Urgency Appeal Threat to Global/National Welfare  Intent: Stress immediacy of need to disarm Hussein; it is a global security issue to disarm Hussein, not just an American one	<b>Name Calling:</b> Iraq is now a "terror state" not state that harbours terrorists as it was at the beginning of the speech  <b>Plain Folks:</b> It is not "self defense but suicide" – very matter-of-fact declaration of the need to act now; a values-based declaration that to wait would be absurd
25	We will protect Iraqi people and allow them to develop as a people free from tyranny	As we enforce the just demands of the world, we will also honor the deepest commitments of our country. Unlike Saddam Hussein, we believe the Iraqi people are deserving and capable of human liberty. And when the dictator has departed, they can set an example to all the Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-governing nation.  The United States, with other countries, will work to advance liberty and peace in that region. Our goal will not be achieved overnight, but it can come over time. The power and appeal of human liberty is felt in every life and every land. And the greatest power of freedom is to overcome hatred and violence, and turn the creative gifts of men and women to the pursuits of peace.	Fate of Iraq Vilification of the "Other"  Intent: Show America as enforcer of democratic ideals who will "save" Iraqi people from dictator	<b>Band Wagon:</b> "we" are enforcing an ideal that "we" know to be just; "our" goal is one that will come over time. Very inclusive, general statements of support and ideology  <b>Manifest Destiny:</b> Invocation of ideals of human liberty and peace to support US invasion of Iraq

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26	Conclusion	<p>That is the future we choose. Free nations have a duty to defend our people by <b>uniting against the violent</b>. And tonight, as we have done before, America and our allies accept that responsibility.</p> <p>Good night, and may God continue to bless America.</p>	<p>Vilification of the "Other" Fate of Iraq</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Remind audience that the "ultimate" reason for invading Iraq is to support and protect the innocent against the evil/violent</p>	<p><b>Manifest Destiny:</b> It is the "future" and the "responsibility" of America to defend itself and others against tyranny</p>
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## **Appendix “C”**

Article 3

### **Analysis: Tony Blair’s “Speech to the House of Commons”**

#### **Analysis Summary**

#### **Propaganda in “Speech to the House of Commons”**

Total arguments that use appeals to pathos in Speech to the House of Commons: 44

**Total legitimate appeals to pathos: 14**

**Total illegitimate appeals to pathos: 30**

**Propaganda Percentage: 68%**

*Applied Pathos Code Legend*

<b>Code Colour</b>	<b>Appeal Category</b>
Red	Threat to Global/National Welfare
Orange	Fear and Urgency Appeals
Green	Vilification of the “Other”
Pink	Historical Allusion “A” (prior dictatorships/international struggles)
Purple	Historical Allusion “B” (September 11 attacks on Twin Towers”
Blue	Fate of Iraqi People

Article 4

**Tony Blair’s “Speech to the House of Commons” Analyzed by Argument**

	Summary	Passage	Identified Appeals to Pathos	Propaganda Index / Justification
1	Opening: Democracy must be recognized as a privilege that we should respect	I beg to move the motion standing on the order paper in my name and those of my right honourable friends. At the outset I say: it is right that this house debate this issue and pass judgment. That is the democracy that is our right <b>but that others struggle for in vain</b> . And again I say: I do not disrespect the views of those in opposition to mine.	<i>Intent:</i> Remind audience of the nature of democracy; imply that others, such as those in Iraq to whom he refers later in the speech, do not share democratic rights as audience does	<b>Not Propaganda</b>
2	We must have a military presence in Iraq	This is a tough choice. But it is also a stark one: to stand British troops down and turn back; or to hold firm to the course we have set. I believe we must hold firm.	∅	∅
3		The question most often posed is not why does it matter, but why does it matter so much? Here we are, the government with its most serious test, its majority at risk, the first Cabinet resignation over an issue of policy. The main parties divided.  People who agree on everything else disagree on this and, likewise, those who never agree on anything find common cause. The country and parliament reflect each other, a debate that, as time as gone on has become less bitter but not less grave.	∅	∅
4	These are all of the factors that depend upon the decision made today	So: Why does it matter so much? Because the outcome of this issue will now <b>determine more than the fate of the Iraqi regime and more than the future of the Iraqi people</b> , for so long <b>brutalized by Saddam</b> . <b>It will determine the way Britain and the world confront the central security threat of the 21<sup>st</sup> century</b> ; the development of the UN; the relationship between Europe and the US; the relations within the EU and the way the US engages with the rest of the world. <b>It will determine the pattern of international politics for the next generation.</b>	Fate of Iraq Threat to Global/National Security Vilification of the “Other” Fear/Urgency Appeal  <i>Intent:</i> Underline the gravitas of the issue and the wide-ranging consequences of all decisions made. Make audience recognize the extreme importance of it outside the realm of Hussein alone	<b>Manifest Destiny:</b> Deterministic portrayal of the stakes of the issue at hand
5	Historical Overview (a)  1991-1995 Hussein had already used WMD and UN set up inspections process to examine full extent of Iraq’s weapons programme	But first, Iraq and its WMD.  In April 1991, after the Gulf War, Iraq was given 15 days to provide a full and final declaration of all its WMD.  <b>Saddam had used the weapons against Iran, against his own people, causing thousands of deaths. He had had plans to use them against allied forces.</b> It became clear after the Gulf War that the WMD ambitions of Iraq were far more extensive than hitherto thought. This issue was identified by the UN as one for urgent remedy. Unsc, the weapons inspections team, was set up. They were expected to complete their task following the declaration at the end of April 1991.  The declaration when it came was false – a <b>blanket denial</b> of the programme, other than in a very tentative form. So the 12-year game began.	Vilification of the “Other”  <i>Intent:</i> Provide “character reference” of Iraq’s past actions and its refusal to cooperate with UN	<b>Not Propaganda</b>

