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**Harald Bauder**  
University of Guelph

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# Equality, Justice and the Problem of International Borders: The Case of Canadian Immigration Regulation<sup>1</sup>

**Harald Bauder**

Department of Geography, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada,  
Email: [hbauder@uoguelph.ca](mailto:hbauder@uoguelph.ca)

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**Abstract** I examine the legitimacy of immigration controls in the context of Canada and this country's restrictive immigration policies. Despite the fundamental, philosophical arguments against immigration restrictions, the necessity of immigration controls is rarely questioned in Canadian politics. In this paper I suggest that there is an incredible cynicism of Canadian immigration policies with respect to this country's own political principles. The idea of international migration controls is neither sustainable from a larger liberal-theory perspective nor a political-economy viewpoint. I suggest that geographers should imagine alternatives to the current systems of immigration control and the regulation of the international movement of people.

## **Introduction**

Geography is about boundaries. A task for human geographers is to critically examine political boundaries and to imagine these boundaries and their purposes in new ways. The boundary of concern in this paper is the international border, and the regulation of the movement of people through international borders. Recent academic debate has called into question the legitimacy of immigration controls imposed by nation states (Isbister, 1996; Jonas, 1996; Hayter, 2000; Düvell, 2002).

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In this paper I focus in particular on the case of Canada and this country's restrictive policies to regulate immigration. Although the details of immigration policies are hotly debated in everyday Canadian politics, the necessity and legitimacy of immigration controls is rarely questioned, despite the fundamental, philosophical arguments against immigration restrictions. A demand for "open borders" and "social justice for people who transgress borders" has recently emerged, but only on the margins of political activism (Open The Borders, 2002; for a similar European view, see Noborder Network, 2002). Below I suggest that Canadian immigration policies are incredibly cynical with respect to this country's own political principles.

Geographers are beginning to proactively intervene in discourses that perpetuate social and political injustice. Jennifer Hyndman (2001), for example, recently outlined a feminist agenda for geopolitics and the international mobility of people. Such an agenda should include imagining alternatives to current conventions of migration regulation. These imaginings are crucial for bringing geographical ideas into the realm of political feasibility. In particular, I suggest that it is possible, perhaps even necessary, for geographers to rethink the current system of regulating the international movement of people.

Now is the time to take initiative. The current regulation of international migration flows consists of a patchwork of regulations, ad hoc policies and ill-conceived responses to terrorism threats. David Harvey (2000, 195) recognizes the importance of seizing the moment when overarching ideological aspirations seem to have been abandoned: "There is a time and place in the ceaseless human endeavour to change the world, when alternative visions, no matter how fantastic, provide the grist for shaping powerful political forces for change." Apparent inconsistencies in the management of immigration flows give us the historical opportunity to cast a fresh vision of the international mobility of people.

No 'Western' immigration country, including Canada, can claim that immigration is a completely external process that the nation state in question has not been involved in creating (Castles and Miller, 1993; Sassen, 1996; Hayter, 2000). Rather, the international migration processes that affect these countries are deeply rooted in colonial history (Castles and Miller, 1993) and discourses of race (Hayter, 2000). Political discourse, however, often denies these roots (e.g. Fukuyama, 1992) and focuses instead on contemporary threats to the nation state. The events of September 11 have further exacerbated the fear of these threats. Immigration regulation is a mechanism of exclusion that reflects discourses of economic gain and national security, and that contradicts principles of equality and social justice.

In this paper, I critique the current convention of immigration regulation from both larger liberal-theory and political-economy perspectives. After a review of Canadian immigration policy, in the first part of the paper, I focus on the inconsistencies within Canadian policy and politics in the second part of the paper. While Canadians insist on freedom of movement for themselves, they do not grant this privilege to others, thus undermining a fundamental principle of human equality that Canadians claim to embrace. I choose Canada as country that is representative of other liberal democracies. In fact, Canada has a relatively open immigrant policy and a higher per capita intake of immigrants than most other 'Western' democracies. If, as I argue below, there is a large

gap between liberal theory and practice in Canada, then it is probably even wider elsewhere. In particular, I suggest that states and communities that commit to universal liberal principles of equality have no moral basis for excluding migrants. If 'Western' democracies lived up to their own liberal standards they would need to abolish restrictions on immigration.