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6	<p>Historical Overview (b) 1992-1994</p> <p>Iraq consistently lied about possessing WMD</p>	<p>The inspectors probed. Finally in March 1992, Iraq admitted that it had previously undeclared WMD but said it had destroyed them. It gave another full and final declaration. Again the inspectors probed but found little.</p> <p>In October 1994, Iraq stopped cooperating with Unscm altogether. Military action was threatened. Inspections resumed. In March 1995, in an effort to rid Iraq of the inspectors, a further full and final declaration of WMD was made. By July 1995, Iraq was forced to admit that it too was false. In August, they provided yet another full and final declaration.</p>	<p>Vilification of the "Other"</p> <p>Intent: Provide content, but also serves as a "character reference" to Iraq and its actions</p>	<p><b>Not Propaganda</b></p>
7	<p>Historical Overview (c)</p> <p>Evidence provided to show that Hussein once again lied about extent of weapons programme</p>	<p>Then a week later, Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamal, defected to Jordan. He disclosed a far more extensive BW (biological weapons) programme and for the first time said Iraq had weaponised the programme; something Saddam had always strenuously denied. All this had been happening whilst the inspectors were in Iraq. Kamal also revealed Iraq's crash programme to produce a nuclear weapon in 1990.</p> <p>Iraq was then forced to release documents which showed just how extensive those programmes were. In 1995, Jordan intercepted prohibited components for missiles that could be used for WMD.</p>	<p>Vilification of the "Other"</p> <p>Intent: Show that Iraq/Hussein was demonstratively lying in the face of witnesses;</p>	<p><b>Not Propaganda</b></p> <p>NOTE: use of Hussein's first name, rather than last name (unlike Hussein's son, referred to by last name) – something Blair continues to do throughout the speech. Diminishes Hussein's authority in eyes of audience.</p>
8	<p>Historical Overview (d)</p> <p>Further declarations proved false; weapons production equipment discovered</p>	<p>In June 1996, a further full and final declaration was made. That too turned out to be false. In June 1997, inspectors were barred from specific sites.</p> <p>In September 1997, another full and final declaration was made. Also false. Meanwhile the inspectors discovered VX nerve agent production equipment, something always denied by the Iraqis.</p>	<p>Vilification of the "Other"</p> <p>Intent: Allude to the longstanding duplicity of the Iraq regime</p>	<p><b>Not Propaganda</b></p>
9	<p>Historical Overview (e)</p> <p>Threat of force made some progress; but again, cooperation failed</p>	<p>In October 1997, the US and the UK threatened military action if Iraq refused to comply with the inspectors. But obstruction continued.</p> <p>Finally, under threat of action, in February 1998, Kofi Annan went to Baghdad and negotiated a memorandum with Saddam to allow inspections to continue. They did. For a few months.</p> <p>In August, cooperation was suspended.</p>	<p>∅</p>	<p>∅</p>
10	<p>Historical Overview (f)</p> <p>1998-now Operation Desert Fox as way to destroy Iraqi WMD capabilities; new inspections team brought in</p>	<p>In December the inspectors left. Their final report is a withering indictment of Saddam's lies, deception and obstruction, with large quantities of WMD remained unaccounted for.</p> <p>The US and the UK then, in December 1998, undertook Desert Fox, a targeted bombing campaign to degrade as much of the Iraqi WMD facilities as we could.</p> <p>In 1999, a new inspections team, Unmovic, was set up. But Saddam refused to allow them to enter Iraq.</p> <p>So there they stayed, in limbo, until after Resolution 1441, when last November they were allowed to return.</p>	<p>Vilification of the "Other"</p> <p>Intent: Provide "character reference" and context for the current question before Parliament</p>	<p><b>Not Propaganda</b></p> <p>NOTE: Blair is "framing" the issue very fairly, I would say, but he is framing nonetheless</p>

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11	Today, we are in same position as before	<p>What is the claim of Saddam today? Why exactly the same claim as before: that he has no WMD.</p> <p>Indeed, we are asked to believe that after seven years of obstruction and non-compliance finally resulting in the inspectors leaving in 1998, seven years in which he hid his programme, built it up even whilst inspection teams were in Iraq, that after they left he voluntarily decided to do what he had consistently refused to do under coercion.</p>	<p>Vilification of the “Other”</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Give audience an “incredulous” scenario to underline Hussein’s alleged actions</p>	<p><b>Band Wagon:</b> Implication that there is unanimous agreement that Hussein continues to be in breach of 1441</p>
12	Inspectors left behind	<p>When the inspectors left in 1998, they left unaccounted for: 10,000 litres of anthrax; a far reaching VX nerve agent programme; up to 6,500 chemical munitions; at least 80 tonnes of mustard gas, possibly more than ten times that amount; unquantifiable amounts of sarin, botulinum toxin and a host of other biological poisons; an entire Scud missile programme.</p>	<p>Fear/Urgency Appeal</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Make audience aware of the stakes – i.e., what may remain in Iraq</p>	<p><b>Not Propaganda:</b> Statement of terms</p>
13	It cannot be believed that he destroyed the weapons	<p>We are now seriously asked to accept that in the last few years, contrary to all history, contrary to all intelligence, he decided unilaterally to destroy the weapons. Such a claim is palpably absurd.</p>	<p>Vilification of the “Other”</p>	<p><b>Plain Folks:</b> Value-laden, strongly worded; no “reasonable” alternative thought pattern</p>
14	Iraq continues to be in breach of UN resolutions and will give another false resolution in December	<p>1441 is a very clear resolution. It lays down a final opportunity for Saddam to disarm. It rehearses the fact that he has been, for years, in material breach of 17 separate UN resolutions. It says that this time compliance must be full, unconditional and immediate. The first step is a full and final declaration of all WMD to be given on 8 December.</p> <p>I won’t go through all the events since then – the House is familiar with them – but this much is accepted by all members of the UNSC: the 8 December declaration is false. That in itself is a material breach. Iraq has made some concessions to cooperation but no-one disputes that it is not fully cooperating. Iraq continues to deny it has any WMD, though no serious intelligence service anywhere in the world believes them.</p>	<p>Vilification of the “Other”</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Portray Hussein as actively and defiantly in breach of UN ordinances</p>	<p><b>Band Wagon:</b> Use of term no serious intelligence service” implies that there is no possible alternative; and that there is unanimity as to his actions</p>
15	Evidence provided regarding “missing” WMD in Iraq	<p>On 7 March, the inspectors published a remarkable document. It is 173 pages long, detailing all the unanswered questions about Iraq’s WMD. It lists 29 different areas where they have been unable to obtain information. For example, on VX it says: ‘Documentation available to Unmovic suggests that Iraq at least had had far reaching plans to weaponize VX...</p> <p>‘Mustard constituted an important part (about 70%) of Iraq’s CW arsenal ... 550 mustard-filled shells and up to 450 mustard filled aerial bombs unaccounted for ... additional uncertainty with respect of 6526 aerial bombs, corresponding to approximately 1000 tonnes of agent, predominately mustard.</p> <p>‘Based on unaccounted for growth media, Iraq’s potential production of anthrax could have been in the range of about 15,000 to 25,000 litres ... Based on all the available evidence, the strong presumption is that about 10,000 litres of anthrax was not destroyed and may still exist.’</p>	<p>Fear/Urgency Appeal</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> To make clear the potential for destruction that Iraq has. Note the document’s use of past-tense and conditional phrasing (in italics); later investigation would reveal that this document was largely outdated when presented in the context of this speech.</p>	<p><b>Transfer Negative:</b> Implication that Iraq does have such capabilities, though his use of the conditional tense suggests that there is no clear evidence</p>
16	Saddam continues to defy UNSC	<p>On this basis, had we meant what we said in Resolution 1441, the Security Council should have convened and condemned Iraq as in material breach. What is perfectly clear is that Saddam is playing the same old games in the same old way. Yes there are concessions. But no fundamental change of heart or mind.</p>	<p>Vilification of the “Other”</p>	<p><b>Name Calling:</b> Summary portrayal of Hussein through terms of him playing the “same old games”</p>

BETWEEN RHETORIC AND PROPAGANDA

17	Countries were reluctant to go to war immediately, so gave Hussein another chance to comply with 1441	<p>But the inspectors indicated there was at least some cooperation; and the world rightly hesitated over war. We therefore approached a second resolution in this way. We laid down an ultimatum calling upon Saddam to come into line with Resolution 1441 or be in material breach. Not an unreasonable proposition, given the history.</p> <p>But still countries hesitated: how do we know how to judge full cooperation?</p>	∅	∅
18	Establishment of benchmarks that Hussein must meet in order to be in compliance with 1441	<p>We then worked on a further compromise. We consulted the inspectors and drew up five tests based on the document they published on 7 March. Tests like interviews with 30 scientists outside of Iraq; production of the anthrax or documentation showing its destruction.</p> <p>The inspectors added another test: that Saddam should publicly call on Iraqis to cooperate with them. So we constructed this framework: that Saddam should be given a specified time to fulfill all six tests to show full cooperation; that if he did so the inspectors could then set out a forward work programme and that if he failed to do so, action would follow.</p> <p>So: clear benchmarks, plus a clear ultimatum. I <b>defy anyone to describe that as an unreasonable position.</b></p>	<p>Vilification of the "Other"</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Portray those who don't agree as unreasonable</p>	<b>Plain Folks</b>
19	The ultimatum solution gained popular support	<p>Last Monday, we were getting somewhere with it. We very nearly had majority agreement and I thank the Chilean President particularly for the constructive way he approached the issue.</p> <p>There were debates about the length of the ultimatum. But the basic construct was gathering supporters.</p>	<p><i>Intent:</i> Present ultimatum as the logical, reasonable next step to resolving the issue</p>	∅
20	France is single-handedly opposing the ultimatum	<p>Then, on Monday night, France said it would veto a second resolution whatever the circumstances. Then France denounced the six tests. Later that day, Iraq rejected them. Still, we continued to negotiate.</p> <p>Last Friday, France said they could not accept any ultimatum. On Monday, we made final efforts to secure agreement. But <b>they remain utterly opposed</b> to anything which lays down an ultimatum authorizing action in the event of non-compliance by Saddam.</p>	<p>Vilification of the "Other" (France)</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Blame France for the failure of the ultimatum resolution</p>	<b>Plain Folks:</b> Use of term "utterly opposed" implies that they are very much in the wrong
21	Non-supporters are not giving the UNSC enough to work with in enforcing Hussein to comply	<p>Just consider the position we are asked to adopt. Those on the Security Council opposed to us say they want Saddam to disarm but will not countenance any new resolution that authorizes force in the event of non-compliance.</p> <p><b>That is their position. No to any ultimatum; no to any resolution that stipulates that failure to comply will lead to military action.</b></p> <p>So we must demand that he disarm but relinquish any concept of a threat if he doesn't.</p>	<p>Vilification of the "Other" (non-supporters)</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Present non-supporters as entirely in the wrong; demonstrate that they are putting the entire initiative at risk</p>	<b>Plain Folks:</b> Very much implied that non-supporters are irrational for not supporting the ultimatum
22	Hussein only responds to force	<p>From December 1998 to December 2002, no UN inspector was allowed to inspect anything in Iraq. For four years, not a thing.</p> <p>What changed his mind? The threat of force. From December to January and then from January through to February, concessions were made.</p> <p>What changed his mind? The threat of force. And <b>what makes him now issue invitations to the inspectors, discover documents he said he never had, produce evidence of weapons supposed to be non-existent, destroy missiles he said he would keep?</b> The imminence of force.</p> <p><b>The only persuasive power to which he responds is 250,000 allied troops on his doorstep</b></p>	<p>Vilification of the "Other"</p> <p>Fear/Urgency Appeal</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Imply that those who oppose the ultimatum are not supporting the UN with enough "force" to oust Saddam; segue into rhetoric that the only avenue to any resolution is not, in fact, compromise/ultimatum but rather the use of that force</p>	<b>Plain Folks:</b> Very matter-of-fact statement of Hussein's non-compliance <b>Name Calling:</b> Implication that Hussein is a "thug" who only responds to force

BETWEEN RHETORIC AND PROPAGANDA

23	We have tried for twelve years and cannot try any longer	Looking back over 12 years, we have been victims of our own desire to <b>placate the implacable, to persuade towards reason the utterly unreasonable, to hope that there was some genuine intent to do good in a regime whose mind is in fact evil. Now the very length of time counts against us.</b> You've waited 12 years. Why not wait a little longer?	Vilification of the "Other" Fear/Urgency Appeal  <i>Intent:</i> rhetorically "give" the choice back to the House; underscore the urgency with which the question must be decided and provide audience with only one ostensibly valid avenue of thought	<b>Name Calling:</b> Regime as a whole is "evil", encourages summary response
24	We have exhausted all diplomatic avenues, and Hussein continues to defy	And indeed we have.  <b>I441 gave a final opportunity.</b> The first test was the 8 <sup>th</sup> of December. He failed it. But still we waited. Until January 27, the first inspection report that showed the absence of full cooperation. Another breach. And still we waited.  Until February 14 and then February 28 with concessions, according to the old familiar routine, <b>tossed to us to whet our appetite for hope and further waiting. But still no-one, not the inspectors nor any member of the security council, nor any half-way rational observer, believes Saddam is cooperating fully or unconditionally or immediately.</b>  Our fault has not been impatience.	Vilification of the "Other" Fear/Urgency Appeal  <i>Intent:</i> Underscore reasons why we have waited too long; show that Hussein continues to be "up to his old tricks" in the same way as he has done for 12 years	<b>Band Wagon Plain Folks</b>  No "half rational" observer; very matter-of-fact statement of Hussein's noncompliance; gives audience no other avenue of thought, as all "rationality" is on Blair's "side"
25	We cannot wait any longer – the longer we wait, the more Hussein will defy the UN	The truth is <b>our patience should have been exhausted weeks and months and years ago.</b> Even now, when if the world united and gave him an ultimatum: comply or face forcible disarmament, he might just do it, the world hesitates and in that hesitation <b>he senses the weakness and therefore continues to defy.</b>	Fear/Urgency Appeal Vilification of the "Other"  <i>Intent:</i> Show that world has reached a "last chance" moment; implore audience to act before it is too late and before Hussein can see the weakness that the UN is suffering from	<b>Band Wagon:</b> Speaks as an entity about "our patience" being exhausted; creates a sense that the world as a whole is fed up with waiting
26	We must act now because future tyrannical regimes will rise if we do not	What would any tyrannical regime possessing WMD think viewing the history of the world's diplomatic dance with Saddam? That our capacity to pass firm resolutions is only <b>matched by our feebleness in implementing them.</b>  <b>That is why this indulgence has to stop. Because it is dangerous. It is dangerous if such regimes disbelieve us.</b>  <b>Dangerous because one day they will mistake our innate revulsion against war for permanent incapacity; when in fact, pushed to the limit, we will act. But then when we act, after years of pretence, the action will have to be harder, bigger, more total in its impact. Iraq is not the only regime with WMD. But back away from this confrontation and future conflicts will be infinitely worse and more devastating.</b>	Fear/Urgency Appeal Threat to Global/National Welfare  <i>Intent:</i> Make clear the danger in not allowing the UN to act	<b>Grim Generality:</b> Raises spectre of a future where other regimes challenge the UN
27	It is not a case of Iraq being in breach; it is a case of understanding that Iraq is a immediate and compelling threat	But of course, in a sense, any fair observer does not really dispute that Iraq is in breach and that I441 implies action in such circumstances. The real problem is that, underneath, people dispute that Iraq is a threat; dispute the link between terrorism and WMD; dispute the whole basis of our assertion that <b>the two together constitute a fundamental assault on our way of life.</b>	Threat to National/Global Welfare  <i>Intent:</i> Underscore the link between Iraq and "home" – it is not a case of danger in a far off country but of danger to Western civilization	<b>Grim Generality:</b> Abstract accusation of Iraq as a threat to the western world's <i>entire</i> "way of life"