In the third part of the article, I assume a political economy perspective in my search for an explanation of existing immigration restrictions. Again, I use Canada as an example of a 'Western' capitalist state. The aim of the final part of the paper is to help envision alternative systems of international mobility that are consistent with 'Western,' including Canadian, values. Such visions, I conclude, cannot be confined to migration politics alone but must incorporate wider-ranging political and economic change.

### **The Case of Canada**

The nature of immigration to Canada has changed over the decades. Immigration according to the "old" model, in which immigrants sever their ties to the country of origin, is in decline. New models of immigration emphasize transnationalism (e.g. Vertovec and Cohen, 1999) and flexible citizenship (Ong, 1999). These concepts capture the mobility and multinational life-styles of many recent migrant families. For example, transnational families who belong to professional and business classes are highly mobile across international borders. Families can be dispersed, with the children and wife living in Canada and the husband working in Hong Kong (Waters, 2002).

For some categories of migrants to Canada, such as investor immigrants, the bestowal of immigrant status, and the rights associated with it, is premised on an ability to pay for those rights through guaranteed investment in the economy with substantial sums of money. In return for cash, these 'global citizens' can lease the welfare services of Canada or other states of their choosing (Stasiulis, 1997, 209). For these elites, a borderless world is already a reality.

Immigration regulation targets less privileged, working-class migrants, particularly from 'Third World' countries. These immigrants are rejected based on the lack of investment capital, education and occupational qualifications, and they must instead rely on the refugee category, temporary visas or illegal status (Konadu-Agyemang, 1999). Canada's immigration regulation is intentionally aligned to the class-status of applicants, especially through the so-called independent class category, consisting of business, investment and skilled-workers programs (Green and Green, 1999). In the business and investor program applicants are evaluated on the basis of capital investments newcomers promise to make. The skilled-workers program scans immigrants for their education and skills; only people with large amounts of monetary or human capital are allowed into Canada. Even the family and refugee classes include economic criteria among other factors (Hiebert, 1994; Abu-Laban, 1998).

Immigrant status and Canadian citizenship are not identical. An accepted immigrant receives probationary "landed immigrant status," which enables this person and his/her immediate dependent family to live, work and move freely within Canada. Landed immigrants can apply for citizenship after four years. The special "Live in Caregiver" program enables migrants ineligible for independent, family or refugee classes, to live in

Canada if they have secured domestic employment in a private Canadian household. After two years, live-in-caregivers can apply for landed status.

## **Equality and the Liberal State**

Particular interpretations of liberalism differ between geographical, political and historical contexts (Bennett, 1997). Given a certain degree of variability in interpretation, however, 'Western' democracies, including Canada, claim to pursue a wider "liberal project" (Cole 2000, 2). At the core of this project lies a commitment to the moral equality of all human beings. This fundamental principle of liberal political philosophy is at odds with immigration policy, which is by definition exclusionary and treats human beings differently depending on whether or not they are citizens of a given state. Immigration policies routinely and openly violate universal ideas of equality. Liberal theorists have therefore difficulties explaining and justifying immigration regulation in a manner that is consistent with the guiding principle of equality (Carens, 1987; Isbister, 1996). "[T]here is a serious gap between the legal and social practices of immigration and naturalization in those states that describe themselves as liberal democracies, and the fundamental commitments of a recognizable liberal political theory" (Cole, 2000, 3).

Several arguments have been put forth in defence of restrictive immigration regulations, but all of these arguments either violate the core principle of equality or are internally inconsistent. The first argument conceptualizes immigration as an external threat to the existence of the nation state. Under such a threat, the state has the right to act in its own interest and restrict immigration (Hobbes, 1669 [1651]). In this case, the "principle of nationality outweighs the principle of humanity" (Cole, 2000, 87). Or, put another way, the idea of human equality applies within the borders of the state, but does not extend beyond national borders.