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<p>28</p>	<p>Historical analogy – while we never know what to do in the moment, we must take past instances of world threats into consideration without dismissing them as “warmongering”</p>	<p>There are glib and sometimes foolish comparisons with the 1930s. No one here is an appeaser. But the only relevant point of analogy is that with history, we know what happened. We can look back and say: <b>there’s the time; that was the moment</b>; for example, <b>when Czechoslovakia was swallowed up by the Nazis – that’s when we should have acted.</b></p> <p>But it wasn’t clear at the time. In fact at the time, many people thought such a fear fanciful. Worse, put forward in bad faith by warmongers. Listen to this editorial – from a paper I’m pleased to say with a different position today – but written in late 1938 after Munich when by now, you would have thought the world was tumultuous in its desire to act.</p> <p>‘Be glad in your hearts. Give thanks to your God. People of Britain, your children are safe. Your husbands and sons will not march to war. Peace is a victory for all mankind. And now let us go back to our own affairs. We have had enough of those menaces, conjured up from the continent to confuse us.’</p> <p>Naturally <b>should Hitler appear again in the same form</b>, we would know what to do. But the point is that history doesn’t declare the future to us so plainly. Each time is different and the present must be judged without the benefit of hindsight.</p>	<p>Fear/Urgency Appeal Historical Allusion “A”</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Back himself out of the corner of being called a “warmonger”; make the comparison between Hussein and Hitler; underscore the need to act <i>now</i>, rather than later. While he says he isn’t trying to compare to WWII, he clearly is drawing a parallel with the use of the editorial</p>	<p><b>Transfer Negative:</b> Implied association between Hitler and Hussein, although Blair expressly denies any comparison with the 1930s</p>
<p>29</p>	<p>The threat posed by Hussein is not the same as posed by Hitler; but it is equally pressing</p>	<p>So let me explain the nature of this threat as I see it.</p> <p>The threat today is not that of the 1930s. It’s not big powers going to war with each other. The ravages which fundamentalist political ideology inflicted on the 20<sup>th</sup> century are memories. The Cold War is over. Europe is at peace, if not always diplomatically.</p> <p>But the world is ever more interdependent. Stock markets and economies rise and fall together. Confidence is the key to prosperity. Insecurity spreads like contagion. So people crave stability and order.</p> <p><b>The threat is chaos.</b> And there are two begetters of chaos. <b>Tyrannical regimes with WMD and extremist terrorist groups who profess a perverted and false view of Islam.</b></p>	<p>Threat to Global/National Welfare Vilification of the “Other”</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Explain how the world has changed; but underscore that threat is just as grave as that posed by Hitler, and, in an economic sense, on a more global scale</p>	<p><b>Grim Generality:</b> Threat as “chaos” in the abstract; use of a hugely laden term</p> <p><i>NOTE:</i> Blair is much more global in his focus than Bush – while Bush discusses threat to America, Blair underscores that it is a threat to the world as a whole – both physically and to western ideology</p>
<p>30</p>	<p>Countries with hostile/repressive regimes are close to having nuclear weapons capabilities</p>	<p>Let me tell the House what I know. <b>I know that there are some countries or groups within countries that are proliferating and trading in WMD, especially nuclear weapons technology.</b></p> <p>I know that there are companies, individuals, some former scientists on nuclear programmes, selling their equipment or expertise.</p> <p>I know that there are several countries – <b>mostly dictatorships with highly repressive regimes</b> – desperately trying to acquire chemical weapons, biological weapons or, in particular, nuclear weapons capability. <b>Some of these countries are now a short time away from having a serviceable nuclear weapon. This activity is not diminishing. It is increasing.</b></p>	<p>Fear/Urgency Appeal Vilification of the “Other” Threat to Global/National Welfare</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Underscore the urgency of the need to stop “repressive countries” from obtaining WMDs</p>	<p><b>Not Propaganda:</b> Is statement of his facts</p>
<p>31</p>	<p>Terrorists are operating in countries around the world</p>	<p>We all know that there are terrorist cells now operating in most major countries. <b>Just as in the last two years, around 20 different nations have suffered serious terrorist outrages. Thousands have died in them.</b></p> <p><b>The purpose of terrorism lies not just in the violent act itself. It is in producing terror. It sets out to inflame, to divide, to produce consequences which they then use to justify further terror.</b></p> <p>Round the world it now poisons the chances of political progress: in the Middle East; in Kashmir; in Chechnya; in Africa.</p> <p>The removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan dealt it a blow. <b>But it has not gone away.</b></p>	<p>Historical Allusion “A” Fear/Urgency Appeal</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Make clear the nature and goal of terrorism; increase fear of terrorism by articulating that fear is its very nature</p>	<p><b>Grim Generality:</b> General point of the nature of terrorism as having no true purpose but to increase fear</p>

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32	These threats together will assault our way of life	<p>And <b>these two threats</b> have different motives and different origins but <b>they share one basic common view: they detest the freedom, democracy and tolerance that are the hallmarks of our way of life.</b></p> <p>At the moment I accept that association between them is loose. <b>But it is hardening.</b></p>	<p>Threat to Global/National Security Vilification of the "Other" Fear/Urgency Appeal</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Show that the threat is not just to people, but to fundamental western way of life</p>	<p><b>Band Wagon Plain Folks</b></p> <p>Show that threat is to the fundamental western way of life; is an extension of the threat from a "local" scale to the grand "big picture" scale</p>
33	The threat itself	<p>And the possibility of the two coming together – <b>of terrorist groups in possession of WMD, even of a so-called dirty radiological bomb</b> is now, in my judgment, <b>a real and present danger.</b></p>	<p>Fear/Urgency Appeal Threat to Global/National Security</p>	<p><b>Not Propaganda:</b> Direct articulation of the threat</p>
34	September 11 as example of what terrorists are capable of	<p>And let us recall: <b>what was shocking about September 11</b> was not just the slaughter of the innocent, but the knowledge that <b>had the terrorists been able to, there would have been not 3,000 innocent dead, but 30,000 or 300,000 and the more the suffering, the greater the terrorists' rejoicing.</b></p>	<p>Historical Allusion "B" Fear/Urgency Appeal Vilification of the "Other"</p>	<p><b>Transfer Negative:</b> Links tragedy of September 11 to Iraq, by extension</p>
35	This is what is still unaccounted for; this is what terrorists are capable of	<p>Three kilograms of VX from a rocket launcher <b>would contaminate a quarter of a square kilometre of a city.</b></p> <p><b>Millions of lethal doses are contained in one litre of Anthrax. 10,000 litres are unaccounted for. 11 September has changed the psychology of America. It should have changed the psychology of the world. Of course Iraq is not the only part of this threat. But it is the test of whether we treat the threat seriously.</b></p>	<p>Fear/Urgency Threat to Global/National Welfare Historical Allusion "B"</p>	<p><b>Transfer Negative:</b> Definite emotional manipulation; raises speculation of what terrorists are capable of, directly links Iraq with September 11</p>
36	The threat to the UN as a diplomatic body	<p>Faced with it, the world should unite. The UN should be the focus, both of diplomacy and of action. That is what 1441 said. That was the deal. <b>And I say to you to break it now, to will the ends but not the means that would do more damage in the long term to the UN than any other course.</b></p> <p>To fall back into the lassitude of the last 12 years, to talk, to discuss, to debate but never act; to declare our will but not to enforce it; to combine strong language with weak intentions, a worse outcome than never speaking at all.</p>	<p>Threat to Global/National Welfare</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Show audiences other sides of the crisis to consider; diplomatic, as well as terrorist, repercussions</p>	<p><b>Grim Generality:</b> Vague statement of doom based on Iraq breaking 1441</p>
37	If the UN does not show strength now, other tyrannical regimes will take advantage	<p>And then, when the threat returns from Iraq or elsewhere, <b>who will believe us? What price our credibility with the next tyrant?</b> No wonder Japan and South Korea, <b>next to North Korea</b>, has issued such strong statements of support.</p>	<p>Fear/Urgency Historical allusion "A"</p>	<p><b>Grim Generality</b></p> <p><i>NOTE:</i> Use of rhetorical questions is very compelling; allows audience to imagine whatever "grim generality" they can</p>

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38	The UN itself is in peril if we do not act now	I have come to the conclusion after much reluctance that <b>the greater danger to the UN is inaction:</b> that to pass Resolution 1441 and then refuse to enforce it <b>would do the most deadly damage to the UN's future strength,</b> confirming it as an instrument of diplomacy but not of action, forcing nations down the very unilateralist path we wish to avoid. <b>But there will be, in any event, no sound future for the UN,</b> no guarantee against the repetition of these events, <b>unless we recognize the urgent need for a political agenda we can unite upon.</b>	Threat to Global/National Welfare Fear/Urgency Appeal  <i>Intent:</i> Underscore what the implications will be for the UN and international relations should the UN not put up a united front. Implores audience to see need for unity rather than division	<b>Grim Generality:</b> Uses vague terms to discuss the “future” of the UN and its possible shaky state in order to gain consensus
39	UN is fundamentally divided	What we have witnessed is indeed the consequence of Europe and the United States dividing from each other. Not all of Europe – Spain, Italy, Holland, Denmark, Portugal – have all strongly supported us. And not a majority of Europe if we include, as we should, Europe’s new members who will accede next year, all 10 of whom have been in our support.  But the paralysis of the UN has been borne out of the division there is. And at the heart of it has been the concept of a world in which there are rival poles of power. The US and its allies in one corner. France, Germany, Russia and its allies in another. I do not believe that all of these nations intended such an outcome. <b>But that is what now faces us.</b>	∅	∅
40	UN afraid of US predominance – but we must work with US, rather than against, for the good of all	<b>I believe such a vision to be misguided and profoundly dangerous.</b> I know why it arises. There is resentment of US predominance.  There is fear of US unilateralism. People ask: do the US listen to us and our preoccupations? And there is perhaps a lack of full understanding of US preoccupations after 11 <sup>th</sup> September. I know all of this. But the way to deal with it is not rivalry but partnership. Partners are not servants but neither are they rivals. <b>I tell you what Europe should have said last September to the US. With one voice it should have said: we understand your strategic anxiety over terrorism and WMD and we will help you meet it.</b>	Threat to Global/National Welfare Historical Allusion “B”  <i>Intent:</i> Raise spectre of what will happen if we don’t work together; use September 11 as “guilt clause”	<b>Plain Folks:</b> Appeal to the “values” of the audience (i.e., “we” should have understood)
41	Resolution of Iraq has implications to the rest of the Middle East	We will mean what we say in any UN resolution we pass and will back it with action if Saddam fails to disarm voluntarily; but in return we ask two things of you: that the US should choose the UN path and you should recognize the fundamental overriding importance of re-starting the MEPP (Middle East Peace Process) which we will hold you to.  <b>I do not believe there is any other issue with the same power to reunite the world community</b> than progress on the issues of Israel and Palestine. Of course there is cynicism about recent announcements. But the US is now committed, and, I believe genuinely, to the roadmap for peace, designed in consultation with the UN. It will now be presented to the parties as Abu Mazen is confirmed in office, hopefully today.  All of us are now signed up to its vision: a state of Israel, recognize and accepted by all the world, and a viable Palestinian state. And that should be part of a larger global agenda. On poverty and sustainable development. On democracy and human rights. On the good governance of nations.  <b>That is why what happens after any conflict in Iraq is of such critical significance.</b>	Fear/Urgency Appeal Global/National Welfare  <i>Intent:</i> Stress that the survival of the UN depends on the resolution of issues in Iraq; that other global problems, such as the Middle East accord, depend on the UN for guidance. Reminder that if Iraq continues to defy/weaken the influence of the UN, it will cause other essential global initiatives to fail as well	<b>Not Propaganda:</b> Is political statement of importance and essential need for UN in other aspects of diplomatic relations

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42	The future of Iraq lies in uniting the UN – and we must provide for the welfare of Iraq after the intervention	<p>Here again there is a chance to unify around the UN. Let me make it clear. There should be a new UN resolution following any conflict providing not just for humanitarian help but also for the administration and governance of Iraq. That must now be done under proper UN authorization.</p> <p>It should protect totally the territorial integrity of Iraq. And let the oil revenues – which people falsely claim we want to seize – be put in a trust fund for the Iraqi people administered through the UN.</p> <p>And let the future government of Iraq be given a chance to begin the process of uniting the nation's disparate groups, on a democratic basis, respecting human rights, as indeed the fledgling democracy in Northern Iraq – protected from Saddam for 12 years by British and American pilots in the no-fly zone – has done so remarkably.</p> <p>And the moment that a new government is in place – willing to disarm Iraq of WMD – for which its people have no need or purpose – then let sanctions be lifted in their entirety.</p>	<p>Fate of Iraq</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Demonstrate/declare to audience that the goal is not the seizure of Iraq's national resources. Underline that the UN's purpose is territorial integrity and human welfare</p>	<b>Not Propaganda:</b> Statement of purpose
43	We aren't trying to intervene in Iraq's internal affairs – but as we will, we must do so properly	<p>I have never put our justification for action as regime change. We have to act within the terms set out in Resolution 1441. That is our legal base.</p> <p>But it is the reason, I say frankly, why if we act we should do so with a clear conscience and a strong heart</p>	∅	∅
44	Iraq's current state of affairs is grim – its people are brutally oppressed and require aid	<p>I accept fully that those opposed to this course of action share my detestation of Saddam. Who could not? Iraq is a wealthy country that in 1978, the year before Saddam seized power, was richer than Portugal or Malaysia.</p> <p>Today it is impoverished, 60% of its population dependent on food aid. <u>Thousands of children die needlessly every year from lack of food and medicine.</u></p> <p>Four million people out of a population of just over 20 million are in exile. <u>The brutality of the repression – the death and torture camps, the barbaric prisons for political opponents, the routine beatings for anyone or their families suspected of disloyalty are well documented.</u></p> <p>Just last week, <u>someone slandering Saddam was tied to a lamppost in a street in Baghdad, his tongue cut out, mutilated and left to bleed to death, as a warning to others.</u></p>	<p>Fate of Iraqi People Vilification of the "Other"</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Provide examples of strongly evocative and emotional state of affairs. Underline <i>why</i> UN must intervene</p>	<b>Not Propaganda;</b> although it is heavily emotional
45	We have freedoms that Iraqis only dream of	<p>I recall a few weeks ago talking to an Iraqi exile and saying to her that I understood how grim it must be under the lash of Saddam. 'But you don't,' she replied. 'You cannot. You do not know what it is like to live in perpetual fear.'</p> <p>And she is right. We take our freedom for granted. <u>But imagine not being able to speak or discuss or debate or even question the society you live in. To see friends and family taken away and never daring to complain. To suffer the humility of failing courage in the face of pitiless terror. That is how the Iraqi people live. Leave Saddam in place and that is how they will continue to live.</u></p>	<p>Vilification of the "Other" Fate of Iraqi People Fear and Urgency Appeal</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Subjectively appeal to audience; implore them to understand need to intervene</p>	<b>Not Propaganda:</b> Is extended specific example of life under Saddam's "lash" – poetic, but legitimate