This selective application of a liberal principle constitutes a "moral partiality" (Cole, 2000, 87), and violates liberalism's core principles merely to maintain the state apparatus (Cole, 2000, 165-191). In addition, the argument of a threat to the very existence of the nation state from immigration seems empirically unsustainable in the Canadian case. Canada embraces a multicultural policy and is apparently under no cultural threat from immigration. Nor is Canada economically threatened by immigration. Immigrants rarely displace Canadian workers (Laryea, 1998), they invest heavily in the Canadian economy (Kunin and Jones, 1995; Woo, 1997), are less likely to receive welfare payments than Canadian-born residents (Lui-Gurr, 1995), make a positive net contribution to the public treasury (Akbari, 1995), and "there is no evidence that immigrants pose an extra burden on the Canadian taxpayer" (Laryea, 1998, 16). Surely, defendants of current policies would argue that immigration restriction successfully weeds out migrants that could harm the Canadian economy. However, even if there were an economic disadvantage from immigration, this disadvantage would hardly be an *existential* threat to Canada to warrant the exclusion of immigrants (Carens, 2000). Under the removal of all immigration controls, Canada is unlikely to receive the massive floods of parasitic immigrants that anti-immigration voices like to project. For example, Hayter (2000, 153), referring to a book by Bob Sutcliffe, estimates that a worldwide removal of immigration restriction would generate an additional 24 million global migrants, causing a possible average population increase of 2.4 percent in the industrialized countries. Even if these

figures are underestimations, free immigration would neither result in a world wide diaspora nor in an immediate re-shuffling of global population patterns. In Europe, for example, massive migration from poorer to richer countries did not occur after the abolition of migration controls between European Union member states.

A second argument in support of immigration controls is that states are communities that share a collective identity. Within these communities, only members can decide what constitutes this identity and who should qualify as members (Walzer, 1983). Immigration legislation is then justifiable because the "...principle of community outweighs the principle of humanity" (Cole, 2000: 86).

Aside from violating the principle of human equality (Carens, 2000, 638), this community-based argument requires states to identify measurable criteria that distinguish insiders from outsiders. However, states rarely have a singular identity, in particular multicultural states like Canada. Although the Liberal government revised Canada's multiculturalism program in 1996, and now argues that a "sense of belonging and attachment to Canada" (Abu-Laban, 1998: 203) should be a necessary condition to acquiring citizenship, this longing for a "presumed state of social harmony" (Vertovec, 1999, 94) reflects a non-existing illusion of social cohesion. In any case, most immigrants, including economic immigrants, display high levels of attachment to Canada. Furthermore, Canada's tendency to admit immigrants based on their skills and education, rather than commitment to Canada, would define the Canadian community in human capital terms. In fact, the skills and educational requirements specified in immigration regulations are met by only 18 to 26 percent of Canada's current citizens (Bauder, 2002). According to the logic of the nation-as-community argument, only a small percentage of highly educated and skilled Canadians would then define the national community.

A further issue relates to spatial scale. Why should communities be defined by national, rather than provincial, municipal or neighbourhood borders? The current international convention of privileging the national scale over other scales in regulating community membership is arbitrary and lacks moral basis according to many liberal theorists (e.g. Carens, 1987; Isbister, 1996, 56-57). In Canada, provinces and municipalities do not have the formal right to exclude persons who are already in Canada. Most Canadians would find it absurd to propose that they have to apply for residence in another city or province. Yet, mobility restrictions apply on the scale of the nation state, despite the common definition of community on much smaller scales such as municipalities and neighbourhoods. As the *Multiculturalism Act* (1985) rightly points out, Canadian nationality does not constitute a singular identity, but a multitude of communities. The legal convention of deploying the nation state as the spatial unit for determining community membership reflects historical circumstances and power arrangements more than theoretical reasoning.