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46	If we don't get rid of Saddam, we are condemning thousands to his continuing brutality	We must face the consequences of the actions we advocate. For me, that means all the dangers of war. But for others, opposed to this course, it means – let us be clear – that <b>the Iraqi people, whose only true hope of liberation lies in the removal of Saddam, for them, the darkness will close back over them again; and he will be free to take his revenge upon those he must know wish him gone.</b>	Fate of Iraq Vilification of the "Other"	<b>Grim Generality:</b> Image of a future of oppression for Iraq; definite emotional manipulation building upon the previous legitimate example provided
47	What will happen if we don't act? We will show other terrorists that we are weak	And if this house now demands at this moment, <b>faced with this threat from this regime</b> , that British troops are pulled back, that <b>we turn away at the point of reckoning</b> and that is what it means – what then?  <b>What will Saddam feel?</b> Strengthened beyond measure. <b>What will the other states who tyrannize their people, the terrorists who threaten our existence, what will they take from that? That the will confronting them is decaying and feeble.</b>  <b>Who will celebrate and who will weep?</b>	Threat to Global/National Welfare Fear/Urgency Appeal Vilification of the "Other"  <i>Intent:</i> Provide audiences with a "worst-case-scenario" by presenting the "feelings" of those who would benefit	<b>Grim Generality:</b> Image presented of nameless other "terror states" who will gain from a weakened UN  <i>NOTE:</i> Blair's poeticism lends itself very well to emotional appeals
48	Consequences to US-UN relationship, to Middle East peace, to Iraqi people – wide ranging consequences	And if our plea is for America to work with others, to be good as well as powerful allies, will our retreat make them multilateralist? <b>Or will it not rather be the biggest impulse to unilateralism there could ever be?</b> And what of the UN and the future of Iraq and the Middle East peace plan, <b>devoid of our influence, stripped of our insistence?</b>  The House wanted this decision. Well, it has it. Those are the choices. And in this dilemma, no choice is perfect, no cause ideal.	Threat to Global/National Welfare Fear/Urgency Appeal  <i>Intent:</i> Underline argument that danger is also diplomatic and to global peace, not just to Iraq	<b>Grim Generality:</b> Rhetorical insistence upon the (subjectively) clear choice to be made
49	These are the terms of the choice we will make	But on this decision hangs the fate of many things:  Of whether we summon the strength to <b>recognize this global challenge of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and meet it.</b> <b>Of the Iraqi people, groaning under years of dictatorship.</b> Of our armed forces – brave men and women of whom we can feel proud, whose morale is high and whose purpose is clear. Of the institutions and alliances that will shape our world for years to come.	Threat to Global/National Welfare Fate of Iraq	<b>Not Propaganda</b>
50	Hazards of retreating	To retreat now, I believe, <b>would put at hazard all that we hold dearest</b> , turn the UN back into a talking shop, stifle the first steps of progress in the Middle East; <b>leave the Iraqi people to the mercy of events on which we would have relinquished all power to influence for the better.</b>	Threat to Global/National Welfare Fate of Iraq  <i>Intent:</i> Stress the serious emphasis on future impact that the UN will, or could have on global welfare	<b>Grim Generality:</b> Provides worst-case scenario of the many consequences that may come from staying out of Iraq.
51	Conclusion	Tell our allies that at the very moment of action, at the very moment when they need our determination that Britain faltered. I will not be party to such a course. <b>This is not the time to falter. This is the time for this House, not just this government or indeed this Prime Minister, but for this House to lead,</b> to show that we will stand up for what we know to be right, <b>to show that we will confront the tyrannies and dictatorships and terrorists who put our way of life at risk, to show at the moment of decision</b> that we have the courage to do the right thing.  I beg to move the motion.	Fear/Urgency Appeal Threat to Global/National Welfare  <i>Intent:</i> Create sense of duty and emotional responsibility as a final note for the speech	<b>Manifest Destiny:</b> Invocation of fate and a sense of history/duty to lend credence to the idea of supporting the USA as a deterministic action

## ***Appendix “D”***

Article 5

### **Analysis: Stephen Harper’s “Speech to the House of Commons”**

#### **Analysis Summary**

#### **Propaganda in “Speech to the House of Commons”**

Total arguments that use appeals to pathos in Speech to the House of Commons: 22

**Total legitimate appeals to pathos: 6**

**Total illegitimate appeals to pathos: 16**

**Propaganda Percentage: 73%**

*Applied Pathos Code Legend*

<b>Code Colour</b>	<b>Appeal Category</b>
Red	Threat to Global/National Welfare
Orange	Fear and Urgency Appeals
Green	Vilification of the “Other”
Pink	Historical Allusion “A” (prior dictatorships/international struggles)
Purple	Historical Allusion “B” (September 11 attacks on Twin Towers”
Blue	Fate of Iraqi People

Article 6

**Stephen Harper’s “Speech to the House of Commons” Analyzed by Argument**

	Summary	Passage	Identified Appeals to Pathos	Propaganda Index / Justification
1	Opening: We discuss a topic of extreme importance	Mr. Speaker, I stand today to speak to a matter of <b>the gravest importance that Parliament can address</b> : the matter of war and specifically the resumption of war against the regime of Saddam Hussein.	Fear/Urgency Appeal  <i>Intent</i> : Address the gravity of the matter; make audience aware of the importance of the issue at hand	<b>Manifest Destiny</b> : Deterministic/fatalistic portrayal of the issues to be discussed
2	Criticism of Liberal government	We appreciate that our colleagues in the Bloc Quebecois have brought this motion forward today. It is appropriate for two reasons. The first is that it is not from the government, <b>which has consistently acted without vision and values during this crisis</b> , and even today I understand resists a timely vote on these matters.	Vilification of the “Other” (Liberal Government)  <i>Intent</i> : Predispose audience to receive Canadian Alliance’s message more favourably; criticize political opponents	<b>Plain Folks</b> : Allusion to the “vision and values” of Canada, and government’s abandonment of the same
3	Criticism of Bloc Quebecois	It is also fitting that this historic motion, <b>which calls on us to abandon our closest friends and allies at this critical time</b> , comes from the Bloc Quebecois, a party that does have values and vision but whose values are different from the traditions that built this country, and <b>whose vision is a country where our country as we know it would not continue to exist</b> .	Vilification of the “Other” (Bloc Quebecois)  <i>Intent</i> : Predispose audience to receive Canadian Alliance’s message more favourably; criticize political opponents	<b>Plain Folks</b> : Allusion to the “vision and values” of Canada, and the Bloc’s separation from the same  <i>NOTE</i> : By criticizing both Liberal and PQ point of view this early on in the speech, Harper is framing his point of view as the “right” one
4	Historical Overview	Let us review how we came to this crossroads internationally. In 1991, after the invasion of Kuwait, <b>the world judged the Iraqi regime to be a dangerous aggressor</b> . <b>In the interests of world peace and regional security</b> , the community of nations expelled Iraq from Kuwait; required Iraq to <b>surrender its dangerous arsenal</b> , its chemical and biological weapons; and to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Iraq agreed to comply with these demands as an enormous and victorious force of allied troops and personnel, not just American and British but Canadian as well, stood ready to invade.	Threat to National/Global Welfare Vilification of the “Other”  <i>Intent</i> : Provide context to the issue at hand	<b>Not Propaganda</b> : Provides historical context to the issue
5	Resolution 1441 was unanimously adopted	We have waited 12 years for Saddam Hussein to give action to those commitments. With the threat of renewed action from the US, the UK and others, on November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1441. It was the 17 <sup>th</sup> Security Council Resolution regarding the threat Iraq posed to international peace and security. The resolution, which was adopted unanimously, gave Iraq a final opportunity to demonstrate immediate compliance with its disarmament obligations and it promised serious consequences otherwise.  Over the last four months, we have seen no evidence to suggest that Saddam Hussein will willingly comply with Resolution 1441	∅	∅
6	We must stop Iraq for the safety of the world	<b>Iraq’s continued defiance</b> of the community of nations presents a challenge which must be addressed. <b>It is inherently dangerous to allow a country such as Iraq to retain weapons of mass destruction</b> , particularly in light of its <b>past aggressive behaviour</b> . If the world community fails to disarm Iraq <b>we fear that other rogue states will be encouraged to believe that they too can have these most deadly weapons to systematically defy international resolutions</b> and that the world will do nothing to stop them.	Vilification of the “Other” Threat to Global/National Welfare Fear/Urgency Appeal  <i>Intent</i> : Articulate the threat to world community	<b>Name Calling</b> : Points to “rogue states” without identifying them

BETWEEN RHETORIC AND PROPAGANDA

7	If we don't address Iraq, WMDs will spread to terrorist groups	As the possession of weapons of mass destruction spreads, <b>the danger of such weapons coming into the hands of terrorist groups will multiply</b> , particularly given in this case <b>the shameless association of Iraq with rogue non-state organizations</b> .	Fear/Urgency Appeal Vilification of the "Other"  <i>Intent:</i> Articulate threat to world community	<b>Grim Generality:</b> Broad, general vision of grim future to come should Hussein remain at large
8	This is the threat to the world	<b>That is the ultimate nightmare which the world must take decisive and effective steps to prevent. Possession of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons by terrorists would constitute a direct, undeniable and lethal threat to the world, including to Canada and its people.</b>	Fear/Urgency Appeal Threat to Global/National Welfare  <i>Intent:</i> Articulate the threat in definitive terms; underscore the "nightmare" scenario that this would entail	<b>Not Propaganda:</b> Is a statement of fact (i.e., it would constitute a threat), albeit in very emotional terms
9	September 11 allusion	<b>As we have learned, or should have learned, on September 11</b> , having no malice toward these groups will not absolve the citizens of any country from <b>the hatred they direct toward us and toward our civilization</b>	Historical Allusion "B" Vilification of the "Other"  <i>Intent:</i>	<b>Transfer Negative Name Calling</b>  Implication that September 11 terrorists are linked with Iraq regime
10	Disarmament of Iraq relies on removal of Hussein	The principal objective is the disarmament of Iraq but it has now become apparent that objective is inseparable from the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime.	∅	∅
11	Bush requested support from allies	Earlier this week President Bush requested the support of his key allies in the participation of a coalition of nations that would be prepared to enforce Security Council resolutions by all necessary means. That same day the allies delivered an ultimatum to the Iraqi leadership: Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours or face military conflict.	∅	∅
12	Allies tried other means, but no luck	These allies did not seek a military conflict today any more than they sought it 12 years ago. The world has tried other means for years but to no avail. <b>We cannot walk away from the threat that Iraq's continued possession of weapons of mass destruction constitutes to its region and to the wider world.</b>	Threat to Global/National Welfare  <i>Intent:</i> Underscore gravity of the threat WMDs would pose to the world at large	<b>Not Propaganda</b>
13	We must disarm Iraq for the good of the world	In the <b>final analysis</b> , disarming Iraq is <b>necessary for the long-term security of the world</b> , to the collective interests of our historic allies <b>and, therefore, manifestly it is in the national interest of this country.</b>	Fear/Urgency Appeal Threat to Global/National Welfare  <i>Intent:</i> Link outcome of Iraq to national welfare; is the "final analysis" (time to decide)	<b>Not Propaganda</b>

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14	<p>Addressing Counter Arguments: Coalition has authority to act because Iraq is in violation of Security Council resolutions</p>	<p>I want to briefly address some of the counter arguments to this position in support of the coalition of the willing led by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair.</p> <p>First, this coalition lacks the legal authority to act. Existing United Nations Security Council resolutions have long provided for the use of force to disarm Iraq and restore international peace and security to the area. Security Council Resolution 678 adopted in 1990 authorized the use of all necessary means, not only to implement Resolution 660 demanding Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, but also to implement all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security to the area.</p> <p>Resolution 687, which provided the ceasefire terms for Iraq in 1991, a ceasefire not an armistice, affirmed Resolution 687. Resolution 1441 itself confirmed that Iraq had been and remains in material breach of its obligations, a point on which there is unanimous international agreement.</p>	<p>Vilification of the "Other"</p> <p>Intent: Demonstrate Iraq's history of flouting international authority</p>	<p><b>Not Propaganda:</b> Statement of facts</p>
		<p>Iraq's past and continuing breaches of the ceasefire obligations now negate the basis for the formal ceasefire. Iraq has, by its conduct, demonstrated that it did not and does not accept the terms of the ceasefire. Consequently, authorization for the use of force in Security Council Resolution 678 has been reactivated.</p>		
15	<p>Drawing parallels to Operation Desert Fox</p>	<p>I would point out that this view of international law is not new. In fact, our own Canadian deployment of troops to the Gulf in 1998 in Operation Desert Fox, strongly supported at the time by the current Prime Minister, was undertaken on the same legal basis. The Clinton administration clearly understood and argued, as the Bush administration does now, that existing Security Council resolutions clearly allow for the use of military force.</p>	<p>∅</p>	<p>∅</p> <p>NOTE: Is an example of Transfer Positive, but not of pathos</p>
16	<p>Inspections process has failed</p>	<p>Another objection is that we only need more time, that the inspection process is working and that diplomacy should be given another chance. Let me address this. The inspections process has been a failure. It has not resulted in disarmament. However, more important, the inspections process is not intended to force or compel disarmament. It is only intended to monitor compliance.</p>	<p>∅</p>	<p>∅</p> <p>NOTE: Is an example of Plain Folks, but not of pathos</p>
17	<p>Hussein only responds to force</p>	<p>To the extent that Saddam Hussein has complied, it has only been through the constant threat of force. Force has been the only language that Saddam Hussein's regime has ever understood. Yet even the threat of force has only convinced Saddam Hussein to engage reluctantly in the token, piecemeal destruction of weapons, and only the most reluctant revelations of the existence of weapons and weapons programs.</p> <p>Even with over 200,000 coalition troops massed at his borders, he quibbles about how interviews are to be conducted with his scientists and how many of the reconnaissance aircraft supporting the inspectors can fly at one time. He simply plays a game of cat and mouse, and he will play it indefinitely. After 12 years he does not believe that the international community has the will to act. He clearly believes that ongoing diplomacy will ultimately be hijacked by those who simply want to delay and who ultimately want inaction.</p>	<p>Vilification of the "Other"</p> <p>Intent: Provide a definitive image of Hussein as brutish, childish, short sighted and cruel</p>	<p><b>Name Calling:</b> Encourages summary negative evaluation of Hussein</p>