A third argument in defence of immigration regulation is that state territory is private property. The citizens of a nation are the rightful owners of their national territory and have the right to exclude whomever they please (Carens, 1987). In this case the right to private property is placed above the principle of human equality, a condition that again violates the principle of equality (Cole, 2000, 154-160). Under the assumption of private ownership, immigration regulation can legitimately select immigrants based on their skills, education and labour market suitability (or any other criteria), much like a private

corporation selects its workforce. It is in this manner that Canada tends to select its immigrants. Former Immigration Minister Elinor Caplan, for example, declared that Canada's new immigration legislation seeks to attract the “best and brightest” workers to make Canada more competitive in the global economy (Thompson, 2001). True, Canada also admits refugees and family-class immigrants, but through the skilled workers program Canada recruits the immigrants it deems most suitable for Canada. The objective of economic gain overrides the liberal principle of equality.<sup>2</sup>

In particular, the idea of inherited privilege rests uneasily with liberal theorists. Citizenship, in this context, equates with ownership of national territory. Most Canadians acquired their citizenship through birth rather than immigration. According to the 1996 Census, 82.8 percent of the Canadian population have acquired their citizenship in this way. From a liberal viewpoint, parentage and birthplace are arbitrary and cannot be grounds for political inclusion or exclusion (Isbister, 1996). Thus, “[t]he current restrictions on immigration in Western democracies — even in the most open ones like Canada and the United States — are not justifiable. Like feudal barriers to mobility, they protect unjust privilege” (Carens, 1987, 270).

Liberal principles of ethics fail to provide a rationale for Canada’s immigration policy. Instead, immigration policies seem to be guided by fundamentally illiberal principles. Immigration restrictions deprive many migrants of their opportunities because it is “in the interest of the privileged to protect their privileges” (Isbister 1996, 57). This critique of immigration controls is echoed by Hayter (2001, 155): “The assumption of a moral right to impose suffering to preserve the privileges of a rich minority of course needs questioning.” In the next section I will move beyond liberal ethics in search of a more satisfactory explanation for Canada’s immigration policies.

## Social Justice and Restricted Migration

Another explanation for Canada's immigration policy lies in the realm of political economy. Marxists have been suspicious of the notions of liberal rights and equality, and see these notions as manifestations of an ideology that affirms the capitalist mode of production (Brown, 1992; Van Parijs, 1992). Marx (2001 [1867]) focused instead on the degree of exploitation as a measure of social justice.<sup>3</sup> According to this perspective, immigrants experience injustice because they are exploited, not because their inherent right to equality is violated. What Marxist and liberal views of justice have in common is that both are normative and claim to be the *just* principle of social organization (Harvey, 1996).

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<sup>2</sup> This economic objective also applies to other immigrant classes. Canadian high commissions in foreign countries tend to reject refugees who do not meet stringent human capital requirements, and family-class immigrants must be sponsored by their family members (Hiebert, 1994; Abu-Laban, 1998).

<sup>3</sup> However, he does not hide his *moral* outrage against the living and working conditions of the working class (Marx, 2001 [1867]; Marx and Engels, 1969 [1848]).

Geographers expanded the notion of social justice to include territorial distributions of exploitation and prosperity (Harvey, 1973; Smith, 1994). In a related context of international migration, Van Parijs (1992) uses the term “citizenship exploitation” to explain the wage gap between countries in the ‘First World’ and the ‘Third World’ (e.g. Frobel et al, 1980). Citizenship is a much better predictor of wage levels than skills and education. “Like feudal exploitation citizenship exploitation pulls the distribution of income away from what it would be under market conditions, where only productive assets (wealth and skills) elicit differential rewards. The Marxist ethical imperative requires that this form of exploitation ... should be abolished” (Van Parijs, 1992, 158). Of course, the abolition of citizenship exploitation would need to coincide with the abolition of other forms of labour exploitation as well. Otherwise, freely moving workers would simply increase and brutalize competition in the lower segments of the labour market.