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18	Delineate between supporters and non-supporters	In recent months this party, the Canadian Alliance, has been strongly supportive of these diplomatic efforts. However, it is clear now that in some cases Saddam has guessed right. For example, Jacques Chirac and the Gaullists of France have once again been preoccupied more with agendas targeted on the Anglo-American word than on the regime of Saddam Hussein. In other cases, however, Saddam has clearly made an error in judgment, a final misjudgment. He underestimated our American and British allies and their many friends around the world.	Vilification of the "Other"  Intent: Portray non-supporters as inadvertently playing into Saddam's hands ("he guessed right"); portray supporters as those standing up to Hussein	<b>Plain Folks:</b> Subjective judgment/implication of irrationality or naïveté on the part of those who don't support US
19	US leadership of the UN is necessary, not detrimental, to the UN	That leads to a final criticism, that the coalition is somehow inadequate because it is not unanimous and because it is led by the United States of America. Ironically, even as our Liberal government has acknowledged, America, with Britain in particular, has given strong leadership to the world on the issue of Iraq. What has been accomplished in recent months has only been accomplished solely because of the American-British coalition and their allies and their determination to act. Indeed, without strong leadership of leading powers, usually the USA, the failures of the United Nations are too numerous and grisly to even mention.	Fear/Urgency Appeal  Intent: Refer to "failures" of United Nations to bolster support for US leadership	<b>Transfer Negative Grim Generality</b>  Implication that UN is powerless without United States; that past failures are result of inadequate (non-American) leadership
20	Canadian Alliance supports USA, because if we do not, Canada's wellbeing will be compromised in the future	We in the Canadian Alliance support the American position today on this issue because we share its concerns and its worries about the future of the world if Iraq is left unattended. Alliances are a two-way process. When we are in agreement we should not leave it to the United States to do all the heavy lifting just because it is the world's only superpower. To do so, I believe, will inevitably undermine one of the most important relationships that we have. In an increasingly globalized and borderless world, the relationship between Canada and the United States is essential to our prosperity, to our democracy and to our future.	Threat to Global/National Welfare  Intent: Imply that "undermining" Canada's relationship with the US by not supporting them in Iraq is a threat to the wellbeing of the country as a whole	<b>Grim Generality:</b> Vague allusion to the diplomatic consequences of not supporting the US
21	Coalition must act now	The coalition assembled by the United States and the United Kingdom is now ready to act. It is now acting. It will bring this long run conflict to an end once and for all. It will bring to an end the regime of Saddam Hussein and the militarism, brutality and aggression that are the foundations of his rule.	Vilification of the "Other"	<b>Not Propaganda:</b> Statement of fact
22	Underscore brutality of Hussein's regime	Since Saddam came to power in 1979, more than one million have died as a consequence. They have died through killing and torture as individual opponents, real and imagined. They have died from acts of civil war and mass genocide in the north and south of the country. They have died in invasions launched against his neighbours. Now his final bloody chapter is being read. As it is being written, make no mistake, this party will not be with Saddam Hussein. We will not be neutral. We will be with our allies and our friends, not militarily but in spirit we will be with them in America and in Britain for a short and successful conflict and for the liberation of the people of Iraq.	Vilification of the "Other" (Hussein/non-supporters) Fate of Iraq  Intent: Articulate the brutality of Hussein's regime and its effect on Iraqi people; galvanize audience to recognize human reasons why Hussein must be stopped by the coalition (and why, by extension, Canada should support it)	<b>Band Wagon:</b> Implication that being "neutral" is being with Hussein
23	Criticism of government for abandoning allies, military personnel, and Canadian values	We will not be with our government, for this government, in taking the position it has taken, has betrayed Canada's history and its values. Reading only the polls and indulging in juvenile and insecure anti-Americanism, the government has, for the first time in our history, left us outside our British and American allies in their time of need. However, it has done worse. It has left us standing for nothing, no realistic alternative, no point of principle and no vision of the future. It has left us standing with no one. Our government is not part of the multilateral coalition in support of this action and it has not been part of any coalition opposing it; just alone, playing irrelevant and contradictory games on both sides of the fence, to the point where we go so far as to leave military personnel in the region without the active and moral support of the government that sent them there.	Vilification of the "Other" (Liberal Government)  Intent: Turn audience's sympathies away from the leading (anti-war) government by accusing them of abandoning not only allies, but Canadian values as a whole	<b>Plain Folks Band Wagon</b>  Implication that the only rational route to take is the pro-war stance of the Alliance  NOTE: Rhetorical parallel between Hussein "playing games of cat and mouse" with UN and Liberal government "playing contradictory games" in not choosing a coalition to stand with

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24	Danger of not joining the "coalition of the willing"	<p>This is not an act of independence. In fact, <b>as we find ourselves isolated from our allies</b>, we found ourselves under the government more dependent on them than ever before, economically, culturally and, of course, militarily.</p> <p><b>My great fear:</b> A country that does not embrace its own friends and allies in a dangerous world but <b>thinks it can use them and reject them at will. Such a country will in time endanger its own existence.</b></p>	<p>Threat to Global/National Welfare Fear/Urgency Appeal Vilification of the "Other" (Liberal government)</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Underscore the many implications of not supporting the US – in terms of danger to future diplomatic and military relations and in terms of becoming overly reliant on the government (dictatorship?)</p>	<p><b>Grim Generality Band Wagon</b></p> <p>Allude to vague endangerment of the country should it not side with USA</p>
25	Historical Allusion – Canada as defined by war	<p>However, to have the future once again of a great country, we must do more than stand with our friends in the United States. We must rediscover our own values. <b>We must remember that this country was forged in large part by war, terrible war, but not because it was terrible and not because it was easy, but because at the time it was right.</b></p>	<p>Historical Allusion "A"</p> <p><i>Intent:</i> Provide sense that Canada's past heroism will hold the country in the same sense in this conflict</p>	<p><b>Transfer Positive:</b> Association of Canada's history with current conflict – equates the issue with past Canadian heroism in struggles</p>
26	Canadian identity/values defined by war	<p><b>In the great wars of the last century, against authoritarianism, against fascism, and against communism</b>, Canada did not merely stand with the Americans, we, more often than not, led the way. We did so for freedom, we did so for democracy, we did so for the values of civilization itself, values which continue to be embodied in our allies and their leaders and are represented in their polar offices, embodied and personified by Saddam Hussein and the perpetrators of 9/11.</p>	<p>Historical Allusion "A"</p>	<p><b>Transfer Positive:</b> Association of Canada's history with current conflict – equates issue with past Canadian heroism in struggles</p>
27	We know that the Canadian people support us, even if the government does not	<p>Therefore, we will not merely vote against this motion today, we will tell the Americans and the British that we are with them.</p> <p>We will of course <b>pray for the innocent people of Iraq and hope that they may have a better future than the one they have had under this tyrannical regime, and we will wish that they may have a future where they have the democratic freedoms that we enjoy, that every man and every woman, yes, even in the Islamic world, is entitled to in every part of this earth.</b> We will stand, and I believe most Canadians will quietly stand with us, for these higher values, which shaped our past and which we will need in an uncertain future.</p>	<p>Fate of Iraq Vilification of the "Other"</p>	<p><b>Manifest Destiny:</b> Deterministic declaration of ideological right to intervene (i.e., for democracy, human rights, etc.)</p>
28	Conclusion	<p>Mr. Speaker, in the days that follow may God guide the actions of the President of the United States and the American people; may God save the Queen, her Prime Minister and all her subjects; and may God continue to bless Canada.</p>	<p>∅</p>	<p>∅</p> <p>NOTE: Manifest Destiny; but not pathos appeal as defined by Pathos Code</p>

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