The asymmetry of mobility between workers with different citizenship relates to the international segmentation of labour. Restrictions of citizenship and international mobility have created a “labor reserve for global capital” (Sassen, 1988, 36), readily available for exploitation in developing countries. Consumers in high-wage countries benefit from the exploitation of workers in low-wage countries through unequal exchange (Emmanuel, 1972; Marx, 1960 [1905-1910]). Canadian immigration policy ensures that this ‘Third World’ labour reserve does not enter Canada where it cannot be as easily exploited due to higher wages and stringent labour and workplace regulations. In addition, fears that low-wage immigrants erode Canadian wage rates uphold immigration restrictions. While ‘Third World’ labour is spatially fixed, Canadian citizens are allowed to cross relatively easily into low-wage countries because their high wage expectations do not makes them competition for local workers.<sup>4</sup> To divorce the exchange value of labour from citizenship and national territory, international migration restrictions should be lifted so that workers can move where conditions are most favourable.

At the national scale, Canadian immigration guidelines have historically been designed to serve the domestic economy (Green and Green, 1999). In the first half of the twentieth century and much of the post-WWII period, immigration levels adapted to the business cycle. Immigration was welcome during the post-WWI reconstruction era, and blocked in the recessions of the 1930s and 1940s, and of the 1970s and early 1980s. Since 1967, even greater emphasis has been placed on economic criteria (Hiebert, 1994; Nash, 1994; Abu-Laban, 1998b; Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998). The *1976 Immigration Act* (Part 1, Section 3h) explicitly linked immigration policy with the aim to foster economic development, and, likewise, the new *2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (Section 3c) states that the aim of immigration policy is “to support the development of a strong and prosperous Canadian economy, in which the benefits of immigration are shared across all regions of Canada” (Department of Justice Canada, 2002). After dislodging immigration levels from the business cycle in the 1990's, federal policy now screens immigrants for their education, skills and human capital and emphasises the need for new immigrants to be self-sufficient and to make an economic contribution to Canada.

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<sup>4</sup> In most cases Canadians are welcome because of their potential to consume as tourists or invest as entrepreneurs.



Political discourse on migration to Canada is typically driven by organized opinion, through which economic stakeholders including businesses, corporations and organized labour articulate their interests and needs (Freeman, 1995; Veugelers, 2000).

As a consequence of the focus on economic gain, 52.2 percent of all immigrants to Canada in 2000 entered under the skilled workers category (LIDS, 2001). Newly proposed revisions of the point system put even greater emphasis on education and skills (*Canada Gazette*, 2001). Younger applicants are given preference because of their potential of making a greater economic contribution than older immigrants. The economic objective of Canadian immigration policy is further revealed by self-employed, entrepreneurs, and investor programs which were introduced in 1967, 1978 and 1986, and which allow capital bearing business-class people to bypass the point system if they invest directly in the Canadian economy. In 2000, 5.9 percent of immigrants were business-class immigrants (LIDS, 2001). Even among refugees, preference is given to financially secure and skilled applicants (Hiebert, 1994; Ley, 1999; Abu-Laban, 1998). Immigration under the family reunification category — which generates fewer economic benefits — fell from 43 percent in 1986 to 26.6 percent in 2000 (LIDS, 2001).

Once immigrants are admitted to Canada they do not compete with Canadian workers on a level playing field (Hiebert, 1999). Skilled workers suffer from the systematic devaluation of their foreign credentials and professional experience by employers and professional associations (Basran and Zong, 1998; Bauder, 2003). Family-class immigrants and refugees suffer perhaps the greatest degree of exploitation (Bonacich, 1973; 1993), illustrated in low wages and sub-standard working conditions (Walton-Roberts and Hiebert, 1997; Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998). The Live-in Caregiver Program recruits Filipina and Eastern European women to domestic services that are usually beyond the oversight of regulatory bodies (Pratt in collaboration with the Philippine Women Centre, 1997). Citizenship exploitation is a common and legal practise in Canada. A recent Supreme Court ruling, for example, gives Canadian citizens preference over immigrants in public service employment (MacCharles, 2002). According to Castells (1975, 54) “*immigrant workers do not exist because there are 'arduous and badly paid' jobs to be done, but, rather, arduous and badly paid jobs exist because immigrant workers are present or can be sent for to do them*” (emphasis in original). Immigrant and citizenship regulations, and the institutionalized mechanisms of exclusion that accompany these regulation, create precisely the differences between national insiders and foreign outsiders that legitimate practices of labour exploitation.

From both, liberal and political economy perspectives, international migration restrictions are unjustifiable. In the next section I develop this critique into an argument for open borders.

### **The Case for Open Borders**

The condition of unrestricted international mobility is not an immediate possibility given the current political climate, economic order and perceived threat of mobile terrorism. However, I want to argue that this idea is not unachievable. There are signs that international migration is being targeted for deregulation and that super-national organizations seek a more open circulation of labour, especially when labour mobility serves the needs of corporations and businesses (Sassen, 1996; Freeman, 1995). The

Canadian Council of Chief Executives, for example, calls for open borders between Canada and the US (Berlin, 2003), and even in the right-wing Canadian Alliance Party, a brief debate for open borders occurred in 2000. In the United States, even Alan Greenspan, head of the Federal Reserve, has argued for a relaxation of immigration policies to stimulate economic growth (Hayter, 2000, 158). At the international scale, Bhagwati (1998, 315-317) proposes to establish a World Migration Organization (WMO) as a tool for universalizing immigration standards and for managing immigration flows in the interest of global capital (320-362).

That both conservative and progressive theorists aspire for open borders does not necessarily mean that the Left and the Right are politically converging. Although they may envision a similar outcome, their rationale and intentions for opening borders are quite different. The Right calls for open borders to attack Canadian labour regulations, to increase international competition among workers and to assault the welfare state — conditions which supposedly impede economic prosperity. As the economist Milton Friedman notes: “You cannot simultaneously have free migration and a welfare state” (quoted by Vdare, 2003). Activists and theorists on the Left are surely aware of these attempts to outmanoeuvre the welfare state. Their calls for open borders, however, are not made in an ideological vacuum or in absence of a greater political vision. Rather, the idea of open borders entails an extension of basic labour and welfare rights from the national to the global scale. In other words, free migration will not annihilate the welfare state if it is matched by the international unity of labour.

The international community of nation states has already moved towards universalizing the treatment of migrants. The 1990 International Convention of the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (United Nations, 2002) articulates a set of rights applicable to all migrant workers. Although organized labour in the past often resisted the relaxation of immigration restrictions, it increasingly supports the loosening of immigration controls (Haus, 1995; Avcı and McDonald, 2000; Nissen and Grenier, 2001).<sup>5</sup> The reduction of immigration barriers provides the opportunity for unions to move beyond state-centred politics and demonstrate a commitment to internationalism — a commitment Marx and Engels called for long ago (1969 [1848]) and one that is echoed by recent labour advocates (Waterman, 2001; Waterman and Willis, 2001). In fact, a shift to the global scale may be the labour movement’s chance to outmanoeuvre the Right in its own pursuit of globalization.

At a discursive level, Hyndman (2001) seeks to rescale geopolitics from the state to the individual. Using the recent example of mobility restrictions for war criminals and dictators under threat of persecution by the international war-crime tribunal, she argues for mobility controls on individual criminals, rather than intervention at the state level. Extending Hyndman’s argument to a general migration context, immigration controls could be rescaled from the state level to the individual level, assessing individual need and motivation, rather than citizenship, as the basis of immigration.

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<sup>5</sup> Ironically, the motivation to express solidarity to immigrants probably relates more to the need to recruit in light of dwindling membership than to promoting human equality and social justice.

Despite these tendencies in business, politics, labour unions and academia, many liberal theorists lack the ability to imagine a world without migration restriction and quickly dismiss the possibility of open borders: “A world without borders would either be a world of economic anarchism or it would be a global state. Neither option is attractive” (Cole, 2000, 4). This pessimism is complemented by major shortcomings on the side of international agreements and national attitudes. For example, the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants and Members of their families focuses on post-migration rights (including the right to return), but is silent about the right to enter a country (Cole, 2000; Hayter, 2000, 1-2). The 1952 Convention on Refugees has similar shortcomings (Sassen, 1996). In addition, ‘Western’ countries like Canada have a special responsibility to address the uprooting of people by economic and political pressures created by economic globalization (e.g. Black, 1996, 73). Yet, international policies towards a “right to remain” in a country are not seriously pursued in Canadian politics. Rather than safeguarding universal principles of human equality, international conventions of universal rights are routinely ignored by nation states like Canada, especially in the context of immigration (Stasiulis, 1997, 209-211) and in light of post-September 11 fears of terrorist infiltration.

Nevertheless, few serious politicians and scholars would question that nation states are responsible for the effects of their actions beyond their national borders<sup>6</sup>. Immigration regulations therefore cannot ignore people’s rights and economic situations outside of a given state territory (Jonas, 1996). In light of recent trends and the injustice of immigration controls, Hayter (2001, 150) projects: “Sooner or later, immigration controls will be abandoned as unworkable, too expensive in suffering and money, too incompatible with the ideals of freedom and justice, and impossible to maintain against pressures of globalization”. Along the same lines, Carens (2000, 637) proclaims immigration restrictions are a “deep injustice of the modern world.” He “imagine(s) ... that in a century or two people will look back upon our world with bafflement and shock (and) ask themselves how we could have possibly failed to see the deep injustice of a world so starkly divided between haves and have nots and why we felt so complacent about this division, so unwilling to do what we could to change it” (637).

A question that remains is whether we can imagine a world without immigration controls. Existing systems and academic conjecturing provide guidance in this matter. One potential model exists in Canada and most other countries on provincial and municipal scales (Cole, 2000, 75; Carens, 2000). Within Canada, there are no formal mobility restrictions to prevent people from moving between provinces or municipalities. Despite the lack of entry restrictions, provinces and communities do not suffer any existential political or economic threat from migration. Particularly in Canada the immigrant gateway cities of Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal are seen as positive examples of multiculturalism precisely because they integrate different social and ethnic

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<sup>6</sup> This cross-border accountability is usually stressed by ‘First World’ countries when their interests are affected, and when they need to legitimize political, military and economic interventions. These same countries routinely ignore cross-border accountability if negative consequences of their own actions affect ‘Third World’ countries.

groups. According to this model, nation states should focus on integrating immigrant groups, rather than excluding them at the border.

A more radical model is presented by Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer (1924), who envisions a socialist society in which labour migration is not regulated by nation states. Rather, national communities are geographically mobile within an overarching transnational social and political order. Workers freely migrate and follow jobs until an economic equilibrium of optimal spatial distribution of labour is achieved. Most orthodox economists would agree that complete labour mobility increases economic efficiency (e.g. Hamilton and Whalley, 1984). Regarding the political organization in a world without immigration restrictions, Richard Falk (1993, 39) proposes a form of global citizenship that “expresses the quality of participation in a political community ... with no necessary territorial delimitation”.

On a more utopian note, David Harvey (2000, 257-281) describes his “restless dream” of a post-revolution world in which hierarchical political order and controlled state borders have been demolished. In this dream, all people enjoy mobility between regions and nations (or what Harvey envisions as *regionas* and *nationas*). The only limitation to migration is that an electronic bulletin board manages the in- and out-flow of migrants to balance skill levels and prevent regions from collapsing due to a massive brain-drain. In contrast to current systems of migration regulation, which seek to provide maximum benefit to the receiving nation state, this proposed system would seek to prevent gross imbalances in the spatial distribution of human capital.

I present these models of a borderless world to demonstrate that we are not short of imaginaries that expose the range of possibilities and that can guide our academic and political agendas. Geographers should seize the opportunity to develop and present new models of the international movement of people — and to cultivate fresh attitudes towards global change that can accommodate such models.

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